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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Swiss apprenticeship system is strongly market-based and constitutes the main educa-
tional pathway at the upper–secondary level of each youth cohort. Recent literature in the
ﬁeld of the economics of vocational education and training (VET) has shed much insight
on the underlying economic rationale of ﬁrms to train apprentices. The aim of this the-
sis is to contribute to knowledge of and empirical evidence on the functioning of the Swiss
apprenticeship system by studying the interaction with its other market participants, that
is, the young people who decide to undertake apprenticeship training. After investigating
the long-term dynamics of the Swiss apprenticeship market with a large administrative data
set in Chapter 2, the focus shifts to the analysis of outcomes at the individual level of the
youngsters who transition from compulsory schooling to apprenticeship training, and, later
on, move to the labor market. For this purpose, we use the longitudinal data set TREE
(transition from education to employment) that comprises PISA literacy test scores for the
year 2000 of pupils aged 15 years along with their individual background characteristics and
detailed information on their later educational and work pathways. Chapter 3 analyzes the
role of easy-to-observe attributes of apprenticeship applicants versus hard-to-obtain informa-
tion about their ability in ﬁrms’ hiring decisions. Chapter 4 empirically evaluates the short-
and long-term eﬀectiveness of interim solution programs designed to enhance the chances of
unsuccessful applicants in the apprenticeship market. Chapter 5 focuses on the labor market
outcomes of VET graduates and analyzes the transferability of the human capital acquired
from apprenticeships.
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1.1 Background
Having an upper-secondary education diploma is becoming increasingly important for suc-
cessful and enduring labor market integration in all industrialized countries (OECD, 2012a).
There is ample international evidence on the pecuniary and non-pecuniary beneﬁts of ed-
ucation for both the individual and the society as a whole (Card, 1999; Harmon et al.,
2003; Lange and Topel, 2006; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011; OECD, 2010, 2012b). How-
ever, countries diﬀer markedly with respect to their institutional arrangements regarding skill
formation at the upper-secondary level. Firm-based VET is of central importance to the ed-
ucational system in several countries, such as Germany, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands
and Switzerland (OECD, 2009a,b; Wolter and Ryan, 2011). Mass apprenticeship systems
are characterized by a legislative framework, regulated programs of learning with ﬁxed du-
ration, formal assessment, and recognized certiﬁcation. These institutional features play
an important role toward maintaining the sustainability of these systems (Acemoglu and
Pischke, 2000; Ryan, 2000; Malcomson et al., 2003; Dustmann and Schoenberg, 2012; Steed-
man, 2012). In Switzerland, two-thirds of a cohort undertake a ﬁrm-based apprenticeship
at the upper-secondary level, whereas only approximately 20 percent of a cohort choose
college-bound high school (SKBF-CSRE, 2014). Nevertheless, because of the high degree of
permeability between apprenticeship training and higher education, the tertiary graduation
rate in Switzerland hovers around the OECD average (OECD, 2014). Rates of (lifetime)
returns to Swiss apprenticeships training are found to be relatively high (Weber et al., 2001).
Similar to other countries with predominant apprenticeship systems, youth unemployment
rates are rather low and school-to-work transitions are more smooth in general (OECD, 2000;
Ryan, 2001; ILO, 2014). The apparently successful performance in providing large numbers
of young people with recognized qualiﬁcations demanded by the labor market has recently
reinforced widespread policy interest in apprenticeships in many other countries (OECD,
2000; UK Parliament, 2009; Hoﬀman, 2011; Symonds et al., 2011; Steedman, 2012; President
Obama’s 2014 State of the Union Address, 2014).
The question of why German ﬁrms seem to considerably invest in apprenticeship training—
providing workers with skills that should be transferable to other employers—has led to a
strand of economic literature extending the classical Becker (1962) model with its prediction
that ﬁrms will not pay for general on-the-job training in perfect markets. The newer training
literature suggests that ﬁrms’ training investment is motivated by several kinds of labor mar-
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ket frictions and information asymmetries that lower post-training mobility and compress the
wage structure for higher skill levels, enabling ﬁrms to recoup training costs by accruing rents
after training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999; Leuven, 2005). Cost–beneﬁt surveys for
Switzerland repeatedly show that training ﬁrms incur no net costs on average (e.g., Strupler
and Wolter, 2012). This result is in line with the standard Becker (1962) model for general
on-the-job training in competitive labor markets, where trainees bear the costs of general
training through lower wages. While post-training beneﬁts due to strong employment pro-
tection are the most decisive factor for ﬁrms oﬀering training in Germany, the Swiss case
illustrates that labor market frictions per se are not a necessary condition for the sustainabil-
ity of an apprenticeship training system (Muehlemann et al., 2010). Importantly, it has also
been shown that non-training ﬁrms in Switzerland would face substantial net costs if they
were to take up apprenticeship training (Wolter et al., 2006; Muehlemann et al., 2010).
Whereas ﬁrms base their decision about whether or not to train, or whether to train
or to hire from the external market, on cost–beneﬁt considerations of the respective strate-
gies (Stevens, 1994a; Blatter et al., 2015), policy makers and society hold high expectations
on ﬁrms’ readiness to train. This is because apprenticeship training constitutes the most
important part of the upper-secondary education system in Switzerland. These diﬀerent ex-
pectations on the apprenticeship system ideally—but not automatically—coincide with each
other.
To this end, on the institutional level, the apprenticeship system is collectively governed
by the Confederation, cantons and corresponding professional organizations (SBFI-SERI,
2015b). These three main partners jointly design and regulate approximately 230 occupa-
tional tracks in the so-called VET ordinances, aiming to ensure high quality standards and
constant adaptation of speciﬁc VET programs to the current needs of the labor market. The
ordinances cover the legally relevant aspects applicable to a given occupation: they deﬁne the
occupational proﬁle, training content, criteria to be met by qualiﬁed workers in the occupa-
tion, training duration, and qualiﬁcation procedures. Depending on the occupational track,
apprenticeships consist of ﬁrm-based on-the-job training (3-4 days a week) in combination
with formal education in public vocational schools (1-2 days), which lasts for 3-4 years. These
federally regulated training occupations cover all domains of the economy and a wide range
of intellectual aspiration levels. At the lower end, apprenticeship training is also meant to
attract youngsters who might not be capable of completing a full-time-schooling alternative.
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On the other hand, besides the high regulation of occupational tracks, the apprentice-
ship system is fully market-based. The recent socio–political aim to enhance the overall
upper-secondary graduation rate from 90 to 95 percent by 2015 (EVD/EDI/EDK, 2011)
mainly depends on the capability and willingness of ﬁrms to successfully integrate vast co-
horts of compulsory school leavers into apprenticeship training. Unlike in a system of general
education, youngsters need to have a training contract with a ﬁrm. This requires early vo-
cational career orientation of compulsory school graduates, matching supply and demand for
apprenticeships in diﬀerent vocational tracks, and matching prerequisites of apprenticeship
applicants with the requirements of ﬁrms. In contrast to a general education system, which
necessitates a period of on-the-job training after one takes up employment at a ﬁrm, ap-
prenticeship training entails early specialization within an occupation. There is, however, no
guarantee of employment as a skilled worker in the training ﬁrm after graduation. As the
majority of Swiss ﬁrms provide training without bearing training costs—presumably without
coupling the training decision with future skill needs—there is no incentive for the ﬁrm to
retain a former apprentice to recoup investments.
This thesis aims to contribute to the empirical knowledge on the functioning of the Swiss
apprenticeship system with respect to its longitudinal dynamics, its interaction with the
behaviors and decisions of heterogeneous young people in the apprenticeship market, and
its success at providing knowledge and skills that can be eﬀectively put to use in the labor
market after completing training. These aspects are discussed as seperate chapters in this
thesis, as outlined below.
1.2 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 2 is devoted to an analysis of the long-term dynamics of training participation of
Swiss ﬁrms. Since the mid-1990s, the apprenticeship systems in Germany and Switzerland
have been mainly discussed in politics and the media under the light of too low a training
participation rate of companies, calling for more full-time schooling alternatives or subsidies
for training ﬁrms. Given that the share of training ﬁrms has declined in past decades (most
markedly, from approximately 25% in 1985 to nearly 15% in the mid-1990s), a negative
trend in ﬁrms’ willingness to train has been suspected to fundamentally threaten the Swiss
apprenticeship system. We use full population longitudinal data of the ﬁrm census from 1985
1.2. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 15
to 2008 to assess to what extent and how the decline in the share of training ﬁrms can be
explained by a range of independent variables. Besides several ﬁrm characteristics that have
been shown to be related with training costs (Schweri et al., 2003; Muehlemann et al., 2007),
we include supply-side factors such as demographic development of the relevant age cohorts,
which have been traditionally ignored in the empirical discussion. Pooled probit models,
ﬁxed-eﬀects models and decomposition techniques for dichotomous outcomes (Fairlie, 2003)
show that the variation in the share of training ﬁrms can be explained to a large extent.
Overall, we do not ﬁnd a ceteris paribus decline over time in ﬁrms’ willingness to train
apprentices. The main reasons for the observed aggregate decrease are increasing numbers
of (new) very small ﬁrms, shifts in industry composition, a reduction in the number of young
people, and an increasing share of young people opting for high school. Further, we ﬁnd a
minor, but nevertheless signiﬁcant, impact of the business cycle on ﬁrms’ training activity.
While most of these factors do not point to increasing structural deﬁcits in the functioning
of the apprenticeship system, the (small) eﬀect of industry shifts towards modern services
points to the importance of maintaining regulated occupational tracks so that they are up-to
date and ﬂexible enough to adapt to new developments in the economy.
However, despite responses to supply-side variation in the apprenticeship market, the
so-called “Lehrstellenbarometer” (apprenticeship barometer; OPET, 2001), a yearly cross-
sectional survey of youngsters and ﬁrms as of 1997, consistently shows a non-negligible share
of compulsory school leavers who do not ﬁnd an apprenticeship position. Simultaneously,
ﬁrms cite the unsuitability of candidates as the main reason for thousands of unﬁlled vacan-
cies. While there are no adequate data to analyze the source of potential mismatch problems
in the apprenticeship market, the next chapter analyzes the question on the manner in which
apprenticeship applicants are sorted into apprenticeships.
Chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of the selection decision of ﬁrms in the hiring process
of apprentices. In the public discussion, stereotyping is claimed to play too dominant a role
in ﬁrms’ hiring decisions, such that applicants with unfavorable attributes (e.g., low parental
socioeconomic status or migration background) are at a disadvantage to secure (good) ap-
prenticeships, presumably irrespective of their true ability. Using the sample of compulsory
school leavers from the TREE data, who were in the apprenticeship market the year after
the PISA-test 2000, we analyze whether and to what extent ﬁrms successfully obtain and
consider information about an applicant’s diﬃcult-to-observe abilities in the hiring process
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for apprenticeship posts. The PISA reading literacy competence test scores provide us with
an ability proxy that is only observable by the researcher, not by recruiters of training ﬁrms.
On the one hand, the literature predicts that when information about the abilities of job seek-
ers is diﬃcult to obtain, statistical discrimination by employers may be an eﬃcient strategy
in the hiring and wage-setting process (Phelps, 1972; Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973; Aigner and
Cain, 1977). On the other hand, this strategy might be costly. Due to speciﬁc institutional
regulations, such as standardized content, ﬁxed duration, and little scope to adjust prear-
ranged wage proﬁles over the apprenticeship period, we hypothesize that ﬁrms’ expectation
error might be subject to an asymmetric risk: hiring someone whose ability level considerably
lies below the expected level can lead to severe costs, while it is not apparent that ﬁrms would
proﬁt much in the reverse case.
Following the procedure in Farber and Gibbons (1996), we use the test score information
cleaned from the part that is explainable by observables, representing the ability component
that is hard-to-observe for outsiders. We then go a step further and explicitly diﬀerentiate
between positive and negative deviations from the predicted ability level. The empirical
results are as follows. First, we ﬁnd that a deviance in the PISA test scores (from what
one would predict based on easy-to-obtain observable characteristics) signiﬁcantly inﬂuences
the probability of succeeding in the transition to a ﬁrm-based apprenticeship but in a non-
symmetric way. In line with our hypothesis, only those with a test result below their pre-
dicted result (the so-called “underachievers”) have signiﬁcantly lower chances of securing an
apprenticeship. Second, as for the resulting allocation of successful applicants into diﬀerent
intellectually demanding vocational tracks, ordered probit estimations show rather symmet-
ric eﬀects; hard-to-get ability information is considered in a way that signiﬁcantly increases
allocative eﬃciency at both ends of the distribution. Taken together, the results implicate
considerable pre-market employer learning. Further, results regarding longer-term outcomes
suggest that additional revelation of ability occurs during the subsequent training period.
Apprentices who are PISA overachievers are less likely to face problems such as dropping
out, repeating a year of apprenticeship, changing the vocational track, or fail in the ﬁnal
exam. In contrast, PISA underachievers who, despite their lower-than-expected ability, suc-
cessfully secure an apprenticeship are disproportionally more likely to be exposed to these
problematic events. This provides an additional explanation for why ﬁrms seem to place
more emphasis on detecting underachievers rather than overachievers in the course of the
1.2. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 17
hiring process.
Chapter 4 evaluates the short- and long-term consequences of following so-called interim
solution programs. During the last few decades, a variety of such non-certifying programs
have been established to enhance the chances of unsuccessful applicants in the apprentice-
ship market. These programs bridge the one-year gap between compulsory schooling and
upper-secondary education with additional schooling or practical training. The role and ef-
fectiveness of interim solution programs is controversial, and, as far as we know, has not
yet been empirically investigated. This chapter analyzes how gap years spent in interim
solution programs aﬀect, ﬁrst, the chances of entering certifying education in the subsequent
year; second, the intellectual aspiration level of the certifying education taken up, and third,
the chances of successfully completing upper-secondary education by age 21. Following an
interim solution program is compared to both having a gap year after compulsory schooling
without educational activity and securing direct entry into certifying education. Propensity
score matching techniques with multiple treatments (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Lechner,
2001) and the unusually rich information in the TREE data are used to build adequate con-
trol groups.
The results show substantial program eﬀects compared to having a no educational activity
during the gap year. Participating in interim solution programs enhances subsequent chances
to enter upper-secondary education by approximately 26 percentage points, decreases the
probability to only enter certifying education at a low intellectual aspiration level (as com-
pared to middle/high-level tracks) by approximately 25 percentage points, and increases the
graduation probability at age 21 by approximately 30 percentage points. The estimated
program eﬀects for both participants and non-participants are similar. In turn, there is no
evidence of positive program eﬀects when program participants are compared to those who
directly enter upper-secondary education. The intellectual aspiration level of the subsequent
certifying track is not aﬀected on average, and the probability of having no diploma or en-
rolment by age 21 is slightly lower (by 5 percentage points). However, there is evidence of
some positive program eﬀects for speciﬁc sub-groups: participants from low-level compulsory
school tracks and those with low PISA literacy test scores are more likely to enter more de-
manding certifying tracks than otherwise identical peers with direct entry. Overall, estimated
program eﬀects are only small in either direction when comparing interim solutions to direct
entries.
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As a whole, the most important implication from a policy point of view are severe short-
and long-term consequences of not following any kind of (transitory) educational activity
directly after compulsory schooling. Such gap years are very strong predictors for a failed
upper-secondary education career as a whole. This might go along with social costs that
might best be countered at an early stage.
According to our results, the group at risk can broadly be characterized as follows. They show
comparable initial school performance to the direct entry group (which is heterogeneous) and
rather better performance than the interim solution group. However, their parental back-
ground is the least favorable on average, with respect to family structure, socioeconomic
index, and number of books at home. Additionally, they exhibit a higher tendency towards
school absenteeism during compulsory school. In bivariate (but not multivariate) compar-
isons, parental support in scholastic matters and (self-assessed) school eﬀort are less favorable,
too. Importantly, for virtually all individuals in gap years or interim solutions, we ﬁnd com-
parable individuals in the direct entry group (the reverse does not hold, however), implying
that the mix of their characteristics should not impede, per se, integration into certifying
education or training.
Thus, preventing pupils from completely dropping out of the educational system by the end
of compulsory school seems very important. Recent policy eﬀorts to improve early detection
and individual guidance (case management) during the end of compulsory schooling already
go in this direction.
Chapter 5 analyzes the speciﬁcity and transferability of human capital acquired in ap-
prenticeship training by analyzing inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility and their (causal)
eﬀects on post-training wages one year after graduation. While the economic rationale for a
comprehensive work-based apprenticeship system is to provide trainees with a set of clearly
deﬁned occupational skills, there is a lack of empirical evidence on how successful the Swiss
apprenticeship system is in producing these sorts of skills. As shown in Stevens (1994b), one
potential challenge of apprenticeship training is that, in the presence of monopsony power of
ﬁrms, there is an inherent incentive for ﬁrms to distort the regulated training content towards
ﬁrm-speciﬁc components, in an eﬀort to reduce across-ﬁrm mobility of workers and extract a
rent after training. The existing empirical literature on mobility after apprenticeships refers
mainly to Germany and might not be generalizable to other countries. A recent German
study found that pure ﬁrm changes and occupation-and-job changes causally result in aver-
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age wage losses (Fitzenberger et al., 2015). By analyzing the outcomes in Switzerland, we
can shed light on the outcomes of mobility from comprehensive apprenticeships schemes (like
those in Germany) under more lightly regulated labor market conditions, similar to those
that prevail, for example, in English-speaking countries.
The data–base for the analysis is composed of individuals surveyed in TREE who completed
their apprenticeship training by 2005 and are observed in the labor market in the subsequent
wave. To estimate the eﬀects of ﬁrm- and occupation-speciﬁc components of human capital,
we build three groups that identify those changing ﬁrms within occupations (ﬁrm movers)
and those changing ﬁrms across occupations (occupation changers), as opposed to staying
in the training ﬁrm and occupation (stayers). As for the occupational boundaries, we use a
rather broad deﬁnition of the occupational ﬁeld (the two-digit occupational level within the
Swiss occupational nomenclature of jobs). Firm mobility within one year after completing
an apprenticeship is shown to be high (49 percent of all apprenticeship graduates, including
occupation changers), whereas mobility out of the learned occupational ﬁeld is limited (7
percent of all graduates).
In ordinary least squares (OLS) wage regressions, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in wages of
ﬁrm stayers and ﬁrm movers within their learned occupational ﬁeld, even when we control for
ability and match quality proxies. Occupation changers, however, earn almost 5 percent less.
We then apply a treatment regression approach that considers the eﬀect of the endogenously
chosen multinomial-valued mobility decision on wages (Deb and Trivedi, 2006). The results
still implicate no wage eﬀect for ﬁrm movers who stay within the learned occupational ﬁeld,
but there is a negative wage diﬀerential of approximately 9 percent for occupation changers.
Additional results show that wage cuts upon changing the occupation depend on the distance
between occupations.
Overall, the results show high transferability of occupational skills across ﬁrms and do not
provide evidence that regulated training contents are distorted by ﬁrms towards components
that are too speciﬁc. This ﬁnding is in line with other empirical evidence for Switzerland (e.g.,
Muehlemann et al., 2010) implying that—in the lightly regulated Swiss labor market—ﬁrms
cannot rely their training decisions and behaviors on the presence of labor market frictions.
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Chapter 2
The training participation of ﬁrms
between 1985 and 2008
2.1 Introduction
1Fluctuations in the apprenticeship market cause regular and intense discussions in Swiss
politics and the media. It has been feared, for example, that the market-based apprenticeship
system is increasingly failing to provide many young people with apprenticeship training.
The quantitative importance of problems in the apprenticeship market is controversial.
The most important question from a policy view-point is whether the system is able to
integrate as many young people aged between 15 and 19 as possible in post-compulsory
education or training. Unfortunately, the precise number of young people who look for
an apprenticeship position but cannot ﬁnd one is unknown. The “Lehrstellenbarometer”
(apprenticeship barometer) provides partial answers: it is an annual cross-sectional survey
conducted since 1997 that gives an indication of how many young people are still looking for
an apprenticeship position in April (1st survey) and in August (2nd survey) of the survey
year. Of the young people looking for an apprenticeship position at the beginning of the
year, around 15% each year had only received a place in a one-year preparatory course or the
like, and around 5% each year had found no solution at all by August. Even though these
shares show some variations between 1997 and 2014, the broad picture has remained rather
constant (see for example OPET, 2001, and all the other yearly publications).
1 This chapter is partly based on—and an extension of—the paper Schweri, Juerg and Barbara Mueller
(2007): Why has the share of training ﬁrms declined in Switzerland, ZAF - Journal for Labour Market
Research, 40(2/3), 149-167.
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Although these ﬁgures seem quite low in comparison with other countries (e.g., for Ger-
many, see Buchholz et al., 2012), they still indicate that a segment of compulsory school
graduates cannot be integrated (directly) into the apprenticeship system. Public discussions
are, therefore, intense and several political initiatives have been launched at the federal and
cantonal level, many of them demanding state intervention in the apprenticeship market,
such as ﬁrm subsidies, tax relief, or the expansion of full-time schooling. Similar discussions
have been underway in Germany and Austria, too.
One important reason put forward in favor of policy interventions is that ﬁrms do not
train enough apprentices, and that, in particular, their willingness to train has declined over
time. This development has often been diagnosed from a simple descriptive indicator, namely
the share of training ﬁrms in the economy, which has decreased from over 24% in 1985 to
around 18% in more recent years. We focus on this argument and show that the causes of the
decline in this indicator have to be considered before far-reaching conclusions can be drawn.
To this end, we analyze ﬁrms’ decisions to train apprentices and try to explain the vari-
ation over time in the share of training ﬁrms using diﬀerent groups of explanatory variables.
As the share of training ﬁrms results from both supply-side and demand-side forces in the
apprenticeship market, a ceteris paribus decreasing willingness of ﬁrms to train—supposedly
due to increased costs for a speciﬁc ﬁrm in providing a speciﬁc sort of training—is not the
only potential explanation for decreased shares of training ﬁrms in the economy.
Supply-side factors are important variables that have been largely ignored in political
discussions as well as empirical research. In Switzerland, most young people start an ap-
prenticeship directly after compulsory schooling. Therefore, the number of young people
looking for apprenticeship places should be strongly inﬂuenced by demographic development
of the relevant youth cohorts. This number should also be determined by the educational
preferences of young people, for example, the observed shift towards more tertiary education.
Changes in the supply of potential apprentices will aﬀect the outcome in the apprenticeship
market.
On the other hand, changes in the economic composition oﬀer a potential mechanism for
a decline in the aggregate demand for apprentices. The cost structure of training provision,
and thus a ﬁrm’s demand for apprentices, has been shown to be considerably related to ﬁrm
characteristics, such as ﬁrm size, industry, and location (Schweri et al., 2003; Muehlemann
et al., 2007). Even without changes in the cost structure of training provision for a speciﬁc
2.1. INTRODUCTION 23
ﬁrm-type, a change in the composition of ﬁrm characteristics in the economy could result in
a change in overall training provision over time. For example, Sheldon (2005) pointed out
that the ongoing shift towards the service sector might weaken the apprenticeship system
because such industries gain importance where apprenticeship training is observed to be less
widespread.
We use the full population data of the Swiss ﬁrm census from 1985 to 2008 to analyze
whether, to what extent, and how the change in the aggregate training activity of Swiss ﬁrms
can be explained. These data allow us to shift the analysis to the individual ﬁrm level, and
at the same time, they provide us a comprehensive picture of economic composition over two
decades. We exploit the information on whether a ﬁrm is training at a speciﬁc point in time,
the set of ﬁrm characteristics, and matched information on the local supply-side situation and
industry-speciﬁc GDP growth. By applying pooled probit estimations, ﬁxed-eﬀects methods,
and the decomposition technique for dichotomous outcomes proposed by Fairlie (2003), we
aim to answer whether and to what extent the change in the share of training ﬁrms can
be attributed to shifts in average ﬁrm characteristics, to changes in the supply of potential
apprentices, and further, to ﬂuctuations in the business cycle. By doing so, we also test the
hypothesis that there is an “unexplainable” decline in ﬁrms’ propensity to train apprentices.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the Swiss
apprenticeship system and Section 2.3 the relevant literature. The estimation strategy is
presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 describes the data source and provides descriptive
information. Section 2.6 contains the empirical results, and Section 2.7 concludes with a
discussion of the ﬁndings.
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2.2 The Swiss apprenticeship system: institutional back-
ground
The apprenticeship system is the route chosen by most young Swiss people at upper secondary
level. Around 60% of young people who complete their compulsory schooling choose to
embark on what is called the dual training system, that is, a training program combining
vocational education at school with training in and work for a company. Almost half of
the remaining 40% of young people who complete compulsory education go on to attend
high school (Gymnasium) to prepare them for university and a more academic career. The
remainder (just over 20%) opt either for other entirely school-based forms of education or (less
than 10% of a cohort of 16-year-olds) pursue no form of post-compulsory education (SKBF-
CSRE, 2011). Vocational training in a dual-training program usually lasts 3-4 years. A few
of the approximately 230 occupations permitted an apprenticeship period of just two years
in the past (mostly in the retail sector). Firms report fairly low dropout rates of around
5% (Schweri et al., 2003). Apprentices graduate with a diploma recognized throughout
Switzerland, attesting that the apprentice has a vocational qualiﬁcation. After or during
an apprenticeship, a qualiﬁcation called “Berufsmatura” (professional baccalaureate) may
be acquired, which additionally entitles the apprentice to begin third-level education at a
university of applied sciences, leading to a Bachelor’s degree. The quality of the training
provided in Switzerland, which combines school lessons (for 1-2 days a week) with on-the-job
training in a ﬁrm under the supervision of certiﬁed staﬀ, is recognized internationally as
meeting top standards (see, for example, Bierhoﬀ and Prais, 1997). The employment period
ends automatically on completion of training. Any extension of the employment period
(making the apprentice a fully-ﬂedged employee) must be negotiated through a separate
contract. Mobility is fairly high among young people who complete their apprenticeships,
with only 36% still working at their original training site one year on (Schweri et al., 2003).
The apprenticeship system is market-based: young people have no guarantee of receiving
an apprenticeship position nor are ﬁrms obliged to train apprentices. The apprenticeship
market can, therefore, be seen as a sub-market of the labor market. Although employers’ or-
ganisations often issue salary recommendations for apprentices, their salaries are determined
by the employing company and are not regulated by law or governed on the basis of collective
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agreements between trade union federations and employers’ federations.2 It is crucial for the
justiﬁcation of our estimation strategy that the apprenticeship market works as a market
and is not dominated by the state’s or associations’ regulations (e.g., by means of collusion).3
Therefore, we present data on the wage variance on the apprenticeship market. We use a
cross-sectional data set from Schweri et al. (2003) where 2352 Swiss ﬁrms were asked about
the cost and beneﬁt of their apprenticeship training programs.
Figure 2.1: Boxplot of monthly wages (average across apprenticeship years, CHF) in selected
occupations; duration of apprenticeship periods in brackets. Data Source: Schweri et al.
(2003)
Figure 2.1 shows the wage variance between the most important occupations in terms of
numbers of apprentices. Although wages do not vary within one ﬁrm for apprentices in the
same occupation, ﬁgure 2.1 exhibits a high degree of wage variance within as well as between
occupations, as can be expected in a free market where wages adapt to diﬀering conditions
and scarcities between occupations, industries, regions, and individual ﬁrms.
2 In a recent comparison of apprenticeship wages in Germany, Britain, and Switzerland based on evidence
from both national statistics and on-site interviews with managers in the metalworking industry, Ryan
et al. (2012) suggest that there exists some informal pay-coordination within employers organizations in
Switzerland, which, however, rather depend on social norms.
3 Apart from the deﬁnition of occupations, certiﬁcates and the length of apprenticeships, of course (con-
cerning this kind of basic regulation necessary to establish a mass apprenticeship system, see Acemoglu
and Pischke, 2000 and Malcomson et al., 2003).
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2.3 Related literature on the training decision of ﬁrms
The economic literature lists two main reasons for the provision of training by ﬁrms (Lind-
ley, 1975): ﬁrms have a “production-oriented” motive and proﬁt by substituting unskilled or
skilled workers with (cheaper) apprentices, or ﬁrms train out of an “investment-oriented” mo-
tive to meet their future needs for skilled workers, recouping their investments after training.
As apprenticeship training in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and other European countries
is regarded to provide general skills of potential use to many ﬁrms, the investment-oriented
motive lies outside the classical prediction of Becker (1962) that ﬁrms never pay for gen-
eral training in perfect markets. The reason is that ﬁrms cannot extract a rent from skilled
workers when labor markets are competitive, so they cannot recoup their investments after
training. Empirical evidence showing substantial ﬁrm investments in German apprenticeship
training (see Harhoﬀ and Kane, 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999) has led to a new strand of
economic literature on ﬁrms’ motivation to train apprentices. To explain ﬁrms’ investments,
the new training literature focuses on the role of market imperfections that reduce workers’
mobility and create a wedge between productivity and wages at higher skill levels (Stevens,
1994b; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999; Leuven, 2005). The training provided in frictional
labor markets will, however, remain below the social optimum that is achieved in competitive
labor markets where individuals pay for their training. A number of studies have attempted
testing the premises of this new training literature (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Clark, 2001,
2002; Beckmann, 2002; Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004; Dustmann and Schoenberg, 2009) by
comparing wages between those workers who stayed in their training ﬁrm after completing
the training (stayers) and those who left (movers). Depending on the exact assumptions
about labor market frictions, diﬀerent hypotheses about movers’ and stayers’ wages emerge.
The mover–stayer literature is, however, far from conclusive (see Clark, 2002).
Recent cost–beneﬁt surveys for Switzerland show that Swiss training ﬁrms bear no train-
ing costs on average: about two-thirds of ﬁrms provide training at a negative net cost by
covering all costs related to training with the apprentices’ productive work during the ap-
prenticeship period (Schweri et al., 2003; Muehlemann et al., 2007; Strupler and Wolter,
2012). This result is in line with Becker’s classical prediction that apprentices will pay for
general training through a low training wage. The models of the new training literature,
according to which ﬁrms pay for general training due to compressed wage structures, seem
less important to describe actual ﬁrm behavior in Switzerland. But even in Switzerland, the
2.3. RELATED LITERATURE ON THE TRAINING DECISION OF FIRMS 27
result of net gains from training would not hold for non-training ﬁrms if they were to take
up apprenticeship training (Wolter et al., 2006; Muehlemann et al., 2010). Importantly, the
decision to train has been shown to signiﬁcantly depend on a ﬁrms’ expected net cost or net
gain from training (Muehlemann et al., 2007). Net costs and net gains are observed to vary
between diﬀerent ﬁrm characteristics, such as ﬁrm size and industry, and between training
occupations and regions, but also within the same occupation and industry.
Although the institutional features of the Swiss apprenticeship system are very similar to
those in Germany, the functioning of the systems seems to be less comparable. In Germany,
the productive contribution of apprentices amounts to only half of the gross cost of training,
leading to considerable net costs on average (Beicht et al., 2004). A recent comparison
of Swiss and German data shows that the diﬀerence in the cost–beneﬁt structure can be
explained by diﬀerences in relative wages of apprentices and skilled workers and the higher
contribution to the production process in Switzerland (Dionisius et al., 2009). This diﬀerences
are consistent with the strong diﬀerences in the regulation of the labor market in both
countries (Muehlemann et al., 2010). The Swiss labor market is much less regulated than
the German one, forcing ﬁrms to make productive use of the apprentices to cover costs. By
contrast, many large German ﬁrms can aﬀord to train apprentices without integrating them
in the production process, since their mobility after the apprenticeship period is reduced by
labor market regulations; there are more than 50% of German apprentices (as opposed to
36% in Switzerland) still employed by their original training ﬁrm one year on. This is not to
say that Swiss labor markets are entirely frictionless. Actually, one-third of Swiss apprentices
create net costs for their training ﬁrms that have to be recouped somehow. Recent evidence
shows, for example, that Swiss ﬁrms oﬀer more training in less dense regional labor markets,
where the poaching thread of other ﬁrms is lower and mobility costs higher (Muehlemann and
Wolter, 2011), and in the presence of high external hiring costs (Blatter et al., 2012). There
has been found evidence for the presence of moderate, but however signiﬁcant, monopsony
power over skilled as opposed to unskilled workers in the Swiss labor market (Muehlemann
et al., 2013). However, monopsony power is shown to be even larger over trainees than
over skilled workers, providing additional source of evidence why the training activity of the
majority of Swiss ﬁrms is well described by a production-oriented training strategy.
Since the cost–beneﬁt data are more recent, there is no empirical evidence available
on whether costs to provide training have changed over the period of our interest. Yet,
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there are no studies, as far as we know, that analyze the longitudinal dynamic of the Swiss
apprenticeship training system at the ﬁrm level.4 Developments over time have, however,
been analyzed for Austria by Stoeger and Winter-Ebmer (2001) for the period 1976 to 1998.
They ﬁnd a strong negative time trend in training activity that is only marginally explained
by ﬁrm characteristics. The largest part of the decline remains unexplainable. They did not
include supply-side factors, however, of which we expect a separate eﬀect as explained in the
Introduction.
Supply-side information has been included by Muehlemann and Wolter (2007) in a cross-
sectional analysis of ﬁrms’ training activity based on Swiss cost–beneﬁt data. They ﬁnd
sizeable eﬀects for both the number of young people and the share of high school enrolment
on training provision. While higher numbers of applicants increase the probability for a suc-
cessful match between potential training ﬁrms and candidates, a higher share of high school
enrolment presumably attracts the most able school leavers, lowering ﬁrms’ expectation on
the average ability level of the remaining pool of potential applicants. Demography has also
been shown to provide a relevant explanation for developments in the number of apprentices
over time at the aggregate cantonal level between 1988 and 2004 (Muehlemann et al., 2009),
with much higher eﬀects than those found for the business cycle. Existing studies regarding
the eﬀect of business cycles on apprenticeship training mostly show a procyclical relation-
ship (for Switzerland see Schweri and Mueller, 2008; Muehlemann et al., 2009; for Germany
see Dietrich and Gerner, 2007; Troltsch and Walden, 2010). In economic downturns, when
business is low and orders are insuﬃcient, employers seem to be reluctant to hire additional
workers, such as new apprentices. This stands in contrast to the often found countercyclical
eﬀects between business-cycle and training incidence of incumbent employees (see Brunello,
2009, for a review on the international literature on the relationship between the business
cycle and training and between the business cycle and apprenticeship).
4 With the exception of analyses with older versions of this data for the Federal Statistical Oﬃce, including
data up to 2001,2005, and 2008, respectively (Mueller and Schweri, 2006; Schweri and Mueller, 2007, 2008;
Mueller and Schweri, 2012a).
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2.4 Estimation Strategy
As discussed in the previous sections, the Swiss apprenticeship market strongly relies on
market forces. As a whole, the functioning of the system is rather consistent with the result
in highly competitive markets, where it is assumed that apprentices’ wages are adjusted such
that the cost of training is allocated to the apprentice. The number of apprenticeship places in
the economy is thus expected to be determined by supply and demand in the apprenticeship
market. The share of training ﬁrms is a result of the market outcome. To test whether
ﬁrms’ propensity to train has declined ceteris paribus, we want to estimate ﬁrms’ demand
for apprentices. With the ﬁrm-level data we describe in section 2.5, we would therefore like
to estimate a ﬁrm demand function:
Adit = γt + γwwit +X
d
itγd + μit (2.1)
Adit denotes the number of apprentices demanded by ﬁrm i in period t, which depends on
wage w and demand-side factors X, e. g. ﬁrm characteristics. For now, we assume the eﬀect
of the independent variables to be constant over time, which is why the respective coeﬃcients
do not have a subscript t. In order to identify this classical ﬁrm demand function, one has
to deal with the problem of the simultaneous determination of the observable combinations
of Adit, wit in equilibrium. The supply side is represented by
Asit = δt + δwwit +X
s
itδs + υit (2.2)
Since Adit=A
s
it in equilibrium, wit is endogenous in equation (2.1). The classical solution
is to use supply shifters Xsit as instruments for wit in the demand equation (2.1). Our data
set (see section 2.5) provides us with supply shifters, but not with wage data. We therefore
cannot estimate the structural equation (2.1) and instead estimate the reduced form equation
where training propensity Ait is a function of all the independent variables in the model.
Ait = βt +X
s
itβs +X
d
itβd + it (2.3)
One of our main interest lies in the intercepts and the year dummies, respectively. The
allegation discussed in the media (see the introduction) is that the ﬁrms’ willingness to train
apprentices has been steadily declining over time. Assuming that no relevant time-variant
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variables have been omitted from the X matrices, this corresponds to the hypothesis that βt
is declining for higher t in a ceteris paribus consideration.
Supply shifters will be the share of 16-year-olds in a region and the share of high school
pupils in a region. Both variables vary between regions as well as over time and have an
inﬂuence on the number of young people looking for apprenticeship places. Our hypothesis
is that an increase in the number of young people or a decrease in the share of high school
pupils will lead to more training places: since most new apprentices are around 16 years old,
an increase in their number leads to a shift in the supply curve. In equilibrium, wages will
fall and more training contracts will be concluded.
We are especially interested to see whether the inclusion of supply-side factors signiﬁcantly
reduces the unexplained diﬀerences between time periods and thus changes our interpretation
concerning the above-mentioned hypothesis on the diﬀerences between the βt. The hypotheses
on the eﬀect of the demand-side independent variables, i.e. on the βd, are discussed in the
next section where we present the data set.
Equation (2.3) can in principle be estimated by pooled OLS. Another problem, however,
is that the decision of a ﬁrm to train one apprentice instead of zero (i.e., to become a training
ﬁrm) might be diﬀerent from the decision to train six instead of ﬁve apprentices. One reason
for this could be ﬁxed entry costs when initiating training for the ﬁrst time. The literature
therefore typically uses two-step models where the ﬁrst step is to analyze the binary training
decision:
Iit =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if Ait > 00 if Ait = 0 (2.4)
Neubaeumer and Bellmann (1999) perform a probit estimation of Iit followed by an OLS
estimation of Ait using only the training ﬁrms. Franz et al. (2000) as well as Stoeger and
Winter-Ebmer (2001) use the probit as the ﬁrst step of a Heckman two-step estimation. In
the second step, the number of apprentices in training ﬁrms is analyzed, taking into account
the self-selection of training ﬁrms in the ﬁrst step. For the hurdle or count data modelling
approach see Muehlemann et al. (2007) and Muehlemann and Wolter (2011).
In this chapter, we concentrate on Iit as a binary training decision variable. As we show
in the next section, most of the variation over time stems from ﬁrms’ changing training
propensities and not from changes in the number of apprentices trained by training ﬁrms.
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The number of apprentices trained, given that a ﬁrm trains, has hardly changed.5
After discussing the estimation results, we proceed with the assessment of the relative
importance of the diﬀerent variables for explaining the observed decrease in the share of
training ﬁrms from 1985 to 2008. To this end, we use the decomposition idea introduced
by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) and apply it to an analysis of diﬀerences across time.6
The change in average training activity I¯08 − I¯85 is:7
I¯08 − I¯85 = βˆ08X¯08 − βˆ85X¯85 (2.5)
After extending the right-hand side with βˆ85X¯08 − βˆ85X¯08, equation (2.5) can be written
as
I¯08 − I¯85 = (X¯08 − X¯85)βˆ85 + (βˆ08 − βˆ85)X¯08 (2.6)
The change I¯08 − I¯85 can thus be decomposed into two parts: a part that is explained
by changes over time in the distribution of independent variables (the ﬁrst part of equation
(2.6), also called the “endowment eﬀect”), and another part that cannot be explained and
is attributed to a change in the coeﬃcients (the second part of equation (2.6), the so-called
“unexplained part”). The unexplained part should only be interpreted with caution, as it
not only captures behavioral diﬀerences but also reﬂects the portion of the gap that is due
to diﬀerences in unobserved endowments. As in most other studies using this technique, we
only interpret that part of the gap that can be explained by measurable characteristics X.
The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition can also be applied to non-linear models with dichoto-
mous dependent variables (Fairlie, 2003).8 As we want to analyze the source of diﬀerences in
the 0/1 training decision over time, this technique is more appropriate. The decomposition
5 Estimation results for the share of apprentices among all employees in a ﬁrm have been published in
Mueller and Schweri (2006); Schweri and Mueller (2008); Mueller and Schweri (2012a). The results do not
alter our main conclusions.
6 The typical application is to analyze the source of diﬀerences between two groups, e.g., wage diﬀerentials
between males and females or between natives and migrants.
7 In fact, the decomposition can be used for any combination of the points in time under scrutiny. We use
the two extreme points in time (1985 and 2008) in the formulas to simplify the discussion.
8 An early approach to decompose diﬀerences in proportions is also provided by Gomulka and Stern (1990),
who additionally also apply it to an “over time” perspective.
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can then be written as
I¯08 − I¯85 =
[
N08∑
i=1
F (X08βˆ85)
N08
−
N85∑
i=1
F (X85βˆ85)
N85
]
+
[
N08∑
i=1
F (X08βˆ08)
N08
−
N08∑
i=1
F (X08βˆ85)
N08
]
(2.7)
The basic idea is the same as above. However, equations (2.5) and (2.6) are not valid for
non-linear models since I¯ = F (X¯βˆ) does not necessarily hold as in linear models. Equation
(2.7), therefore, averages predicted training probabilities F (.), where F (.) is the cumulative
distribution function from the standard normal distribution in the case of probit estimations.
In order to evaluate the total contribution of the independent variables (endowments) to the
gap in the share of training ﬁrms across time (the ﬁrst part of equation (2.7)), we only need
to estimate two sets of predicted probabilities by holding the βˆ vector constant and then
take the diﬀerence between the average values. However, one must decide which βˆ vector to
use in order to weight the ﬁrst term of the decomposition. An equally valid decomposition
can be done by either weighting the changes in X by, for example, the coeﬃcients of βˆ85 (as
in equations (2.5) to (2.7)) or by the coeﬃcients of βˆ08. Therefore, it has become a popular
alternative to weight the term by coeﬃcients derived from a pooled estimation. The results
presented in section 2.6 will stem from the coeﬃcients estimated based on both single years
and by pooling all waves of our data.9
The Fairlie decomposition technique also allows us to further decompose the explained
part in order to identify the contribution of each independent variable to the total gap. The
empirical importance of supply-side factors can thus be compared with that of the demand-
side factors. The linear decomposition for a single variable can be easily seen in the ﬁrst
part of equation (2.6): the changes in the means of the independent variables are multiplied
by the respective coeﬃcients. The total explained diﬀerence thus results from summing
up the changes caused by shifts in the distribution of the individual independent variables.
In the case of binary outcomes, a detailed decomposition is less straightforward, because
the independent contribution of one variable depends on the value of the other variables
through the respective non-linear function. Furthermore, the equation has to be adapted for
N85 = N08.
9 In the same vein as Fairlie (2003), we include year dummies in the probit estimation of the pooled version
but do not use them to calculate the detailed decomposition described later.
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Assuming an identical number of observations over time, the resulting change in the
average predicted probabilities due to the independent contribution of X1 to the gap can be
written as
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
F (X081i βˆ
85
1 +X
85
2i βˆ
85
2 )− F (X851i βˆ851 +X852i βˆ852 )
]
(2.8)
The contribution of a single variable to the explained gap is thus evaluated by replacing
the distribution of this variable with the distribution of the same variable in another year
while keeping the distribution of the rest of the independent variables X2 at their initial
levels. A property of this procedure is that the sum of the single contributions will be equal
to the total contribution of all variables to the gap.
The procedure described in Fairlie (2003) entails one-to-one matching of ﬁrms between
the two years of interest. If the sample size varies between groups (years), the estimation
involves drawing random samples from the larger group. Our reported results stem from
estimations with 1000 random replications. Since the separate contributions of each variable
may be sensitive to the ordering of variables, we choose to randomize the ordering of switching
distributions, too.10
While cross-section analysis as described above may serve well to describe and predict
ﬁrms’ training propensities based on observed characteristics for a speciﬁc point in time, it
is less suited to identify causal eﬀects. Unobserved heterogeneity is a potential problem in
our estimations. As discussed in section 2.5, only a limited number of independent variables
are available. Many ﬁrm and regional labor market characteristics that might inﬂuence a
ﬁrm’s training decision are not observed in our data. If these unobserved variables, denoted
henceforth by cit, are part of it in equation (2.3), and thus correlated with the observed
independent variables, the estimated coeﬃcients of the latter will be biased.11
Given a linear model and assuming that unobserved ﬁrm characteristics c are constant
over time,
Ait = Xitβ + ci + μit (2.9)
10 The STATA module to perform decomposition techniques as described in Fairlie (2003) has been provided
by Jann (2006).
11 The outcome of a Hausman test suggests that this correlation does exist (p = 0.0000) and that a ﬁxed-
eﬀects model should therefore be preferred over an (inconsistent) random eﬀects model.
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we can get rid of the unobserved heterogeneity ci in equation (2.9) by time-demeaning all
variables:
(Ait − A¯i) = (Xit − X¯i)β + (μit − μ¯i) (2.10)
Equation (2.10) describes the linear ﬁxed-eﬀects model that can be consistently estimated
under the usual OLS assumptions.
Using a binary dependent variable Iit that indicates whether a ﬁrm trains, we estimate two
diﬀerent ﬁxed-eﬀects models. First, we perform a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation based on a linear
probability model (LPM). This allows us to compare results with an ordinary LPM based
on pooled cross-sectional estimations. Second, we also estimate a conditional logit ﬁxed-
eﬀects model for comparison. This method is generally preferable; however, it suﬀers from
some drawbacks (Wooldridge, 2002); only observations that show a change in the dependent
variable over time contribute to the maximum likelihood. Because many ﬁrms in our sample
either always train or never train, we lose about 80 percent of all observations and probably
end up with a sample that no longer represents the population of interest (then, we only
analyze a sample of ex-post observed changes over ﬁrms that might have been especially
sensitive to changes in some ﬁrm-characteristics or regional circumstances). Further, there
is no satisfactory way to derive partial eﬀects: the conditional maximum likelihood does not
provide estimates of the individual ﬁxed eﬀects, which would be needed to compute marginal
eﬀects that are comparable to ordinary binary models.
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2.5 Data and hypotheses
Our basic data set consists of ﬁrm census data of the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce (FSO).
The ﬁrm census was conducted out in 1985, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2008. As of
2008, the ﬁrm census was replaced by register data (called STATENT), which do not allow
direct comparison with the ﬁrm census data. Therefore, our observation period is 1985 to
2008. We exploit the information on whether a ﬁrm has currently employed one or more
apprentices. The question about apprentices was not asked in 1991. A major advantage of
the data is that the ﬁrm census encompasses the full population of Swiss ﬁrms in the industry
and service sectors.12 We only use the data of private marked-based ﬁrms for our analysis.
Since we can trace ﬁrms that existed in more than one of the survey years, we can construct a
panel data set that does not suﬀer from attrition due to non-response. The survey frequency
of every 3-4 years is not a major problem for our purpose since apprenticeships last that long,
too. The large gap between 1985 and 1995 is unfortunate, however, and additional surveys
would have enhanced the analytical possibilities. The advantage of a population data set also
comes at the price of a reduced set of variables13, which, however, we enhance with additional
statistical information from the FSO, as described further below.
Figure 2.2 presents descriptive information on the training activities of ﬁrms over the
period 1985 to 2008.
Figure 2.2: Swiss ﬁrms’ training activities (1985-2008)
Figure 2.2 shows how the share of training ﬁrms in our sample has evolved over time
12 The ﬁrm census for the primary sector diﬀers with regards to survey years and is not used for our analysis.
13 In Switzerland, large ﬁrm panels comparable with the IAB establishment panel for Germany are not
available. Employer-employee matched data sets including a wide variety of variables on ﬁrms as well as
employees are also not known.
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(dark bars). There was a sharp decline between 1985 and 1995, following which the share of
training ﬁrms increased again. However, the indicator still shows a decline of 6.1 percentage
points (24.6%-18.5%) between our ﬁrst wave (1985) and our last wave (2008).
The mean share of apprentices in the training ﬁrms14 (grey bars) amounts to 25% and
has hardly changed over time. Therefore, the variation in the share of apprentices among the
total number of employees in the economy (bright bars) mainly seems to be caused by the
variation in the share of training ﬁrms. The indicator on whether a ﬁrm trains apprentices
(1) or does not train apprentices (0) will therefore be the dependent variable of interest in
our estimations.
The following additional information on ﬁrms are available from the ﬁrm census data and
are included as independent variables: survey year, ﬁrm size, industry, ﬁrm type (independent
ﬁrm, headquarters or branch), region (i.e., canton or greater region), and area type (rural or
urban). Table 2.1 shows the univariate distribution of all variables in our ﬁnal data.15
Three noticeable points with respect to the distribution of ﬁrms need to be highlighted.
First, the total number of ﬁrms has markedly increased by 25% from 1985 to 2008, with a
large part of this increase occurring between 1985 and 1995, naturally raising the denominator
of the share of training ﬁrms as of 1995. In contrast, the number of training ﬁrms mirrors
the pattern of training activity described in Figure 2.2: it was highest in 1985 and lowest in
1995. Second, the increase in the total number of ﬁrms was accompanied by an increasing
share of small ﬁrms with less than two employees (this share increased from 33% in 1985 to
44% in 2008). Third, we observe a shift in the industry composition away from the industry
and traditional service sectors towards modern (skill-intensive) services, the latter expanding
from 24% of all ﬁrms in 1985 to 37% in 2008.
The literature has derived the following hypotheses of how these ﬁrm characteristics
aﬀect ﬁrms’ training activity: larger ﬁrms are known to have a higher training propensity
(Neubaeumer and Bellmann, 1999; Franz et al., 2000; Stoeger and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). This
can be explained by two factors. First, larger ﬁrms are more likely to have enough suitable
work to be able to use apprentices eﬃciently in the production process. Second, they are
also more likely to have a vacancy for a skilled worker when the apprentice has ﬁnished his
14 The share of apprentices in a ﬁrm is computed as the ratio of the number of apprentices to the total number
of employees (including apprentices), where employees are measured by so-called full-time equivalents
(FTEs).
15 We do not present descriptive statistics for all regions (cantons) and detailed industry categories, but we
do report summarized descriptive information at higher aggregated levels.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: distribution of variables (1985-2008)
1985 1995 1998 2001 2005 2008
Number of ﬁrms 275873 330620 338971 343577 333753 347060
Number of training ﬁrms 67891 50991 60332 60574 60447 64273
% % % % % %
Training ﬁrm: no 75.39 84.58 82.20 82.37 81.89 81.48
Training ﬁrm: yes 24.61 15.42 17.80 17.63 18.11 18.52
Firm size: <2 FTE 32.76 39.32 42.50 43.34 43.33 44.13
Firm size: 2 FTE 20.23 18.08 17.97 17.06 16.46 15.74
Firm size: 3-4 FTE 18.82 16.58 16.04 15.54 15.54 14.93
Firm size: 5-9 FTE 14.55 13.49 12.14 12.23 12.52 12.60
Firm size: 10-19 FTE 7.03 6.59 5.93 6.02 6.23 6.37
Firm size: 20-49 FTE 4.23 3.88 3.50 3.71 3.84 3.99
Firm size: 50-99 FTE 1.40 1.21 1.11 1.20 1.20 1.26
Firm size: 100-149 FTE 0.43 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.41
Firm size: 150-249 FTE 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.30
Firm size: 250-499 FTE 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18
Firm size: 500-999 FTE 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Firm size: >1000 FTE 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Firm type: headquarter 4.96 4.84 3.69 3.23 2.96 2.91
Firm type: independent ﬁrm 81.20 81.46 84.98 85.87 86.29 86.12
Firm type: branch 13.84 13.69 11.33 10.90 10.75 10.97
Area type: urban 75.07 75.72 75.68 76.40 76.74 77.14
Area type: rural 24.93 24.28 24.32 23.60 23.26 22.86
Greater region: Lake Geneva 19.11 18.82 18.26 18.13 18.22 18.83
Greater region: Espace Mittelland 21.90 21.57 21.25 20.78 20.53 19.95
Greater region: North-western CH 12.21 12.42 13.05 13.01 12.84 12.86
Greater region: Zurich 17.79 18.35 18.05 18.49 18.40 18.37
Greater region: Eastern CH 15.08 14.47 14.86 14.66 14.67 14.28
Greater region: Central CH 8.65 9.22 9.54 9.95 10.24 10.54
Greater region: Ticino 5.25 5.15 5.00 4.97 5.09 5.17
Industry: traditional industry 12.11 10.39 9.78 9.53 8.97 8.63
Industry: modern industry 3.45 3.36 3.02 3.05 3.07 2.93
Industry: construction 10.38 10.65 10.63 10.54 10.76 10.93
Industry: traditional services 49.82 44.72 44.37 41.91 41.75 41.14
Industry: modern services 24.24 30.87 32.20 34.96 35.45 36.38
Demography 2.28 1.65 1.71 1.71 1.73 1.76
Share of high school students 18.42 25.57 25.66 25.37 26.20 26.65
GDP-growth 4.00 −0.02 3.09 0.97 2.50 2.07
Sample: second and third sector, all ﬁrms that are private and marked-based
training. According to table 2.A1 in the appendix, there is a strong bivariate relationship
between ﬁrm size and training activity. In the year 2008, the share of training ﬁrms was 5%
in the smallest ﬁrm size class (less than two full-time equivalents) and 89% in the highest ﬁrm
size class (over 1000 full-time equivalents). Thus, we include dummies representing twelve
diﬀerent ﬁrm size classes in our analysis.
Industries diﬀer by production technology and skill needs. The training strategies of
ﬁrms will, therefore, diﬀer between industries: in the construction industry, for example,
apprentices can typically work productively early on. These ﬁrms may ﬁnd it favorable to
employ apprentices (instead of unskilled workers with higher wages) and thus should have a
high training propensity. Service industries have a poorer tradition in apprenticeship train-
ing than crafts and manufacturing. We further distinguish between traditional and modern
sectors for descriptive purposes. Modern services (skill-intensive) and modern manufactur-
ing (highly technology intensive industries) might operate in a faster changing environment
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than traditional sectors, which might impede the training of apprentices over several years.
According to the descriptive statistics in table 2.A1, the modern services sector records the
lowest share of training ﬁrms. In the multivariate analysis, we include a full set of indus-
try dummies representing 45 diﬀerent industries via the 2-digit numeric code of the General
Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities in order to control for as much ﬁrm heterogeneity as
possible.
With regard to ﬁrm type, single ﬁrms and headquarters probably have a wider array
of activities, whereas specialized branches of a ﬁrm might show a smaller propensity to
train. As for ﬁrm location, it is well known that the French- and Italian-speaking regions
of Switzerland are home to more full-time vocational schools and fewer dual apprenticeship
places. The educational system is regulated by cantons and might have an inﬂuence on the
educational decisions of school leavers as well as on the training decisions of ﬁrms. In order to
capture regional heterogeneity, we include the most detailed set of regional dummies in our
analyses (cantons or greater regions, depending on the speciﬁcation). We can also diﬀerentiate
between urban and rural areas: in rural districts, the reputation eﬀects of apprenticeships
(with customers) might be more important, and poaching might be less of a problem. One
might therefore expect the share of training ﬁrms to be higher in rural areas. Table 2.A1
in the appendix shows that the bivariate relationships between training activity and the
described ﬁrm characteristics are in line with these expectations.
In order to include supply-side information as indicated in the previous sections, we match
the following variables to the ﬁrm census data: the share of 16-year-olds among the working-
age population in the canton of a ﬁrm’s location and the share of high school students among
the 16-year-olds in the canton of a ﬁrm’s location. These data are derived from other statistics
published by the Swiss FSO.16
We use cantonal level information since cantons form strong political entities in Switzer-
land. Cantons vary markedly in the composition of their population. Moreover, the authority
to plan and implement educational policies resides with cantons and not with the federal au-
thorities. Therefore, the share of 16-year-olds as well as the share of high school pupils among
16-year-olds is expected to vary markedly between cantons.
Figure 2.A1 in the appendix illustrates the heterogeneity between cantons in these vari-
16 That is, data on the population structure (Statistik des ja¨hrlichen Bevo¨lkerungsstandes (ESPOP)) and
data on high school enrolment (Statistik der Lernenden (Schu¨ler/innen und Studierende)).
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ables and shows a clear bivariate cross-sectional relationship between the cantonal share of
training ﬁrms and 16-year-olds as well as the cantonal share of training ﬁrms and high school
enrolment.
As seen from ﬁgure 2.3, demography is also very likely to inﬂuence the variance in the
outcomes of the apprenticeship market over time.
Figure 2.3: Number of 16-year-olds and apprenticeship beginners (1981-2009)
The number of 16-year-olds showed a signiﬁcant downward trend from the early eighties to
the mid-nineties and rose again afterwards. The number of people starting apprenticeships17
seems to mirror this trend. The share of training ﬁrms might, therefore, be aﬀected by
the number of apprenticeship candidates available in the market. We include demographic
information in the regressions in the form of the share of 16-year-olds among the working-age
population of a canton. Averages over all ﬁrms for this variable over time can be found at
the end of table 2.1.
The share of 16-year-olds opting for high school accounts for shifts in the preferences
for general versus vocational education. An increase in the share of high school pupils, as
observed between 1985 and 1995 (table 2.1), will reduce the number of candidates in the
apprenticeship market and is, therefore, expected to lower the overall share of training ﬁrms.
Not including this variable might bias the time dummies, which we want to reﬂect possible
time trends in ﬁrm behavior in our estimations.18
17 Data source: Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Statistik der Lernenden (Schu¨ler/innen und Studierende.)
18 Including the share of high school pupils would be questionable if it was itself inﬂuenced by the outcome
of the apprenticeship market. This would be the case if young people who do not get an apprenticeship
place went to high school instead. This is unlikely, however: in the short run, high schools have a given
infrastructure and stock of teachers. The number of high school places is therefore inelastic in the short run.
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In order to capture ﬂuctuations in the business cycle, we match the oﬃcial GDP growth
derived from the Swiss national accounts (“Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung”) at the
most detailed industry level for which data are available.
Figure 2.4: Apprenticeship beginners and GDP growth (1981-2009)
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the development of the share of apprenticeship beginners (in the
population of 16-year-ols without high school enrolment) and GDP growth between 1981
and 2009. It shows that the share of apprentices in potential apprenticeship applicants
broadly follows the movement of GDP growth since the early nineties. At the beginning
of the ﬁgure and the very end, however, the two curves are rather independent from each
other. A tentative interpretation could be that the business cycle might be more important
when the numbers of 16-year-olds increase (ﬁgure 2.3). However, this hypothesis will not be
testable with the limited observation points of the ﬁrm census data.
For all the variables matched to the ﬁrm census data based on their location (demography
and share of high school students) or industry (GDP growth), we match the mean across the
year of the ﬁrm census and the two preceding years. This is our preferred deﬁnition, because
the ﬁrm census measures the current number of apprentices, that is, apprenticeship beginners
over three years, on average.
Empirical evidence supports this: both the number and the share of high school pupils in the relevant age
cohort change only gradually and do not show cyclical ﬂuctuations. For example, a study by the Federal
Statistical Oﬃce which aims to predict the development of pupil numbers conﬁrms that the number of
high school pupils did not depend on business cycles in the past (FSO, 2004b). The same result has been
found in Muehlemann et al. (2009).
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 Changes in ﬁrms’ training propensity between 1985 and 2008
In this section, we discuss the estimation results with a focus on the time-diﬀerences between
observation periods.
Table 2.2 presents pooled cross-sectional probit estimations for the full data set (all ﬁrms,
all years) where the dependent variable is a dummy training variable. Marginal eﬀects are
computed at the mean of the explanatory variables. The ﬁrst column contains a model that
excludes supply-side factors. While ﬁrm characteristics, industry, and regional dummies all
have signiﬁcant eﬀects on ﬁrms’ propensity to train, they can only partly explain the diﬀerent
training levels across time. Controlling for these factors, the average training propensity of
ﬁrms was 3.0 percentage points higher in 1985 than in 2008 (compared with a diﬀerence of
6.1 percentage points in the descriptive statistics; see also ﬁgure 2.2).
Table 2.2: Estimation of ﬁrms’ training propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Probit Probit Probit LPM FE-LPM FE-LPMsl FE-logit
Firm size: 2 FTE 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
Firm size: 3-4 FTE 0.264∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
Firm size: 5-9 FTE 0.387∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗
Firm size: 10-19 FTE 0.501∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗
Firm size: 20-49 FTE 0.600∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 2.003∗∗∗
Firm size: 50-99 FTE 0.688∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 2.812∗∗∗
Firm size: 100-149 FTE 0.743∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 3.481∗∗∗
Firm size: 150-249 FTE 0.767∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 3.897∗∗∗
Firm size: 250-499 FTE 0.805∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 4.698∗∗∗
Firm size: 500-999 FTE 0.822∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 1.121∗∗∗ 5.220∗∗∗
Firm size: >1000 FTE 0.844∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗ 5.548∗∗∗
Firm type: headquarter 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
Firm type: branch −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗
Industry dummies (45) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗
Regional dummies (26) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year 1985 0.030∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.046
Year 1995 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.775∗∗∗
Year 1998 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗
Year 2001 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
Year 2005 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗
Demography 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
Share of high school students −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
GDP growth (coeﬀ*10) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004 0.014
(Pseudo) R2 0.2070 0.2070 0.2071 0.192 0.120 0.060 0.062
N 1969854 1969854 1969854 1969854 1969854 427878 427878
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on (cluster-)robust standard errors.
Reference group: Firm size <=2 FTE, independent ﬁrm, urban district, traditional services, Year 2008.
FTE = full-time equivalents. Note: Probit results show marginal eﬀects at the mean of the other explanatory variables,
FE-Logit results show coeﬃcients (no marginal eﬀects).
sl sample restricted to the sample of model (7).
The second column shows the estimation results including supply-side factors. Demo-
graphic development does have a substantial signiﬁcant eﬀect, as can be seen from the fol-
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lowing illustration: from 1985 to 1995, the share of 16-year-olds in the adult population
dropped from 2.27% to 1.65% (for all of Switzerland). Based on model 2, this decrease
would, ceteris paribus, have caused a drop of 2.05 percentage points in the share of training
ﬁrms. The share of high school pupils signiﬁcantly aﬀects the training propensity in the
expected direction, too: the higher the (cantonal) share of compulsory school leavers opting
to go to high school, the lower the ﬁrms’ training activity. While most of the coeﬃcients do
not react strongly to the inclusion of these supply-side factors, the coeﬃcient of the dummy
variable for the year 1985 drops substantially from 3.0 to 0.5 percentage points. The diﬀer-
ence in ﬁrms’ training activity between 1985 and 2008 can, therefore, be largely explained
by the independent variables. Although the inclusion of supply-side factors does not increase
the goodness-of-ﬁt of the model, it does crucially aﬀect the conclusions that can be drawn
concerning the development of ﬁrms’ training propensity: the small unexplained diﬀerence
does not suggest a major change in ﬁrms’ ceteris paribus willingness to train.
Furthermore, another factor might be responsible for the remaining diﬀerences, namely
the business cycle. We do not have ﬁrm level data related to business performance. We,
however, include information on economic growth at the sectoral level in model 3 and ﬁnd
a positive eﬀect on training propensity. The inclusion of this variable further mitigates the
estimated diﬀerences across years. The small estimated diﬀerence of 0.3 percentage points
between 1985 and 2008 is not statistically signiﬁcant anymore; the observed drop of 6.1
percentage points can, therefore, be fully explained by including all variables in model 3.
This estimation, however, cannot fully explain the substantial drop observed in 1995.19
Model 5 in table 2.2 presents the results of the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation. Model 4 shows
the underlying pooled linear probability model for comparison purposes. The coeﬃcients of
LPM model 4 are quite similar to the marginal eﬀects of probit model 3.
The major change in ﬁxed-eﬀects model 5 compared to the former LPM and probit models
occurs with ﬁrm size: notably, the dummies indicating smaller ﬁrm sizes show a massive
decline in coeﬃcient size. Therefore, the ﬁrm size coeﬃcients of cross-sectional estimations
seem to have absorbed considerable unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity related to ﬁrm
size; they should not be interpreted causally. According to the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates, the
growing or shrinking of ﬁrms induces much smaller changes in a ﬁrm’s training propensity
19 An explanation might be measurement error: The number of apprentices that was reported by ﬁrms in
1995 is slightly lower than the number of apprentices according to other data of the Federal Statistical
Oﬃce, while the ﬁgures are quite close for other years. The FSO does not have an explanation for this,
however, and we could not ﬁnd any obvious distortion for particular subgroups in the 1995 data.
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than implied by cross-sectional estimations.
The eﬀect of the demography variable is conﬁrmed in model 5, and the coeﬃcient is even
larger than the corresponding value in the pooled probit models (though it is slightly smaller
than that in LPM model 4). The change in demography between 1985 and 1995, which would
have caused a drop of 2.0 percentage points in the share of training ﬁrms according to model
2 (as computed with the underlying data), now suggests a decrease of 2.85 percentage points.
Moreover, the year dummy estimates of the probit models also hold in the panel regression.
The longitudinal conclusions of the pooled model are thus conﬁrmed: the decrease in the
share of training ﬁrms can be explained by a combination of demand-side and supply-side
factors; there is, for example, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence left between 1985 and 2008. There is,
in addition, no evidence of a downward trend in ﬁrms’ ceteris paribus willingness to train
since the training propensity rather slightly increased after 1995.
The discussed results are conﬁrmed in the last estimation (model 7), where we estimate
a ﬁxed-eﬀects conditional logit that takes into account the binary nature of the dependent
variable within a panel design. As discussed in section 2.4, this method analyzes the sub-
sample of ﬁrms that showed a change in the dependent variable across time, and there is no
straightforward way to compute marginal eﬀects. Therefore, using the same sub-sample, we
additionally show a linear ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation (model 6) for comparison. As expected,
the coeﬃcients of most variables in model 6 are higher than those in model 5, since they are
obtained by using only the sample of ﬁrms that showed a change in training activity at least
once. The only qualitative diﬀerence between models 6 and 7 compared to the models using
the full sample, concerns the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on economic growth. As the coeﬃcient
itself seems to be only a little smaller in model 6 than in model 5, this result might be due to
the smaller sample size together with the fact, that the causal eﬀect is not large anyway; 1
percentage point higher GDP growth enhances training propensity only by 0.005 percentage
points (model 5).
2.6.2 Decomposition analysis
So far, we have seen that, after controlling for all the information at hand, there is no
signiﬁcant ceteris paribus diﬀerence in the estimated training propensity of ﬁrms between
the years 1985 and 2008 as measured by a year dummy. With the decomposition technique
discussed in section 2.4, we can try to shed more light on the power of single independent
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variables in explaining and predicting the changes in training activity over time.
As a starting point, we predict the share of training ﬁrms based on the diﬀerent combi-
nations of data and coeﬃcients for the 6 points in time under consideration. For instance,
the probit coeﬃcients resulting from the cross-sectional estimation with data for 1985 are
combined with the values of the independent variables of the other years to predict the share
of training ﬁrms over time, holding training behavior related to each ﬁrm attribute at a con-
stant level. This procedure provides an answer to the following question: if ﬁrm behavior (as
expressed by probit coeﬃcients) were the same as in 1985, but the ﬁrm composition of the
economy or important surrounding factors changed over time, what share of training ﬁrms
would we predict to observe in the other years? In other words: given the main assumption
of constant behavior for this decomposition technique, we show to what extent the change
in the share of training ﬁrms over time can be explained by changes in the independent
variables.
The decompositions are based on coeﬃcients from the cross-sectional estimations. How-
ever, the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation in table 2.2 showed that ﬁrm size coeﬃcients change con-
siderably compared with the cross-sectional estimations and that the latter should not be
interpreted causally. Is our decomposition biased since it is based on cross-sectional probit
estimates? Recall that we are attempting to make the best prediction, assuming that ﬁrm
behavior did not change. The best prediction, however, does not imply causality. The ex-
planatory contribution of the ﬁrm size variables should, therefore, not be interpreted causally.
Instead, ﬁrm size serves as proxy for diﬀerent unobserved ﬁrm characteristics.20
Table 2.3 displays the actual share of training ﬁrms and predictions of this share based on
diﬀerent data combinations. The upper panel of the table presents predictions based on cross-
sectional probits without supply-side variables but including ﬁrm characteristics (ﬁrm size,
industry, and ﬁrm type) and region dummies as independent variables. The lower panel of
the table presents the same predictions but includes supply-side factors (share of 16-year-olds
20 As regards ﬁrm size, we know that from 1985 to 2008, many very small ﬁrms newly entered the market.
The trend towards a larger share of very small ﬁrms is well documented (FSO, 2004a); these ﬁrms mainly
originate in the expanding service sector. The question now is whether the ﬁrm-size coeﬃcients in the
1985 probit provide a good representation of the new ﬁrms’ training propensity in order to predict the
eﬀect of the increase in the number of small ﬁrms. If these new small ﬁrms behave the same as the
small ﬁrms in 1985 did, the coeﬃcients of 1985 provide a good prediction of the training propensity of
these new ﬁrms. If, however, new small ﬁrms are systematically diﬀerent from existing small ﬁrms (with
respect to their training behavior), the prediction based on the 1985 coeﬃcients is not valid. Then, the
part explained by ﬁrm size might be too high in the decomposition. For this reason and in the absence
on reasonable theoretical or practical guidance, we do not imply that coeﬃcients of any particular year
should be preferred over the others.
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and share of high school pupils) in the underlying probit estimations.
Panels A and B are identically organized. Column (1) presents predictions for all years
based on coeﬃcients from a probit estimation using data from 1985. For illustration purposes,
the probit coeﬃcients for the year 1985 and the values of the independent variables in 1995
are used to predict the share of training ﬁrms in the year 1995; the share for the year 1998 is
predicted using the values of the independent variables in 1998, etc. The predictions using the
coeﬃcients from 1985 and the data from 2008 (i.e. 0.220 and 0.179, respectively) correspond
exactly with the computation of the ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst bracket of equation (2.7) in section
2.4. The underlying estimations in column (8) diﬀer from the pooled version in column (7)
in two respects: cantons, instead of greater regions, are controlled for,21 and GDP growth is
included in the model (see table 2.A2 in the appendix).
Table 2.3: Predicting the share of training ﬁrms using data and cross-sectional probits for all
periods with two diﬀerent sets of independent variables
PANEL A: Only ﬁrm characteristics/regions used in estimations
Predicted share (out of sample prediction)
Underlying Actual share using cross-section estimates of single years:
data (observed) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ.
1985 1995 1998 2001 2005 2008 pooled pooled
Data 1985 0.246 0.246 0.168 0.208 0.207 0.213 0.219 0.209 0.208
Data 1995 0.154 0.230 0.154 0.189 0.189 0.194 0.199 0.191 0.191
Data 1998 0.178 0.220 0.145 0.178 0.178 0.182 0.186 0.180 0.180
Data 2001 0.176 0.219 0.144 0.176 0.176 0.180 0.184 0.178 0.178
Data 2005 0.181 0.220 0.145 0.177 0.177 0.181 0.186 0.179 0.179
Data 2008 0.185 0.220 0.145 0.177 0.177 0.181 0.185 0.179 0.179
Actual change Explained change
1985-2008 1985-2008
-0.061 -0.026 -0.023 -0.030 -0.030 -0.032 -0.033 -0.030 -0.029
PANEL B: All variables used in estimations
Predicted share (out of sample prediction)
Underlying Actual share using cross-section estimates of single years:
data (observed) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ.
1985 1995 1998 2001 2005 2008 pooled pooled
Data 1985 0.246 0.246 0.231 0.271 0.257 0.265 0.257 0.251 0.249
Data 1995 0.154 0.185 0.154 0.186 0.186 0.191 0.198 0.180 0.175
Data 1998 0.178 0.177 0.148 0.178 0.177 0.181 0.186 0.172 0.177
Data 2001 0.176 0.178 0.148 0.177 0.176 0.180 0.185 0.172 0.170
Data 2005 0.181 0.179 0.149 0.178 0.177 0.181 0.186 0.173 0.176
Data 2008 0.185 0.179 0.150 0.179 0.178 0.182 0.185 0.174 0.176
Actual change Explained change
1985-2008 1985-2008
-0.061 -0.067 -0.081 -0.091 -0.080 -0.083 -0.071 -0.078 -0.072
Note: Underlying probit estimation results of Panel B can be found in the appendix, table 2.A2.
The predictions in Panel A of table 2.3 are not particularly good. However, they demon-
21 In underlying single cross-section estimations (1) - (6) we cannot control for cantons because supply-side
factors are included on a cantonal level, too.
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strate that a part of the decline in the share of training ﬁrms between 1985 and the subsequent
periods may be attributed to a change in the structural composition of the economy. The
predicted diﬀerence between the share of training ﬁrms in the years 1985 and 2008 ranges
from 2.3 to 3.3 percentage points, depending on the underlying coeﬃcients, whereas the real
diﬀerence in the share of training ﬁrms amounts to 6.1 percentage points.
In Panel B, the predicted diﬀerences range from -6.7 to -9.1 percentage points. These
predictions are closer to the true value, thus demonstrating once again that the inclusion of
supply-side factors in longitudinal analyses is important. In the absence of year dummies
in the underlying estimations, however, we even over-predict the decline in training ﬁrms
with the variables at hand. Most of the models provide quite good predictions for all years,
with the exception of 1995. None of the models predicts the substantial drop in the share of
training ﬁrms in 1995 or the full extent of the increased training propensity since 1998.
Finally, we calculate the contribution of each independent variable to the total predicted
diﬀerence between 1985 and 2008 using coeﬃcients derived from estimations based on the
data for 1985, the data for 2008, and the pooled data among all years. The pooled versions
correspond to the pooled versions of table 2.3 with the exception of the inclusion of year
dummies in the underlying regression, because this is methodologically more adequate in the
detailed decomposition. Table 2.4 shows the contribution made by the diﬀerent independent
variables to the total predicted diﬀerence.
Table 2.4: Detailed decomposition of the diﬀerence in the shares of training ﬁrms (1985-2008)
Decomposition based on ... (table/model)
coeﬀ. 1985 coeﬀ. 2008 coeﬀ. pooled (all) coeﬀ. pooled (all)
(2.A2/1) (2.A2/2) (2.A2/7) (2.2/3)
Actual change 1985-2008 −0.0609 −0.0609 −0.0609 −0.0609
Explained change 1985-2008 −0.0672 −0.0714 −0.0763 −0.0585
Contribution of variables:
Regional dummies −0.0001 0.1% −0.0006∗∗∗ 0.9% −0.0004∗∗∗ 0.6% −0.0006∗∗∗ 1.1%
Industry dummies −0.0036∗∗∗ 5.4% −0.0120∗∗∗ 17.8% −0.0090∗∗∗ 11.8% −0.0081∗∗∗ 13.9%
Firm size −0.0204∗∗∗ 30.4% −0.0222∗∗∗ 33.0% −0.0208∗∗∗ 27.3% −0.0208∗∗∗ 35.6%
Firm type −0.0004∗∗ 0.6% −0.0012∗∗∗ 1.8% −0.0009∗∗∗ 1.1% −0.0008∗∗∗ 1.4%
Rural area −0.0001∗∗ 0.1% −0.0004∗∗∗ 0.6% −0.0002∗∗∗ 0.3% −0.0002∗∗∗ 0.3%
Demography −0.0209∗∗∗ 31.0% −0.0154∗∗∗ 22.9% −0.0279∗∗∗ 36.5% −0.0184∗∗∗ 31.4%
Share of high school pupils −0.0217∗∗∗ 32.3% −0.0196∗∗∗ 29.2% −0.0171∗∗∗ 22.5% −0.0065∗∗∗ 11.1%
GDP growth −0.0031∗∗∗ 5.2%
Explained change 1985-2008 −0.0672 100.0% −0.0714 100.0% −0.0763 100.0% −0.0585 100.0%
N 275873 347060 1969854 1969854
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Underlying probit estimation results can be found in table 2.A2 in the appendix and table 2.2.
The contributions of all categories within a group (region, industry, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm type) have been added up to a group
total. Signiﬁcances refer to joint signiﬁcances.
The pooled versions are based on estimations with year dummies as additional control variables; this procedure has been
suggested by Fairlie (2003), see also Jann (2006). The explained part thus deviates slightly (by 0.0017) from the one
reported in table 2.3, Panel B. While the inclusion of year dummies is more accurate in table 2.4, it would result in
perfect predictions in table 2.3 and thus not provide any information at all.
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Changes in four variables, ﬁrm size, industry, demography, and the share of high school
students, contribute substantially to the explained changes from 1985 to 2008. The structure
of the Swiss economy with regard to ﬁrm size composition, and to a lesser extent, industry
composition, has thus changed in a way that has led to a decrease in the share of training
ﬁrms. These demand-side factors explain around one-third to over one-half of the change,
depending on the underlying coeﬃcients: while training behavior has been hardly unaﬀected
with regard to ﬁrm size (contributions using the coeﬃcients for 1985 and 2008 = 30.4% and
33.0%, respectively) the same does not hold for industries, as the coeﬃcients for 1985 and
2008 lead to diﬀerent contributions to the explained change (1985 coeﬃcients: 5.4%; 2008-
coeﬃcients: 17.8%). Supply-side factors, namely demography and the share of high school
pupils, explain the other part (contributions using the coeﬃcients for 1985 and 2008 = 63.3%
and 52.1%, respectively). The decomposition in the last column also includes GDP growth
and shows that business cycle eﬀects play only a minor role in explaining the diﬀerence
between 1985 and 2008. Moreover, it shows a substantially lower contribution of the share
of high school pupils. The inclusion of detailed regional control dummies in the underlying
pooled regression (see model (3) in table 2.2) mitigates the eﬀect of the cantonal high school
share. The eﬀect of this variable seems to be overestimated in the former models, where
only greater regions were controlled for; the cantonal high school share seems to capture
some additional between-cantonal variation in educational systems, and thus, the eﬀect of
this variable is presumably overestimated in the other longitudinal predictions.
Overall, the result continues to support our view that supply-side factors should not be
ignored when analyzing trends in the apprenticeship market.
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2.7 Discussion and Conclusions
The share of ﬁrms’ training apprentices is an indicator that receives much public attention
in Switzerland. The indicator shows a decline of 6.1 percentage points from 1985 to 2008,
the oldest and (up to now) the most recent years, respectively, for which data are available.
This has often been interpreted as a sign of ﬁrms’ reduced involvement in apprenticeship
training. The variation over time in the share of training ﬁrms was analyzed in this chapter
with pooled probit models, ﬁxed-eﬀects models, and a non-linear decomposition technique.
The main ﬁndings indicate that the unexplained part of the diﬀerence between 1985 and 2008
reduces to zero in the diﬀerent models when all available independent variables are controlled
for. There is no clear trend in the unexplained part to indicate a (negative or positive) trend
in individual ﬁrms’ willingness to train apprentices.
Part of the decline between 1985 and 2008 can be explained by demand-side factors.
Changes in the ﬁrm size, and to a lesser extent, the industry composition of the Swiss
economy, have led to a decrease in the share of training ﬁrms. Including supply- side factors,
namely the share of 16-year-olds in the working-age population as well as the share of high
school pupils, allow us to explain most of the variation. According to the results of the
decomposition analysis, these supply-side factors provide approximately half the explanation
for the observed decline. These results are important for policy making since the observed
decline in the share of training ﬁrms has been used repeatedly as an argument in favor of
policy intervention. Do the factors we have found to explain the decline warrant new policy
interventions and regulations? One major reason for the decline in the share of training ﬁrms
is the increase in the share of very small ﬁrms in the economy. Since the increase is mainly
due to additional new very small-sized ﬁrms, the increase does not crowd out apprenticeship
places and does not constitute a serious challenge for the apprenticeship system. The changing
industry structure has had a moderate eﬀect on the change in the share of training ﬁrms. We
do not ﬁnd that this factor, which is often mentioned in conjunction with global trends such
as “the knowledge society”, plays a major role. Nevertheless, the increasing share of modern
service ﬁrms might be a challenge for the apprenticeship system in the future since modern
services traditionally have lower training propensities than other industries. It is important
that the existing regulations, namely the training regulations that shape every occupation,
remain up-to-date and ﬂexible enough to adapt to new developments in the economy.22
22 Actually, the Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Professional Education and Technology is currently modernizing the
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Turning to supply-side factors, we found a decline in the share of training ﬁrms due to
changes in demography. This proves the ﬂexibility of the (market-based) system and is, per
se, no reason to worry. The increasing share of young people choosing high school instead of
vocational training is another reason for the decrease in the share of training ﬁrms. Future
increase in the share of high school pupils will obviously impact the apprenticeship system.
However, a change in ﬁrms’ demand for human capital, that is, a possible substitution of
apprentices with high school pupils, again, provides no reason for state intervention aimed
at increasing the share of training ﬁrms. If, however, the state expands high schools without
a change in ﬁrms’ human capital needs, this might deprive the apprenticeship market of
highly performing youngsters, thus reducing the training propensity of those ﬁrms that oﬀer
apprenticeship places to high performers. To sum up, the factors we have identiﬁed as causing
the decline in the share of training ﬁrms do not, in our view, call for new state interventions.
All the same, there is a rather small, but not negligible, group of young people that cannot
secure apprenticeships and does not follow post-compulsory education. We have shown that
there is no negative time trend in ﬁrms’ willingness to train apprentices. Why then do not
all young people ﬁnd an apprenticeship position? The most likely explanation is mismatch
problems, since at the same time, thousands of apprenticeship places remain vacant every
year. Either young people do not ﬁnd vacancies close to their place of residence (regional
mismatch), they seek positions in other occupations where no vacant places are available,
or they did not acquire the necessary qualiﬁcations in compulsory school to qualify for the
vacant places (skills mismatch). Future empirical research should address this question and
test whether mismatch phenomena can explain why some young people do not acquire a post-
compulsory education. Ideal employer–employee matched data, together with individual data
on all compulsory school leavers and their educational pathways, would enhance analytical
possibilities. In principle, the new data structure of the FSO, which refers to matched
registered data based on personal identiﬁcation numbers, is a step in this direction.
We do not claim to have analyzed all the challenges facing the apprenticeship market in
this chapter, but we have focused on one indicator, the share of training ﬁrms, which has
been prominently discussed in the Swiss media and politics. We have shown that the decline
in the share of training ﬁrms compared to 1985, in itself, is not a suﬃcient argument for
policy interventions. The decline can be largely explained by the emergence of new very
training regulations for all roughly 250 occupations, together with employer associations and cantons.
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small ﬁrms and by supply-side factors such as demography. The supply-side factors have to
be included in a longitudinal analysis to provide a complete and undistorted picture of the
developments in the apprenticeship market over time. The aggregate picture shows that as
of the mid-nineties, the supply of potential apprentices (without high-school enrolment) has
increased again due to demographic reasons and the apprenticeship market has been able
to absorb—with some ﬂuctuations—even higher shares of these youngsters in recent times
compared to 1995 (both in relative and absolute terms). The most important reasons for this
picture might be the rather favorable cost–beneﬁt ratio of training for the training ﬁrms, and
presumably, also of some non-training ﬁrms around the break-even to train.
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2.A Appendix
Table 2.A1: Descriptive statistics: share of training ﬁrms by ﬁrm characteristics (1985-2008)
1985 1995 1998 2001 2005 2008
% % % % % %
Firm size: <2 FTE 9.38 4.35 5.55 5.59 5.11 5.10
Firm size: 2 FTE 18.94 12.48 15.20 14.57 15.27 15.00
Firm size: 3-4 FTE 28.49 19.66 23.51 23.23 23.79 24.34
Firm size: 5-9 FTE 36.76 26.45 31.67 31.32 32.18 32.75
Firm size: 10-19 FTE 43.74 30.64 38.16 37.56 40.21 41.60
Firm size: 20-49 FTE 53.21 38.35 46.40 46.65 48.04 50.76
Firm size: 50-99 FTE 63.73 47.36 58.19 56.32 58.76 61.89
Firm size: 100-149 FTE 74.68 56.95 64.53 64.33 65.71 67.52
Firm size: 150-249 FTE 78.33 64.06 69.98 67.24 67.43 70.48
Firm size: 250-499 FTE 86.36 74.95 75.00 74.48 75.31 73.35
Firm size: 500-999 FTE 91.12 82.39 84.07 75.53 74.16 82.13
Firm size: >1000 FTE 93.94 88.68 73.08 82.69 82.61 89.29
Firm type: headquarter 44.61 30.92 38.48 40.11 41.36 41.84
Firm type: independent ﬁrm 23.29 14.40 16.38 16.19 16.56 16.67
Firm type: branch 25.18 16.02 21.73 22.31 24.17 26.82
Area type: urban 24.22 14.81 17.04 16.81 17.08 17.50
Area type: rural 25.78 17.35 20.15 20.28 21.51 21.95
Greater region: Lake Geneva 20.25 13.00 15.22 15.04 15.45 15.95
Greater region: Espace Mittelland 27.59 17.61 20.24 20.29 20.61 21.66
Greater region: North-western CH 26.09 15.17 16.91 17.51 18.09 18.25
Greater region: Zurich 20.95 12.42 14.93 14.65 15.17 15.72
Greater region Eastern CH 26.59 18.31 21.20 21.12 21.89 22.41
Greater region: Central CH 29.76 18.34 20.12 19.18 19.88 19.21
Greater region: Ticino 22.75 13.12 14.95 13.99 13.81 14.19
Industry: traditional industry 29.15 19.22 23.22 22.99 24.26 24.56
Industry: modern industry 30.83 17.98 22.99 23.05 24.01 24.31
Industry: construction 37.07 23.28 27.43 26.53 28.53 28.15
Industry: traditional services 21.47 14.36 17.16 17.72 18.08 18.81
Industry: modern services 22.58 12.69 13.36 12.90 12.92 13.40
Figure 2.A1: Share of training ﬁrms, demography and high school enrolment by canton
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Table 2.A2: Estimation of ﬁrms’ training propensity; cross-sectional estimations for single
years and pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1985 1995 1998 2001 2005 2008 pooled pooled
2 FTE 0.145∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
3-4 FTE 0.274∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
5-9 FTE 0.399∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
10-19 FTE 0.506∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
20-49 FTE 0.599∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
50-99 FTE 0.668∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗
100-149 FTE 0.727∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗
150-249 FTE 0.740∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗
250-499 FTE 0.773∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
500-999 FTE 0.785∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
>1000 FTE 0.792∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗
Firm type: headquarter 0.052∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
Firm type: branch −0.045∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
Industry dummies (45) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies (7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies (26) Yes
Demography 0.048∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
Share high school students −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
GDP-growth (coeﬀ*10) 0.033∗∗∗
(Pseudo) R2 0.1792 0.1862 0.2041 0.2056 0.2237 0.2333 0.2047 0.2061
N 275873 330620 338971 343577 333753 347060 1969854 1969854
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on robust standard errors.
Reference group: Firm size <=2 FTE, independent ﬁrm, urban district. FTE = full-time equivalents.
Note: Probit results show marginal eﬀects at the mean of the other explanatory variables.
Chapter 3
The role of hard-to-obtain information
on ability for the transition into VET
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter,1 we attempt to investigate the eﬀect of easy-to-observe characteristics and
hard-to-observe ability on the success of applicants in the transition from compulsory school-
ing to apprenticeship training.
Diﬃculties in identifying the true productive capacity of heterogeneous workers have
played an important role in labor economics for a long time. The literature predicts that, in
the absence of accurate information on ability, ﬁrms will base hiring or wage-setting decisions
on easy-to-observe signals and thus screen and statistically discriminate on education level,
gender, ethnicity or other readily available factors that are assumed to be correlated with the
missing information (See Phelps, 1972; Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973; Aigner and Cain, 1977).
An indirect test of statistical discrimination is provided by the employer learning literature
(Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001), wherein information on cognitive
ability that is only observable to the researcher, e.g., Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test scores
(AFQT), is found to have increasing inﬂuence on wages as workers gain experience, indicating
that workers’ true productivity is gradually revealed over time to the labor market.
The transition into apprenticeship training can be seen as a sorting process of young
people without labor market experience into ﬁrms and into a set of rather standardized jobs,
1 This chapter is based on the idea and co-autorship of my supervisor Stefan C. Wolter and is a slightly
adapted version of the published paper Mueller and Wolter (2014), The role of hard-to-obtain information
on ability for the school-to-work transition. Empirical Economics 46(4), 1447-1471.
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where bad matches are comparatively costly to adjust. Using unique data comprising PISA
literacy test scores along with a set of information on individuals that is observable to the
hiring ﬁrms, we analyze whether and to what extent hard-to-get ability information aﬀects
the hiring process and whether there is further revelation of hard-to-observe ability during
the subsequent training period.
As an apprentice needs to be hired by a ﬁrm for the entire training period, apprenticeship
training entails early integration into the labor market (at approximately age 16). Unsuccess-
ful applicants mostly pursue non-certifying intermediate school programs that are designed
to increase the prospects on the apprenticeship market the year after.
Employers’ screening devices thus play an important role in the sorting process of young
adults into vocational education. In the public discussion, stereotyping is claimed to play
a (too) dominant role in ﬁrms hiring decisions, such that applicants with unfavorable at-
tributes, as low parental socioeconomic status, migration background, low-level compulsory
school track attendance and bad school marks, are at a disadvantage to get (good) appren-
ticeship places, presumably irrespective of their true ability. However, the latter is diﬃcult
to assess for ﬁrms because, in the absence of uniform school standards and external exams
in Switzerland, compulsory schooling outcomes are not well comparable across schools and
classes, which in turn reinforces the incentive for ﬁrms to take into account additional abil-
ity proxies—this may include, for example, family background characteristics—in order to
enhance the accuracy of their ability believes.
Although employment decisions solely based on easy-to-observe factors as described are
cheap to make, they may also be costly, especially in the setting of apprenticeship training.
Economic rationale suggests a potentially high interest among ﬁrms in seeking hard-to-get
information about ability before selecting apprenticeship applicants: in contrast with ordi-
nary work contracts, apprenticeship contracts cannot be terminated easily2, and wages for
each apprenticeship year as well as training standards are ﬁxed beforehand over the de-
ﬁned training period (3 or 4 years, depending on the training profession). Furthermore, the
successful completion of the apprenticeship largely depends on academic performance at the
vocational school: A severe mismatch between apprentice and the intellectual aspiration level
of the training profession—especially the negative case where apprentices are overwhelmed—
2 An ordinary working contract can be terminated by the employer without giving reasons, while an ap-
prenticeship contract can be terminated only under certain speciﬁed conditions (see http://www.lehr-
vertrag.ch/).
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potentially results in a drop out of training and, as a consequence, in sunk costs for the
training ﬁrm.
To test whether a student’s hard-to-observe ability is revealed and accounted for within
the transition from schooling to market-based upper-secondary education or whether allo-
cation into vocational tracks is solely based on easy-to-observe factors, we make use of the
longitudinal data set TREE, that comprises PISA 2000 test scores of pupils at age 15 along
with individual background characteristics and detailed information on their further educa-
tional and working pathways. The PISA reading literacy competence test provides us with
an ability proxy that is only observable by the researcher, not by recruiters of training ﬁrms.
We do not claim that this ability measure encompasses all ability dimensions that might be
important for ﬁrms; however, reading literacy is expected to be an indispensable part of rele-
vant competencies to successfully pass apprenticeship training (especially but not exclusively
the school based part of it) and to successfully manage working life afterwards. Following
the procedure in Farber and Gibbons (1996), we use the test score information in its orthog-
onalized form, thus already cleaned from the part that is explainable by observables, leaving
the ability component that is hard-to-observe for outsiders. We then go one step further
and analyze an—as far as we know—unaddressed topic in the existing literature by explic-
itly diﬀerentiating between so-called overachievers and underachievers. This enables us to
test whether hard-to-observe ability is revealed and accounted for (if at all) symmetrically.
Thereby, we can test separately whether hard-to-observe ability information is gathered and
used in favor of those applicants who are—based on the PISA test score—better then they
appear to be (overachievers) and whether ability is revealed to the disfavor of those stu-
dents who create an overall outward impression that is better than their (PISA) performance
(underachievers).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides an
overview of the related literature. In section 3.3, we present the empirical strategy. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the data and in section 3.5 we show and discuss the empirical results.
Finally, section 3.6 concludes with a summary and discussion of our ﬁndings.
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3.2 The selection procedure of ﬁrms and the role of
information on hard-to-observe ability: related lit-
erature and hypotheses
Firm-based apprenticeship training requires hiring by an employer willing to train the appli-
cant. The employer and the parents of the apprentice sign a work and training contract that
is binding for both parties till the end of the apprenticeship training but does not guarantee
further employment once the apprenticeship training is over. The search and selection pro-
cess for apprenticeship positions is comparable to an ordinary job search procedure: ﬁrms
announce apprenticeship openings, potential apprentices apply for these openings, applicants
undergo a selection process with interviews or even tests and, ﬁnally, receive the appren-
ticeship post or must continue searching. The latter may be accompanied by a process of
adapting expectations about the apprenticeship track aspiration level one might be suited for:
after unavailingly applying for high-prestige apprenticeships, applicants might adjust their
aspirations downward and begin to apply for less demanding vocational tracks (occupations).
It has been of public concern for several years that ﬁnding an (good) apprenticeship post
is—irrespective of their true potential—becoming more diﬃcult for compulsory school leavers
with unfavorable (easy-to-observe) characteristics.3 Recent empirical evidence implies, too,
that ﬁrms’ selection of apprentices is strongly linked to individual background character-
istics and former schooling outcomes, whereas the latter are regarded as to provide only
limited ability information, too (Haeberlin et al., 2004; Hupka et al., 2006; Imdorf, 2006;
Neuenschwander and Malti, 2009). It is therefore not clear whether the selection practices of
ﬁrms brings about an allocation that is superior to the one that would be accessible by pure
stereotyping on easy-to-observe applicants’ characteristics that are correlated with ability.
If the costs to overcome imperfect ability information are suﬃciently high, the concept of
statistical discrimination predicts that ﬁrms base their hiring decisions on all easy-to-observe
ability indicators that are assumed to be correlated with the missing information (Phelps,
1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner and Cain, 1977). Firms are thus assumed to build expectations
3 As a consequence thereof, worker’s organizations (Travailsuisse and the Association of Commer-
cial Employees) have published guidelines to sensitize ﬁrms for fair selection practices, namely
not to place weight on applicant’s family background and not to overweight former school types
(http://www.zukunftstattherkunft.ch). There has also been launched an online platform that allows pres-
election of applicants based on anonymized application dossiers that only include information of objective
relevance (http://www.weareready.ch).
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about an applicants’ ability by considering all observable characteristics that provide addi-
tional ability information due to diﬀerent group speciﬁc (expected) mean abilities. Whereas
this form of stereotyping (”ﬁrst moment”’ statistical discrimination) is discriminating on
the individual level (there is unequal treatment of actually equal able individuals), it is
not discriminating on average and not discriminating against certain groups: there is equal
treatment of individuals with equal expected ability.4
The role of easy-to-observe and initially hard-to-observe ability has been investigated by
the employer learning literature by exploiting the US NSLY79 data which contain an ability
measure (the Armed Forced Qualiﬁcation test-scores) that is only observable to researchers
but hard-to-observe for employers. Farber and Gibbons (1996) ﬁnd that the part of AFQ
test score5 information that was not predictable by observables at market entry (the residu-
alized test score) becomes increasingly correlated with wages as market experience increases:
employers learn. Altonji and Pierret (1997, 2001) simultaneously investigate employer learn-
ing and statistical discrimination and ﬁnd that wages not only become more dependent on
a worker’s ability (AFQ test-scores) but at the same time also become less dependent on
easily observable characteristics. These results suggest that ﬁrms initially form beliefs about
the productivity of a worker using statistical discrimination, i.e., based on educational cre-
dentials and ethnicity; as true productivity is revealed over time, ﬁrms revise their beliefs
accordingly.6 Using the same data Lange (2007) ﬁnds that employers learn quickly; initial
expectation errors decline on average by one-half within the ﬁrst three years and thus restrict
the importance for job market signaling of schooling decisions. The tradeoﬀ between screen-
ing upon hiring and employer learning has further been found to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent
educational levels (Arcidiacono et al., 2010): whereas ability is revealed to the labor market
only gradually for high school graduates it is observed nearly perfectly from the very begin-
ning of the careers of college graduates. Information that are typically included in resumes
of college graduates and thus are easily observable to recruiters of ﬁrms (such as for example
college major, grades or standardized test scores) are, however, not included in the analysis;
they are shown to be strongly correlated with AFQ test-scores and thus expected to be a
likely explanation for immediate ability revelation in the college market.
4 Unless the case where ﬁrms are risk averse and there is unequal variance in productivity across groups.
5 Farber and Gibbons (1996) only use those parts of the AFQ test that resemble very much the PISA test
scores used in our data.
6 Evidence for employer learning has also been found in Great Britain (Galindo-Rueda, 2003) and, in the
case of blue-collar workers, in Germany (Bauer and Haisken-DeNew, 2001).
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In contrast to the described studies our analysis puts its focus more heavily on the time of
the hiring process and therefore on the question whether new applicants on the labor market
are only evaluated based on their easy-to-observe characteristics (including school marks and
level of school track) or whether hard-to-observe ability is detected and used by recruiting
ﬁrms as well. Due to special institutional circumstances described below we then extend
our analysis to test whether hard-to-obtain information on ability aﬀects the labor market
entry in symmetric or asymmetric way. The reason for doing so is the hypothesis that ﬁrms’
expectation error might be subject to an asymmetric risk, too: hiring someone whose ability
level considerably lies below the expected level can lead to severe costs as described below,
while it is not apparent that ﬁrms would proﬁt much in the reverse case.
There are at least three arguments that explain why one expects Swiss training ﬁrms
to invest considerably in learning about an applicant’s ability prior to hiring him or her.
Whereas the ﬁrst argument is a general one, the second and third arguments demonstrate
also the potential rationale for the asymmetry hypothesis.
First, there is a widespread disbelief among ﬁrms in the credibility of observable schooling
outcomes at compulsory school level (Moser, 2004; Imdorf, 2009). It arises from the lack of
uniform school standards, the lack of standardized tests in compulsory schools (grades are
only comparable within classes or teachers), the lack of homogeneous curricula and the opaque
tracking mechanism into diﬀerent levels at around age 12.
Second, the sorting process of young school leavers into ﬁrms and occupations is not
based on trial and error (job shopping), as, for example, in the US (see Topel and Ward,
1992). Training contracts have a ﬁxed duration of 3 to 4 years—depending on the training
occupation—and cannot be terminated as easily as ordinary working contracts. There is no
scope for adjusting training content below a deﬁned minimum level (both in terms of topics
that must be covered and in terms of complexity that must be taught), nor is it possible to
downwardly adjust training wages. Wages are ﬁxed in advance for the entire period of the
training contract.
Third, the earlier phase of apprenticeship training is typically related to net costs for ﬁrms;
some apprenticeship tracks (mostly technical apprenticeships) are associated with consider-
able ﬁrm net investments even until the end of training (Muehlemann et al., 2007; Wolter and
Ryan, 2011). Premature terminations of apprenticeship contracts are therefore costly, so are
eﬀorts and investments of ﬁrms to prevent drop outs e.g. by providing additional coaching
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in case of arising scholastic problems. Academic diﬃculties at the vocational school due to a
bad match between trainee and the intellectual aspiration level of the vocational track are the
primary reason for premature terminations of apprenticeships (Stalder and Schmied, 2006)
and therefore cognitive skills as measured in PISA should be an important ability information
for the training ﬁrms.
In line with these considerations it is observed that ﬁrms try to diminish the risk of running
into problems by investing in learning about a trainee’s ability before hiring. They perform
screening on the basis of several instruments (see Muehlemann et al., 2007) such as application
letters, school-reports, interviews and so-called trial days. Due to the mentioned distrust of
ﬁrms towards the informational value of school grades and the (intransparent) sorting into
school types at compulsory level, some ﬁrms are increasingly requiring test results of external
screening tests as part of the application dossier. These standardized aptitude tests, sold and
administered by specialized private ﬁrms and ﬁnanced by the applicants and their parents,
promise to assess the knowledge in school subjects and general cognitive skills in order to
provide information on an applicant’s ability to potentially pass the desired apprenticeship
training (see Siegenthaler, 2011).
However, the observation that a part of the ﬁrms try to get superior ability information
prior to hiring does not automatically imply, ﬁrst, that they actually make use of this informa-
tion in the hiring process, second, that they actually gain ability information that is relevant
to predict the desired outcome such as apprenticeship success and third, that they actually
gain ability information that is of additional value compared to easy-to-get information.7
7 Siegenthaler (2011) for example analyzed the informational value for the case of the privately sold aptitude
test ”multicheck retail sale” and found that the test results do not improve ﬁrms’ ability to predict
apprenticeship success once easy-to-obtain information provided in application dossiers (former school
grades and the level of compulsory schooling) is taken into account.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
Successful transition and apprenticeship as explained above are represented by three diﬀerent
dependent variables. A dummy variable indicates whether an applicant succeeds in seam-
lessly entering certifying ﬁrm-based apprenticeship training. A second variable indicates the
intellectual standard of the vocational program the successful applicants follow.8 The third
variable reﬂects the occurrence of problems during training. The exemplary econometric
model is thus:
Successful Transition∗i = y
∗
i = αi +Xiβ +B
∗
i π + i (3.1)
Successful Transitioni =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if y
∗
i > 0
0 otherwise,
(3.2)
where the vector X stands for those student characteristics that are easily observable by
the market and that might be correlated with ability and B∗i represents the part of students’
ability that is unobservable at ﬁrst glance.
To test whether hard-to-observe ability inﬂuences the success9 of transition and training,
we need an ability measure, B∗i , that is known to the econometrician and relevant for the
transition but, at the same time, cannot be easily observed by recruiters of training ﬁrms. If
B∗i is taken into account by employers although hard-to-observe, then its estimated eﬀect πˆ
should signiﬁcantly diﬀer from zero. If, however, decisions are only made based on easy-to-
observe characteristics, the coeﬃcient πˆ should not be signiﬁcant.
The variable that allows us to diﬀerentiate between observable and unobservable abil-
ity is given in our data by the PISA literacy test score. PISA test scores are observable
to researchers but unknown to teachers, parents, employers, pupils, or any other person or
institution. This enables us to create a variable that represents the unobservable part of
8 The intellectual aspiration level of apprenticeship training is also relevant for the second transition, the
one from the apprenticeship training into the labor market. Bertschy et al. (2009) have shown that this
level aﬀects the chances of seamless transition in a signiﬁcant and causal way.
9 Although we deﬁne an immediate transition from school to work as a successful transition, this does not
mean that all of the unsuccessful applicants would have been better oﬀ if they had succeeded immediately
in ﬁnding an apprenticeship. For some of the unsuccessful candidates the delay of transition might even
improve the match between their ability, expectations and the demands of their future employers.
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a student’s ability, namely, the part that is orthogonal to employers’ readily available in-
formation. Following the procedure of Farber and Gibbons (1996), we deﬁne B∗i to be the
residual from a regression of Bi on all observable students’ characteristics, X, that might
act as ability-predicting factors. We ﬁrst regress test scores on the type of school track,
school grades and individual background variables such as immigration background, gender,
parental education, and other information that is known or assumed to be correlated with
school performance and observable to outsiders because it is either included in school reports
or is common information in letters of application. As employers might also look out for
non-cognitive traits such as motivation, dependability or social behavior (that reﬂect other
dimensions of ability but are potentially correlated with cognitive ability, too), we include
variables on non-cognitive skills and behavioral information that should be strongly related
to information that most employers will observe easily in the course of the hiring process.
The unobservable part of ability, B∗i , can then be obtained by subtracting expected ability
(predicted test scores) from observed test scores.
B∗i = Bi − E∗(Bi|Xi) = Bi −Xiγˆ (3.3)
The corresponding OLS regression accounts for almost 40% of the variance in PISA test
scores (see table 3.2 in section 3.4), showing that a substantial part of the Pisa scores can be
determined by characteristics that are easily observable by employers.10
We then go one step further and split the residuals, B∗i , along their sign into two parts:
the positive and negative residual PISA score. We also create two dummy variables: The
ﬁrst dummy variable indicates whether a student belongs to the group of underachievers,
that is, if actual ability, Bi, lies a considerable amount, t, below the ability level, E
∗(Bi|Xi),
predicted by observable characteristics (B∗i is negative and exceeds a certain threshold). The
10 We have to concede the fact that employers have easy-to-obtain information on the candidates like e.g.
health problems that might be correlated with the PISA results and that are not observable by the
researchers. In this case, the additional information available to employers helps them to estimate the
true ability more accurately then our own regressions would suggest. This carries the potential risk that
the researcher would wrongfully qualify a candidate as an over- or underachiever, whereas the employer
had accurately assessed the true ability based on his/her easy-to-obtain information. In order to minimize
the risk of an unjustiﬁed classiﬁcation of the individual, we use a large threshold for the creation of the
dummy variables of 73 PISA points (= one proﬁciency level) around the predicted score. As it is unlikely
that an easy-to-obtain information not available to the researchers would inﬂuence the predication to such
an extend (keeping in mind that we already control for observables that are likely to be highly correlated
with information that we might miss), we assume that this potential bias is negligible. As far as this
assumption is testable, we do not ﬁnd evidence for violations (p=0.784 in a RESET test).
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second dummy variable indicates whether someone belongs to the group of overachievers, that
is, if actual ability lies to a considerable amount, t, above the level predicted by observable
characteristics (B∗i is positive and exceeds a certain threshold). These dummy variables allow
us to test whether hard-to-observe ability is revealed symmetrically, if at all, at both ends of
the residual distribution.
Underachieveri =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if B
∗
i < 0− t
0 otherwise
(3.4)
Overachieveri =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if B
∗
i > 0 + t
0 otherwise
(3.5)
We choose the threshold, t, to be a value that has some established implication: t equals
the number of score points that lie within the same PISA proﬁciency level according to OECD
(2001) and thus comprises a span of 73 test score points. Therefore, under - and overachievers
are deﬁned as those students whose realized PISA score diﬀers by more than one proﬁciency
level from what would have been expected according to their observable characteristics. Note
that the term ”-achiever” always refers to the PISA achievement relative to the expectations
throughout this chapter.
In order to take into account the generated regressor character of predicted PISA test-
scores and thus of the dummies for under- and overachievers, we calculated bootstrapped
standard errors (1000 replications).
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3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data set we use is the Swiss longitudinal data set Transition from Education into Em-
ployment (TREE) that followed the pupils that had been tested in the Programme for Inter-
national Student Assessment 2000 (PISA 2000).
For the scope of our analysis, we restrict the TREE sample to those compulsory school
graduates who were in the apprenticeship market the year after the PISA test, distinguishing
between the successful ones, namely, those who take up ﬁrm-based apprenticeship training
after compulsory school, and the unsuccessful ones who ﬁnd themselves in some kind of
non-certifying interim solution or gap year despite having had applied at least once for an
apprenticeship in a ﬁrm. This leaves us with 2097 pupils that are observed in PISA 2000
and in the follow-up survey.
One core information for our analysis is derived from PISA reading literacy test results.
The focus of PISA 2000 was on testing reading literacy of 15-year-olds in 43 participating
countries (OECD, 2001); mathematical and scientiﬁc literacy were investigated only for half
of the students. PISA measures competencies in points with a mean of 500 points for all
participating countries and a standard deviation of 100 points. PISA reading literacy is
measured by a composite test score that summarizes the results from three reading literacy
scales. The ”retrieving information” scale reports on students’ ability to locate information
in a text. The ”interpreting texts” scale report on the ability to construct meaning and
draw inferences from written information. A ”reﬂection and evaluation” scale reports on
students’ ability to relate text to their knowledge, ideas and experiences. The average reading
literacy test score of Swiss pupils turned out to not signiﬁcantly deviate from the OECD
mean (OECD, 2001); however, there was a comparatively large overall variation in student
performance with rather strong social selectivity found for Switzerland.
Additionally, experts have divided the scale into six diﬀerent proﬁciency levels (very low,
low, medium low, medium high, high, very high). For our analysis, we deﬁne under- and
overachievers to deviate by more than one proﬁciency level (73 score points) from what one
would predict (see section 3.3 and below for the prediction model). To give an impression on
the diﬀerence between two adjacent proﬁciency levels: students proﬁcient at level 3 (medium
low) are capable of reading tasks of moderate complexity, such as locating multiple pieces
of information, making links between diﬀerent parts of a text, and relating it to familiar
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everyday knowledge. Students proﬁcient at level 4 (medium high) are capable of diﬃcult
reading tasks, such as locating embedded information, construing meaning from nuances of
language and critically evaluating a text (OECD, 2001).
As independent variables other than PISA reading literacy test score results we use in-
formation on those characteristics that are easily observable by employers. A description of
these variables, along with PISA test scores, is provided in table 3.1 and already shows strong
bivariate relationships between test-scores and easy-to-observe individual characteristics. For
detailed variable deﬁnitions see table 3.A1 in the appendix 3.A.
Table 3.1: Descriptives—univariate and bivariate (with PISA Test Scores)
Distribution of PISA test scores*
Independent variables Share (%) Mean* Std. Dev* Min* Max*
PISA literacy test score 496.6 78.4 198.0 812.9
Achieves-as-expected 78.7 497.4 62.5 286.5 643.9
Underachiever 10.3 384.5 57.6 198.0 545.5
Overachiever 11.0 596.0 57.1 446.1 812.9
Male 52.0 492.8 78.4 198.0 737.5
Female 48.0 500.7 78.2 250.6 812.9
Swiss 81.1 508.5 73.6 198.0 812.9
Immigrant: second-generation 8.6 457.5 76.6 283.6 622.5
Immigrant: ﬁrst-generation 10.3 435.8 77.9 250.6 634.6
¡ Age 16 71.4 504.3 77.0 198.0 812.9
¿= Age 16 28.6 477.4 78.7 255.0 704.3
Parental education: comp. school 32.0 474.7 82.2 198.0 738.7
Parental education: upper sec. II 38.3 510.3 73.2 257.7 812.9
Parental education: tertiary 29.7 502.6 75.7 268.1 737.5
Family structure: nuclear 78.2 499.5 78.1 198.0 738.7
Family structure: single 11.7 490.0 75.8 267.1 697.3
Family structure: mixed 6.5 493.9 73.9 257.7 812.9
Family structure: other 3.5 457.9 91.3 255.0 670.5
Track lower sec II: no selection 5.7 491.8 71.8 272.0 676.1
Track lower sec II: low 33.1 444.4 73.7 198.0 653.8
Track lower sec II: medium 44.7 521.7 67.0 294.9 812.9
Track lower sec II: high 16.5 535.0 61.4 357.3 738.7
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max corr PISA
Mark in test language 4.74 0.61 1.00 6.00 0.22
Mark in mathematics 4.71 0.77 1.00 6.00 0.10
Mark in science 4.86 0.66 2.00 6.00 0.20
Instrumental motivation 2.87 0.73 1.00 4.00 0.02
Absenteeism 1.30 0.45 1.00 4.00 −0.16
Sense of belonging 3.31 0.52 1.00 4.00 0.08
The school track at the lower secondary level is represented by a variable with four cate-
gories: high-level school track that prepares students for high school, intermediate-level school
track, basic-level school track (which has no requirements) and school track with no selection.
The share of pupils in diﬀerent tracks varies between cantons; we thus account for regional
variations in educational systems by controlling for cantons in all estimations. Further in-
formation on the academic performance of a student is given by school marks in annual
school reports. These reports are important components of applications for apprenticeships.
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The PISA data provide us with information on school marks in the regional (test) language,
mathematics and sciences.
The next set of variables we use reﬂects easy-to-observe information on pupils’ individual
and parental background as typically speciﬁed in the CV of apprenticeship applicants. There
is information on gender, student’s age (as some of the ninth graders are one year older
due to repetitions of school years) and migration status. The latter is represented by two
dummy variables, one for second-generation immigrants (born in Switzerland, but with both
parents born outside Switzerland) and one for ﬁrst-generation immigrants (born outside
Switzerland). Further, there is information on highest-achieved parental education (no post-
compulsory education, upper secondary level, tertiary level) and family structure (nuclear,
single, mixed, other).
Finally, we also use a set of PISA 2000 variables (OECD, 2002) that should be good
proxies for information on non-cognitive ability that most employers might observe easily in
the hiring process. The index of instrumental motivation was derived from students’ reports
on how often they study to increase their job opportunities, ensure that their future will
be ﬁnancially secure, and enable them to get a good job. A four-point scale was used with
response categories almost never, sometimes, often and almost always. The PISA index of
sense of belonging was derived from students’ reports on whether their school is a place where
they feel like an outsider, make friends easily, feel like they belong, feel awkward and out of
place, other students seem to like them, or feel lonely. The PISA index of absenteeism was
derived from students’ reports on how often they missed school, skipped classes and were
late for school in the two last weeks.11 We include these measures on non-cognitive ability
and social behavior as z-standardized indices into our regressions (mean of zero and standard
deviation of 1).
As discussed in section 3.3, we use PISA test scores to create a variable that represents
the unobservable part of student’s ability; that is, we want to ﬁlter out ability information
that is not predictable by observable individual or group characteristics. The results of
the corresponding OLS regression are presented in table 3.2 (model 4). A substantial part
of the variation in PISA test scores can be determined by easy-to-observe characteristics
11 Although we have a very rich set of background variables on the students, it is still possible that the
employers can collect additional information that is not observable by the researchers. If this information
would be correlated with the deviation from the predicted PISA scores, an omitted variable bias would
occur. However, to the extent that these unobservables are correlated with the observable characteristics
the bias is minimized (see also footnote 10).
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(approximately 40%). The coeﬃcients show signiﬁcantly lower test scores for males, for
older pupils (repetitions), for immigrants, for pupils with less educated parents, for pupils
living in a family structure which is ’diﬃcult to describe’ (other), for pupils in lower levels of
compulsory school tracks, for pupils with less favourable school marks in the test (regional)
language, in mathematics and in sciences, and for pupils with higher absenteeism and lower
sense of belonging.
Table 3.2: Estimation results: OLS PISA literatcy test scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 6.607∗ 6.478∗ 6.921∗
(3.184) (2.829) (2.826)
Immigrant: second generation −37.021∗∗ −25.557∗∗ −23.665∗∗
(6.057) (5.085) (5.063)
Immigrant: ﬁrst generation −56.198∗∗ −33.927∗∗ −33.093∗∗
(5.708) (4.837) (4.791)
Age 16 −23.756∗∗ −18.439∗∗ −17.655∗∗
(3.628) (3.200) (3.199)
Parental education: upper sec. 19.101∗∗ 10.677∗∗ 11.126∗∗
(4.077) (3.478) (3.476)
Parental education: tertiary 15.227∗∗ 5.477 6.111+
(4.239) (3.597) (3.576)
Family structure: single −7.592 −1.812 −0.966
(4.803) (4.199) (4.167)
Family structure: mixed −5.159 3.127 3.650
(6.429) (5.776) (5.770)
Family structure: other −37.120∗∗ −20.128∗ −18.052∗
(9.540) (9.205) (8.995)
School mark in test language 17.840∗∗ 14.764∗∗ 14.881∗∗
(2.674) (2.670) (2.675)
School mark in mathematics 4.705∗ 4.769∗ 4.431∗
(2.022) (1.995) (1.997)
School mark in sciences 12.429∗∗ 10.143∗∗ 9.885∗∗
(2.575) (2.502) (2.512)
Track lower sec II: high-level 124.446∗∗ 113.028∗∗ 112.258∗∗
(5.723) (5.663) (5.647)
Track lower sec II: medium-level 82.060∗∗ 73.878∗∗ 73.441∗∗
(3.761) (3.651) (3.624)
Track lower sec II: no selection 7.267 4.763 7.972
(10.149) (9.554) (9.532)
Instrumental motivation −0.224
(1.418)
Absenteeism −6.237∗∗
(1.548)
Sense of belonging 2.594+
(1.413)
Constant 495.542∗∗ 269.332∗∗ 302.840∗∗ 304.532∗∗
(6.682) (17.332) (17.382) (17.587)
N 2097 2097 2097 2097
R-squared 0.180 0.340 0.388 0.395
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, robust standard errors in parentheses.
Reference group: male, Swiss parents, age¡16, highest parental education: compulsory
school, nuclear family structure, low-level compulsory school, cantons (22) controlled for
in all models.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the residuals resulting from regressing test scores
on students attributes. For 78% of the pupils, the regression model is able to predict PISA
test scores within the range of one competence level (73 points). Approximately 11% of the
observations at each end of the residual distribution are identiﬁed as overachievers (posi-
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tive deviation larger than one proﬁciency level) or underachievers (negative deviation larger
than one proﬁciency level). For all these observations, realized test scores of under- and
overachievers lie outside the 95% conﬁdence interval of the predicted value.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of unexplained PISA test scores (residuals)
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Note: The unexplained part of PISA test scores is computed by subtracting
predicted test scores (OLS regression on all observables) from realized test scores
(see section 3.3 and Model 4 of table 3.2).
73 score points refer to one PISA literacy competence level according to OECD (2001).
For the dependent variables, shown in table 3.3, we will ﬁrst analyze the indicator of
whether somebody who has applied for a training position succeeds in entering a certifying
apprenticeship directly after compulsory schooling or not. The share of those without an
apprenticeship one year after the PISA test is 25%.
The second dependent variable provides information on the intellectual aspiration level of
the vocational track for those who have started apprenticeship training. The aspiration levels
for 101 diﬀerent vocational tracks were rated on a scale ranging from 1 to 6 by an expert
group of vocational advisers (for details and studies using this variable see Stalder, 2011).12
Approximately 45% of all apprentices in our sample follow an apprenticeship track of
high intellectual aspiration level (5 or 6), e.g., toward a certiﬁcate as a commercial employee,
12 We have imputed missing information (1.4%) about the aspiration level of less common tracks by regressing
on training duration (years), amount of vocational schooling lectures (hours per year) and an interaction
term between the two. These factors strongly explain the aspiration level (R-squared of 84%).
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IT technician, electronic technician, draughtsman, chemist, or optician. Approximately 25%
do an apprenticeship with a low intellectual aspiration level (1 or 2), such as hairdressers,
gardeners, bakers, painters, salespeople, ﬂorists, cooks, carpenters, or cosmeticians. As shown
in table 3.3, there is a relationship in the data between one’s reading literacy, as measured by
PISA, and the intellectual aspiration level of the vocational track someone follows.13 Due to
the ordinal character of the intellectual aspiration level we perform ordered probit estimation
and present average partial eﬀects for the highest aspiration level.
Table 3.3: Dependent variables—univariate and bivariate (with PISA Test Scores)
Distribution of PISA test scores*
Outcome variables Share (%) Mean* Std. Dev* Min* Max*
Educational status (N=2079)
Non-certifying/no education (0) 24.7 480.5 85.2 255.0 812.9
Certifying apprenticeship training (1) 75.3 501.9 75.3 198.0 737.5
Training aspiration level (N=1578)
very low (1) 13.8 457.9 74.5 198.0 640.9
low (2) 11.0 472.7 78.9 278.5 737.4
lower medium (3) 12.8 481.9 70.2 268.8 671.7
upper medium (4) 16.9 493.6 70.6 268.1 670.5
high (5) 9.6 528.7 65.6 327.0 668.7
very high (6) 35.9 531.6 65.6 300.8 737.5
Problems in training (N=1382)
No problems (0) 80.7 511.7 73.7 198.0 737.5
Any problems (1) 19.3 482.4 71.7 298.3 670.5
To test whether hard-to-observe ability has further eﬀects beyond the success of the
school-to-work transition, we analyze an indicator that takes a value of 1 for evidence of
problems during apprenticeship training, such as repetition of an apprenticeship year, change
of training occupation, failure on the ﬁnal exam or dropping out of training. The share of
apprentices who had at least one of those critical events is 19% of those who are observable
in the data for the standard duration of their training.
13 PISA test-scores have not been used by the experts to assess the aspiration level.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Probability of directly entering a certifying apprenticeship
training
The ﬁrst probit model in table 3.4 only includes characteristics that are easily observable by
ﬁrms and might be used by these to form expectations of students’ ability. The estimated
average marginal eﬀects show that many of the easy-to-observe characteristics play a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant role. Applicants coming from a medium-level compulsory school track
have e.g. a 9.1 percentage point higher probability of entering apprenticeship training than
those from basic-level tracks. The probability of successfully applying to a ﬁrm is, however,
highest for those from high-level compulsory schools (with a diﬀerence of 19.0 percentage
points). The school mark in mathematics is important as well: having a better mark of one
unit (for example a mark of 5.0 (good) instead of 4.0 (suﬃcient)) increases the probability
of successfully applying for an apprenticeship by 4.8 percentage points. In contrast, marks
in sciences and in the test language (regional language) seem to have no additional eﬀect.
As for the background variables, females, immigrants (ﬁrst- and second-generation), pupils
with higher absenteeism and those living in single parent households or patchwork families are
signiﬁcantly less likely to be in certifying apprenticeships one year after PISA (all else being
equal); having parents with upper secondary education (as opposed to compulsory school
education) has a positive eﬀect. On the other hand, having parents with tertiary education
does not signiﬁcantly increase the probability of having a smooth transition, although the
coeﬃcient goes in the expected direction. Apart from the gender variable, all the coeﬃcients
point in the same direction as the coeﬃcients in the PISA test score regression in table 3.2
in section 3.4.
Model 2 additionally includes the PISA literacy test score. The test score is scaled (1=73
PISA points), so that the eﬀect size can be interpreted as the eﬀect of a variance of 73 PISA
points (which is equal to one competence level). The coeﬃcient shows no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on successfully applying for apprenticeship training, implying that hard-to-observe ability
would not be relevant for a successful transition. The fact that some of the observable
characteristics still have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient even when the PISA score is controlled for
should not immediately be interpreted as a sign of discrimination of these school leavers as it
is highly unlikely, that the PISA score incorporates all relevant information for the employers.
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Table 3.4: Estimation results: Probability of directly entering apprenticeship training
Probit estimation: 1=direct entry into certifying apprenticeship, 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PISA Literacy test score/73 0.014
(0.010)
Predicted PISA score/73 0.120∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Residual PISA score/73 0.014
(0.011)
Negative PISA residuals*(-1)/73 −0.041∗
(0.020)
Positive PISA residuals/73 −0.014
(0.021)
Underachiever −0.063∗ −0.068∗
(0.031) (0.031)
Overachiever −0.000 −0.003
(0.031) (0.030)
Female −0.167∗∗ −0.169∗∗ −0.168∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Immigrant: second generation −0.107∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.107∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Immigrant: ﬁrst generation −0.098∗∗ −0.090∗∗ −0.098∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Age 16 −0.017 −0.014 −0.018
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Parental education: upper sec. 0.050∗ 0.048∗ 0.049∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Parental education: tertiary 0.020 0.019 0.019
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Family structure: single −0.108∗∗ −0.108∗∗ −0.108∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Family structure: mixed −0.083∗ −0.083∗∗ −0.085∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Family structure: other −0.038 −0.034 −0.033
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047)
School mark in test language 0.002 −0.001 0.002
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
School mark in mathematics 0.048∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
School mark in sciences 0.007 0.005 0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Track lower sec II: high-level 0.190∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.188∗∗
(0.034) (0.039) (0.035)
Track lower sec II: medium-level 0.091∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.021) (0.024) (0.021)
Track lower sec II: no selection −0.011 −0.014 −0.016
(0.070) (0.070) (0.077)
Instrumental motivation 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Absenteeism −0.020∗ −0.019∗ −0.019∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Sense of belonging 0.012 0.011 0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
N 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097 2097
Pseudo R-squared 0.164 0.165 0.088 0.089 0.090 0.090 0.166
+ p¡0.10, * p¡0.05, ** p¡0.01, Average marginal eﬀects, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Reference group: Achieves-as-expected, male, Swiss parents, age¡16, parental education: comp. school, nuclear family
structure, low-level compulsory school track, cantons (22) controlled for in all models.
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Although we cannot exclude discrimination, the coeﬃcients might also indicate that these
variables are proxies for other important parts of the prospective apprentices that are taken
into account in the hiring process.
Model 3 uses only the part of the hard-to-observe ability that is predictable by easy-
to-observe characteristics of the applicants. The predicted PISA result thus replaces the
easy-to-obtain information. According to the results, an additional predicted competence
level would increase the chances to obtain an apprenticeship by 12.0 percentage points (with
p=0.000).
Model 4 additionally includes the part of the PISA test-score that cannot be predicted by
observables. This variable is not statistically signiﬁcant and the point estimate is rather small
(equivalent to the 1.4 percentage points in model 1). Hence given the diﬀerence between the
predictable part of the PISA score and the hard-to-obtain part of it, one would deduce that
the hard to obtain part of the PISA information plays no role in ﬁrms’ decisions to recruit
apprentices.
However, once we diﬀerentiate between a positive and a negative residual it becomes
obvious that the non-existent eﬀect of the residual is due to the asymmetric impact that
the residual has on the probability of a successful transfer into apprenticeship training. If we
distinguish between the negative and positive residual in the PISA scores (model 5) and create
dummy variables for being either an underachiever or an overachiever in model 6 (along with
predicted PISA) and model 7 (along with all easy-to-observe variables)14, we see that only
a negative deviation from the predicted PISA score seems to matter for employers. School
leavers that score at least one competence level below the PISA score that one would have
expected based on their easy-to-observe characteristics, have a probability for a successful
transition that lies almost seven percentage points below the probability of school-leavers
with identical observables. In contrast, school leavers with a substantively higher PISA score
than one would have expected have the same probability for a successful transition as less
able colleagues with the same observable characteristics.
Contrasting models 5, 6 and 7 additionally shows that using residuals (model 5) or dummy
variables for large deviations from the predicted PISA results does not change the results,
14 We have also estimated models that allow for the possibility that the eﬀect of (positive/negative) residual
PISA scores is diﬀerent in magnitude depending on whether the diﬀerence is within the magnitude of one
PISA competence level (small) or outside one competence level (the deﬁnition for under-/overachievers).
Results show that small deviations are neither signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from large deviations nor signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero and thus more spurious.
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neither does the inclusion of easy-to-observe variables instead of predicted PISA test scores
(diﬀerence between model 6 and 7). The result that underachievers have signiﬁcantly lower
probabilities in seamlessly transition from school to apprenticeship therefore is robust across
diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
One might argue that, during the hiring process, employers especially look out for non-
cognitive skills or behavioral aspects of pupils, such as motivation, and that if PISA test scores
are correlated with these other factors, our estimations might reﬂect the importance of these
non-cognitive factors and not of cognitive abilities, which are already demonstrated through
school marks or educational track. We cannot completely rule out such mechanisms, as they
are diﬃcult to test. However, including or excluding information that is contained in PISA
like instrumental motivation, sense of belonging or absenteeism (as a behavioral measure at
age 15) in all our estimations does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our qualitative results.15
3.5.2 Intellectual aspiration level of the dual vocational track
This section describes the empirical results of ordered probit estimations for the question of
how hard-to-observe ability components inﬂuence the intellectual aspiration level (from 1 to
6) of the apprenticeship track a school leaver successfully enters.
The ﬁrst model in table 3.5 again only includes characteristics that are easily observable
for the employer and might be used by outsiders to build expectations of students’ ability. The
estimated marginal eﬀects show that many easy-to-observe characteristics that are correlated
with PISA test-scores (table 3.2 in section 3.4) play again a signiﬁcant role for the sorting
into occupations (tracks) with diﬀerent intellectual aspiration levels. Given the eﬀect sizes,
the school track followed in compulsory schooling is the essential criteria for the allocation
into the diﬀerent demanding occupational tracks, besides parental education, school marks
and instrumental motivation.
Including the PISA test-score information in model 2 illustrates that most of the coeﬃ-
cients of those easy-to-observe variables decrease due to the correlation with PISA and that
hard-to-observe ability measured by PISA has a highly signiﬁcant separate eﬀect on the as-
piration level: a hard-to-observe diﬀerence of one proﬁciency level leads to a 7.5 percentage
point higher probability of following a highest-level vocational pathway.
According to model 4, the unpredictable part of PISA has, however, a much smaller
15 Estimations excluding non-cognitive variables are available upon request from the authors.
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Table 3.5: Estimation results: Intellectual aspiration level of vocational track
Ordered probit estimation: aspiration level scaled from 1 (very low) to 6 (very high)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PISA Literacy test score/73 0.075∗∗
(0.011)
Predicted PISA score/73 0.270∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Residual PISA score/73 0.078∗∗
(0.010)
Negative PISA residuals*(-1)/73 −0.075∗∗
(0.021)
Positive PISA residuals/73 0.081∗∗
(0.022)
Underachiever −0.110∗∗ −0.115∗∗
(0.033) (0.032)
Overachiever 0.124∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
Female 0.013 0.003 0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Immigrant: second generation 0.138∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Immigrant: ﬁrst generation −0.016 0.009 −0.022
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Age 16 −0.060∗∗ −0.041∗ −0.063∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Parental education: upper sec. 0.078∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Parental education: tertiary 0.055∗ 0.047∗ 0.050∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Family structure: single 0.027 0.029 0.028
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Family structure: mixed −0.014 −0.022 −0.016
(0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
Family structure: other −0.020 −0.009 −0.029
(0.044) (0.042) (0.046)
School mark in test language 0.049∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
School mark in mathematics 0.058∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.060∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
School mark in sciences −0.025 −0.034∗ −0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Track lower sec II: high-level 0.567∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.569∗∗
(0.034) (0.038) (0.033)
Track lower sec II: medium-level 0.342∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.345∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
Track lower sec II: no selection −0.081 −0.081 −0.074
(0.072) (0.069) (0.073)
Instrumental motivation 0.041∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Absenteeism −0.001 0.006 −0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Sense of belonging 0.012 0.010 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
N 1578 1578 1578 1578 1578 1578 1578
Pseudo R-squared 0.089 0.098 0.068 0.077 0.077 0.075 0.095
+ p¡0.10, * p¡0.05, ** p¡0.01, Average marginal eﬀects, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Reference group: Achieves-as-expected, male, Swiss parents, age¡16, parental education: comp. school, nuclear family
structure, low-level compulsory school track, cantons (22) controlled for in all models.
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eﬀect than the predictable one, showing that the part of the eﬀect of the observables that
also explains diﬀerences in PISA scores is the most relevant and only to lesser extent the
exact PISA scores.
The subsequent tests for asymmetric eﬀects suggest that the part of ability that cannot be
predicted by observables aﬀects the outcome rather symmetrically: the eﬀect of the residuals
in both directions amounts to approximately 8 percentage points (model 5). Likewise, PISA
underachievers (dummy-speciﬁcation) are on average found in lower aspiration levels, and
PISA overachievers are found in higher aspiration levels relative to otherwise identical school
leavers whose ability is well predicted by easy-to-observe characteristics. Both coeﬃcients of
the under- and overachiever dummies are highly signiﬁcant and approximately 11 percentage
points in magnitude.
3.5.3 Failure and success in apprenticeship training
Table 3.6 shows the probit estimation results for having problems during training such as
dropping out, repeating a year, changing training occupation or failing the external exam.
The set of independent variables across models is the same as before, we additionally include
the new information on the aspiration level of the vocational track.
The estimation results in table 3.6 imply the following: First, hard-to-observe ability has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect: the higher the unpredictable PISA score at the time of application, the less
likely are costly events during the apprenticeship period, such as dropping out, repeating a
year, changing training occupation or failing the exam. A higher PISA score of one proﬁciency
level (73 test-score points) decreases the probability of having problems by approximately
4.5 percentage points (models 2 and 4). The coeﬃcients for large deviations presented by
the under- and overachievers dummies show a rather symmetrical pattern for negative and
positive deviations (model 6 and 7).
Second, in comparison with the previous analyses in section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, (initially)
hard-to-observe ability has gained in relative importance compared to the ability part that
could be predicted by observables.16 This ﬁnding goes in line with labor market theories that
postulate that employers learn about ability of their employees as time goes by.
16 The residual in model 4 has about half of the eﬀect size of the predicted PISA score. In the previous
regressions this relation was 1:8.5 (no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the overall residual) and 1:3.5.
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Table 3.6: Estimation results: Problems in apprenticeship
Probit estimation: Problems in apprenticeship: 1=evidence of problems, 0=otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PISA Literacy test score/73 −0.043∗∗
(0.012)
Predicted PISA score/73 −0.088∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.094∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Residual PISA score/73 −0.045∗∗
(0.013)
Negative PISA residuals*(-1)/73 0.051∗
(0.024)
Positive PISA residuals/73 −0.039
(0.025)
Underachiever 0.095∗ 0.094∗
(0.038) (0.039)
Overachiever −0.073∗ −0.066+
(0.035) (0.034)
Female −0.022 −0.019 −0.021
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Immigrant: second generation 0.062+ 0.048 0.061
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Immigrant: ﬁrst generation 0.064+ 0.051 0.067+
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Age 16 0.050∗ 0.040+ 0.052∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Parental education: upper sec. −0.039 −0.032 −0.036
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Parental education: tertiary −0.027 −0.026 −0.026
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Family structure: single 0.059+ 0.059+ 0.058+
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Family structure: mixed 0.082∗ 0.084∗ 0.082∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.041)
Family structure: other 0.054 0.051 0.063
(0.058) (0.057) (0.061)
School mark in test language 0.014 0.024 0.016
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
School mark in mathematics −0.012 −0.012 −0.015
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
School mark in sciences −0.029+ −0.024 −0.029+
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Track lower sec II: high-level −0.079+ −0.030 −0.096∗
(0.044) (0.046) (0.045)
Track lower sec II: medium-level −0.034 −0.004 −0.047
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031)
Track lower sec II: no selection 0.068 0.068 0.066
(0.073) (0.073) (0.075)
Instrumental motivation 0.008 0.006 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Absenteeism 0.016+ 0.012 0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Sense of belonging −0.011 −0.011 −0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Aspiration level (2) 0.056 0.067 0.053 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.068
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Aspiration level (3) 0.092∗ 0.097∗ 0.090∗ 0.094∗ 0.094∗ 0.092∗ 0.096∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
Aspiration level (4) 0.076∗ 0.090∗ 0.079+ 0.092∗ 0.092∗ 0.088∗ 0.089∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Aspiration level (5) 0.113∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.114∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Aspiration level (6) 0.095∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
N 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382
Pseudo R-squared 0.114 0.122 0.097 0.106 0.097 0.108 0.123
+ p¡0.10, * p¡0.05, ** p¡0.01, Average marginal eﬀects, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Reference group: Achieves-as-expected, male, Swiss parents, age¡16, parental education: comp. school, nuclear family
structure, low-level compulsory school track, cantons (22) controlled for in all models.
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3.5.4 Further investigations—using an alternative ability measure
In this section we test the robustness of our results against an alternative ability measure
provided by the data, namely the PISA literacy test score in mathematics17.
Since mathematical literacy has been tested only incidentally in PISA 2000, the sample
shrinks to 54% of our initial sample. The correlation coeﬃcient between test scores in reading
and test scores in mathematics is r = 0.56 in this subsample.
We replicate our analysis by again assuming that these test scores are, ﬁrst, correlated
with the ability information that employers would like to have18, second, hard-to-observe to
the labor market but known to the researcher, and third, comparable across individuals.
In spite of having substituted the dependent variable, the new PISA test score model
in table 3.7 looks very similar to the one presented in table 3.2 on page 66. A comparison
of the two PISA regressions brings about two notable ﬁndings: First, in contrast to the
results for reading literacy, females have lower test scores in mathematics by nearly half a
PISA proﬁciency level compared to men. Second, the performance gap between natives and
immigrants persist (approximately half a PISA proﬁciency level) and is even slightly larger
in mathematics than in reading.
As for the eﬀect of hard-to-observe ability on transition and apprenticeship success, the
main results in table 3.7 show to be nearly identical to those of the previous sections: when
it comes to the hiring decision, only negative ability deviations from expected ability seem to
matter and positive deviations are not considered by the market. Again, the hard-to-observe
part of PISA scores aﬀects the sorting into aspiration levels rather symmetrically. As for
problems during apprenticeship we ﬁnd, again, a signiﬁcant eﬀect of hard-to-observe ability.
With regards to the last outcome and in contrast to the analysis using reading literacy and
the whole sample, we do, however, not ﬁnd evidence for a better performance of overachievers,
but only higher diﬃculties for underachievers.
Overall, the main results are in line with our previous ﬁndings: First, ﬁrms seem to
look out for (hard-to-observe) ability that shows to matter for the success of apprenticeship
training. Second, we ﬁnd evidence for our hypotheses that ﬁrms especially try to diminish the
17 Empirical studies based on NSLY79 data (see section 3.2) often use fathers’ education as an alternative
ability measure that is assumed to be hard-to-observe. Throughout this chapter, however, we regard
parental education as to be easy-to-observe, as parental education / occupation is standard information
in application dossiers of apprenticeship applicants.
18 Potential training ﬁrms often not only complain about insuﬃcient language skills of applicants, but also
about insuﬃcient mathematical knowledge of compulsory school leavers.
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risk of negative ability surprises when hiring. Third, hard-to-observe ability plays a signiﬁcant
but minor role in the hiring decision but gains relative importance during apprenticeship
training.
3.6 Summary and conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to analyze whether and to what extent employer learning
about hard-to-observe ability takes place at the very beginning of a worker’s career, namely,
in the transition process from compulsory schooling to marked-based upper-secondary edu-
cation in Switzerland. In light of the fact that apprenticeship contracts have standardized
content and ﬁxed duration and leave little scope to adjust prearranged wage proﬁles over the
training period, our ﬁrst aim was to analyze whether employers try to obtain more revealing
information about an applicant’s ability before hiring rather than only relying on readily
available information. We test how deviation in the PISA 2000 test scores from what one
would predict based on observable characteristics inﬂuences successful transition and train-
ing. As the institutional setting may particularly provide incentives for ﬁrms to gather and
use hard-to-get information in order to avoid hiring applicants whose ability level consider-
ably lies below the expected level (so called underachievers), we allow for asymmetric eﬀects
of hard-to-get ability information in the hiring process. Second, we analyze whether hard-
to-observe ability is further revealed in the course of the apprenticeship period and becomes
observable through training outcomes.
Our results suggest that hard-to-observe ability plays a signiﬁcant role in transition as
well as the training success, but not always in a symmetric manner. Regarding applicants’
transition success, we ﬁnd that only PISA underachievers are aﬀected by pre-market employer
learning. They are less likely to successfully apply for apprenticeships than their otherwise
identical peers. Overachievers, in turn, do not seem to beneﬁt from having more academic
potential than one would expect. Therefore, costly-to-observe ability components are only
revealed in the hiring process at the lower end of the residual distribution, indicating that
ﬁrms use pre-market learning in particular to minimize the downward risk of a mismatch.
For the resulting allocation of successful applicants into diﬀerent intellectually demanding
vocational tracks, we ﬁnd, however, rather symmetric eﬀects; hard-to-get ability information
is revealed in a way that signiﬁcantly increases allocative eﬃciency at both ends of the
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distribution.
The results regarding long-term outcomes suggest, however, that there is still additional
revelation of ability during the subsequent training period. Apprentices who are PISA over-
achievers are less likely to face problems, such as dropping out, repeating a year of appren-
ticeship, changing vocational track or ﬁnal exam failure. In contrast, PISA underachievers
who, despite their lower-than-expected ability, successfully ﬁnd an apprenticeship are dis-
proportionally more likely to be exposed to these problematic events. The fact that even
underachievers who successfully ﬁnd an apprenticeship show inferior outcomes during the
apprenticeship period provides an additional explanation for why ﬁrms seem to place more
emphasis on detecting under- rather than overachievers in the course of the hiring process.
We showed in this chapter that, in the case of costly and far-ranging hiring decisions, such
as apprenticeship training contracts, information that cannot be observed easily is already
used by employers at the initial stage of the hiring process and that applicants that diﬀer
from their apparently similar peers in regard of their ability are therefore treated diﬀerently.
However, due to the nature of our data, we can only observe the outcome of the hiring
process and not the behavior of ﬁrms themselves. Given the observation that some easy-to-
observe characteristics like nationality, school track or parental background have an impact
on these outcomes even after controlling for observable cognitive and non-cognitive competen-
cies, future research should address the question, whether the impact of these characteristics
is due to discrimination or whether they stand for information that so far only ﬁrms observe
but not the researchers.
Finally, our ﬁnding that negative and positive hard-to-observe ability surprises are re-
vealed and accounted for in an asymmetric way—presumably depending on labor market
or institutional arrangements—could be further tested within the setting of the standard
employer learning literature.
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3.A Appendix
Table 3.A1: Variable deﬁnition
Variablea) Deﬁnition
Certifying education Dep. variable. Equals 1 if pupil enters a certifying upper-sec. education in
the form of apprenticeship training directly after compulsory school; 0 otherwise
(non-certifying interim solutions or no education).
Aspiration level Dep. variable. Aspiration level of 101 vocational tracks (expert ratings) from 1
(low) to 6 (high).
Problems in training Dep. variable. Equals 1 if apprentice exhibits repetition of apprenticeship year,
failure in exam, change in training occupation or drop out.
PISA test score Reading literacy test score from the PISA 2000 survey.
Underachiever Equals 1 if PISA test score is considerably (1 competence level) lower than pre-
dicted by observables; 0 otherwise.
Overachiever Equals 1 if PISA test score is considerably (1 competence level) higher than
predicted by observables; 0 otherwise.
Female Equals 1 if female; 0 if male.
Nationality Dummies representing 3 categories: ”Swiss” (born in Switzerland with at least
one parent born in Switzerland), ”second-generation immigrant” (pupil born in
Switzerland but parents born outside Switzerland), ”ﬁrst-generation immigrant”
(pupil and parents foreign born).
Age 16 at PISA survey Equals 1 if pupil aged 16 at the time of PISA 2000; 0 if aged 15.
Parental education Dummies representing 3 categories of highest parental education: compulsory
school, upper-secondary education, tertiary education.
Family structure Dummies representing 4 categories: nuclear, single, mixed and other, where the
last category also covers missing information.
Mark in test language Mark in test language (German, French, Italian, depending on linguistic region)
in last school report. Metric scale: 1-6 (1=lowest, 6=highest).
Mark in mathematics Mark in mathematics in last school report (1=lowest, 6=highest).
Mark in sciences Mark in sciences (mean across biology, chemistry, physics, sciences) in last school
report. Metric scale: 1-6 (1=lowest, 6=highest).
Level compulsory school Dummies for the school track that was attended at the time of the PISA 2000
survey: low-level compulsory school (e.g. Realschule), medium-level compul-
sory school (e.g. Sekundarschule), high-level compulsory school (e.g. Pro-
Gymnasium) and ”no selection” (integrated track).
Regions (cantons) Dummies for 22 Swiss cantons (= states).
Instrumental motivation PISA indexb) derived from students’ reports on how often they study to increase
their job opportunities, to ensure that their future will be ﬁnancially secure, and
to enable them to get a good job (3 items).
Sense of belonging PISA indexb) derived from students’ reports on whether their school is a place
where they feel like an outsider, make friends easily, feel like they belong, feel
awkward/out of place, other students seem to like them, or feel lonely (6 items).
Absenteeism PISA indexb) derived from students’ reports on how often they missed
school/classes and were late for school in the two last weeks (3 items).
a) All variables except for the outcome variables are measured at the time of PISA 2000. b) z-standardized indices used.
Chapter 4
The eﬀect of gap years and interim
solutions on educational outcomes
4.1 Introduction
Having an upper-secondary education diploma is becoming increasingly important for suc-
cessful and enduring labor market integration in all industrialized countries (OECD, 2012a).
There is ample international evidence on pecuniary and non-pecuniary beneﬁts of education
at the individual and social level (Card, 1999; Harmon et al., 2003; Lange and Topel, 2006;
Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011; OECD, 2010, 2012b). Consequently, the sociopolitical objec-
tive to equip virtually all people of newer cohorts with formal post-compulsory education has
been placed high on the Swiss political agenda in recent years. In the course of this process,
the federal state and cantons have jointly deﬁned the aim to enhance the upper-secondary
graduation rate by age 25 from 90 to 95 percent by 2015 (EDK, 2006; EVD/EDI/EDK,
2011)1. One of the identiﬁed starting points is to work against the steadily increasing gradu-
ation age at upper-secondary level (EDK, 2006), mainly caused by decreasing rates of direct
entries into certifying education and, inversely, by increasing rates of young people in non-
certifying gap years after compulsory schooling. According to oﬃcial statistics2, about one
quarter of young people do not follow certifying education in the year after compulsory school
(age sixteen). Amongst them, a majority are observed to follow so-called “interim solution
1 EVD: Federal Department of Economic Aﬀairs, EDI: Federal Department of Home Aﬀairs, EDK: Swiss
Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education.
2 See the key indicators on education provided by the Swiss federal statistical oﬃce (FSO) at
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/15/17/blank/01.indicator.404301.4084.html,
Verla¨ufe und U¨berga¨nge - U¨bergang in die Sekundarstufe II.
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programs”. Similar developments are observed in Germany, where the rate of young people in
the so-called transitory system has been even more pronounced (approximately 40% in 2004
compared to 15% in Switzerland, see Hupka-Brunner et al., 2011). These interim solution
programs share some features with active labor market programs and are especially designed
to bridge the gap between lower-secondary and (labor market-based) upper-secondary educa-
tion, providing those who have neither found an apprenticeship training place nor admission
to general education schooling with relevant skills in order to enhance their chances of success-
fully entering certifying education the subsequent year. The main objective of this chapter
is to evaluate the short- and long-run impact of these programs.
Similar to other active programs, the prevalence and quantitative importance of interim
solutions is sometimes suspected to have the undesirable side eﬀect of an institutionalized
reinforcement of their necessity by, for example, increasing the expectations of training ﬁrms
or schools regarding educational prerequisites of applicants by facilitating the postponement
of educational decisions and serious search eﬀorts of compulsory school leavers for appren-
ticeship places, or by exculpating compulsory schools from adequately preparing pupils to
directly enter certifying tracks. Nevertheless, given the dominant role of these programs
in Switzerland, a pragmatic question that can be asked is whether the intended program
objectives are met such that participants fare better than they would in an alternative state.
Empirical knowledge on the eﬀects of diﬀerent sorts of gap years is important because they
potentially induce individual and social costs. First, lagged entries into certifying education
are associated with individual opportunity costs, especially if gap years are attributed to
redundant loops and waiting years that do not enhance—or even lower—the changes of
acquiring a certifying education afterwards (e.g., by stigmatization). In addition, in the case
of interim solution programs, there might be private direct costs (e.g., admission fees) and,
moreover, public direct costs and opportunity costs arising from the public supply of most
of these programs. On the other hand, there might be large individual and social gains
arising from interim solution programs, namely if these programs are eﬀective measures to,
ﬁrst, integrate individuals into upper-secondary education who otherwise would not have
succeeded in taking up any further studies or training; second, increase individuals’ chances
to enter more challenging tracks than otherwise possible; or, third, increase the possibility of
entering an educational track with a better match to someone’s interests and thus with lower
risks of dropping out of education or undergoing later career adjustments. So far, little is
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known about the causal eﬀects of interim solutions on further educational involvement and
success. Similarly, little is known about the eﬀects of gap years without any educational
activity.
This chapter analyzes how gap years spent in interim solution programs aﬀect, ﬁrst,
the chances of entering certifying education in the subsequent year; second, the intellectual
aspiration level of the certifying education taken up; and third, the success in acquiring upper-
secondary education by age 21, compared to both direct entries into certifying education and
to gap years without educational activity after compulsory schooling. As interim solution
programs might be more useful to some individuals in some cases, we will place emphasis
on detecting potential heterogeneity in program eﬀects and on a detailed discussion of the
(non-)selection into programs.
The lack of empirical evidence on the consequences of gap years and the eﬀectiveness of in-
terim solutions can be ascribed to the lack of longitudinal administrative data on educational
pathways in Switzerland. We use the Swiss follow-up survey of the PISA 2000-cohort TREE
(transition from education to employment), providing the only (large-scale) data on individ-
ual trajectories and later outcomes. Other studies based on these data suggest considerable
discontinuities and lagged entries after compulsory schooling, but also considerable numbers
of young people with gap years ﬁnally succeeding in taking up certifying education (Keller
et al., 2010; Hupka-Brunner et al., 2011). Furthermore, Buchholz et al. (2012) ﬁnd that the
Swiss education system, even though sharing many features with the German system, is more
eﬀective in integrating a vast majority of young people into market-based upper-secondary
education, especially those with only low cognitive competences who are regarded as not
capable of undergoing training in Germany. Buchholz et al. (2012) suggest that the Swiss
interim solution system might thus rather operate as a “jumping board”, whereas related
programs in Germany more often lead into a “dead end”. The eﬀect of diﬀerent sorts of gap
years has not been analyzed directly in these studies, however.
As the route someone follows after compulsory schooling is not randomly decided, an
assessment of the causal eﬀect of diﬀerent kinds of gap years on further educational success
requires speculation on what would have happened to a person had s/he taken up another
decision. We address this fundamental evaluation problem by applying propensity score
matching techniques with multiple treatments (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Imbens, 2000;
Lechner, 2001) based on the information from the TREE data. The data allow us to observe
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a wide set of background information on compulsory school graduates, including information
on PISA 2000 test scores, former school performance, expectations and behavior, parental
background, and regional information. We justify our estimation technic by assuming that
the treatment-control-group design based on this unusually rich set of variables allows us to
properly estimate counterfactual outcomes.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: more detailed information on the
institutional setting and the speciﬁc research questions are discussed in Section 4.2. Section
4.3 describes the data and the sample. The evaluation framework and estimation strategy is
presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 describes the treatment and control group construction,
and Section 4.6 is dedicated to the results of the empirical analyses. Section 4.7 concludes
the chapter.
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4.2 Institutional setting and hypothesis
In Switzerland, compulsory schooling ends after nine years (approximately at age 15), and
youngsters have to decide on their further educational pathway. While only a small share
decides to follow a general education track, the vast majority opts for VET-based educa-
tion (see SKBF-CSRE, 2011). There are about 250 diﬀerent vocational tracks regulated by
the federal state, with a high diversity of tracks regarding the intellectual aspiration level.
As following dual apprenticeship education requires having a contract with a training ﬁrm,
upper-secondary education is prone to market forces for a considerable part of a cohort.
It requires early vocational career orientation of compulsory school graduates, a match be-
tween supply and demand for apprenticeship places in diﬀerent vocational ﬁelds, and a match
between prerequisites of applicants and requirements of ﬁrms.
Even though the graduation rate at the upper-secondary education level has been in-
creasing over the last decade (according to federal statistics from 85.6% in 1990 to 93.7%
in 2010)3, the share of direct entries after compulsory school into certifying education has
decreased from 84 percent (year 1990) to 75 percent (year 2000, year 2010), mainly due to a
decrease in immediate transitions into vocational education and training (VET).4,5
At the same time, the share of compulsory school graduates following a non-certifying
intermediate school year has increased from 9% to 14%. As non-school-based activities are
not captured by oﬃcial statistics, there is no information on the activity followed by the rest of
the youngsters. They might either follow non-school-based interim solutions (language stays,
au pair work, traineeships) or, alternatively, do something that is not related to training or
education, such as jobbing, being unemployed, travelling or staying at home.
The role of (school or practical based) interim solution programs is to oﬀer a means
of bridging the gap between lower and upper-secondary education by providing those with
transition problems with more general education, ﬁrst practical working experience, career
orientation support, labor market relevant values or better language skills, depending on
3 See the key indicators on education provided by the Swiss federal statistical oﬃce (FSO) at
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/15/17/blank/01.indicator.405101.4015.html, Ab-
schlussquote auf der Sekundarstufe II.
4 See the key indicators on education provided by the Swiss federal statistical oﬃce (FSO) at
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/15/17/blank/01.indicator.404301.4084.html,
Verla¨ufe und U¨berga¨nge - U¨bergang in die Sekundarstufe II.
5 Note that all these ﬁgures are based on cross-section data, as it has not been possible in oﬃcial statistics to
longitudinally observe educational pathways (or pathways out of the educational system) at the individual
level until recently. As of the year 2012, this will be possible because of the introduction of an individual
identiﬁcation number.
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the concrete program (see Egger, Dreher & Partner AG, 2007, for a detailed description
on the system of interim solutions). Programs can be scholastic or practical oriented, or a
combination of the two. Many programs are administered by cantonal vocational training
departments and provided by either public or private institutions. There are substantial
diﬀerences between cantons with respect to the degree of coordination of these programs and
with respect to the quantitative importance of such programs. There is a wide heterogene-
ity of programs, too, all with respect to content, target population, admission costs, and
providers.
Large parts of programs are solely school based (so-called “10th school years”) and pro-
vide participants with additional general education. Amongst them, some programs put
higher focus on enhancing linguistic competence (especially for participants with migration
background) and some programs are targeted towards preparatory schooling for a certain
occupational ﬁeld, eventually combined with practical pre-trainings within school or in ﬁrms.
These programs are sometimes fee based and mostly require early application. To ﬁnd
admission, applicants have to produce evidence of considerable past search eﬀort and cur-
rent motivation towards educational activities. Applicants with the least severe scholastic,
personal, or familiar deﬁcits are most likely to be chosen as participants (Egger et al., 2007);
the youngsters most at risk, namely those lacking school motivation or those with the most
problematic deﬁcit structure, are unlikely to be reached by those programs. Apart from pri-
vately organized and ﬁnanced solutions, alternative options are provided by so-called “pre-
apprenticeships” or other practical-oriented preparatory courses. The latter can be started
even after the beginning date of the new school year. They still require, however, the partic-
ipation of ﬁrms and a certain basic motivation on the part of the applicant.
For compulsory school graduates who, by the end of compulsory schooling, have not yet
found any bridging solution for the following year, there are low-threshold programs (so-
called “motivation semesters”) that are funded by the unemployment insurance oﬃce and
organized by job placement institutions on behalf of social security services of municipalities.
Apart from unemployment registration, there are hardly any admission requirements to be
fulﬁlled.
The systemic function of a variety of these non-certifying interim solutions can be sum-
marized as follows (Meyer, 2003):
• Compensatory function: To smooth away scholastic, linguistic, motivational, behav-
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ioral, or other deﬁcits to enable participants to achieve success in the post-compulsory
educational market and in the world of work
• Orientation function: To support young people in deciding on their further educational
pathway and in their choice of profession
• Buﬀer function: To provide compulsory school graduates with a sort of daily structure
if they cannot enter post-compulsory education due to shortages in apprenticeship
openings or due to minimum age requirements, as for example in the health sector
(“institutionalized waiting room”).
The importance of the last-mentioned counter-cyclical absorber function is bolstered by
oﬃcial statistics that show ﬂuctuations in the share of young people in interim solutions
that are diametrical to the business cycle and to entries into apprenticeship trainings (FSO,
2007a,b). However, even in times of economic downturns, there are ﬁrms claiming to ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to ﬁnd adequate apprentices due to insuﬃcient academic endowment or lack of
maturity among applicants (LINK, 2009), implying that some sort of qualiﬁcation mismatch
or mismatch between supply and demand for speciﬁc vocational tracks is likely to exist.
The diﬀerent functions of interim solutions are thus not easy to disentangle. In many cases,
compulsory school graduates who have not found an apprenticeship place in their desired oc-
cupational ﬁeld prefer to wait a year instead of taking up a diﬀerent apprenticeship (LINK,
2009). For some challenging apprenticeship tracks (e.g., IT-technicians, commercial employ-
ees), many ﬁrms explicitly demand a 10th school year from applicants who have only followed
a low-level compulsory school track. The compensation function of interim solutions is thus
not limited to supporting weak performers in getting any (possibly low-level) apprenticeship
place, but presumably plays also an important role in enabling high motivated and well
performing pupils of low-level compulsory schools to enter an apprenticeship at the highest
aspiration level. However, it might be generally diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between the compen-
sation function (which assumes accumulation of new human capital) and the pure signaling
potential of interim solutions.
Even though the eﬀectiveness of interim solution programs in enabling subsequent entry
into certifying education has not yet been investigated, there are some case studies, implying
success rates of programs of around 70 percent (Egger et al., 2007).
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The issue of whether successful subsequent entries into certifying education should directly
be attributed to interim solution programs depends on the hypothetical entry rate that would
have occurred in the absence of such programs. For example, if only the waiting queue
function was of importance, one might argue that there are alternative activities that could,
during the year of waiting for an apprenticeship or school place, keep young people “oﬀ the
streets” as well, such as unskilled work, possibly leading to equal chances to start a certifying
education afterwards.
In order to assess whether interim solution programs meet their intention to causally
enhance subsequent chances, we ﬁrst compare upper-secondary entry rates of interim solution
program participants with entry rates of those without educational activity during the gap
year, taking into account the fact that the two groups might substantially diﬀer from each
other with respect to individual characteristics. The latter seems to be particularly important,
because it is straightforward to expect that those who choose interim solution programs
(instead of no educational activity) are a positively selected group with regard to ability,
motivation, parental support, educational expectations, and other factors that might lead to
higher success rates even without participating in programs.
A similar argument can be made for the second outcome of interest, the intellectual aspi-
ration level of the certifying track taken up after the gap year. If gap years are about waiting
for better apprenticeship places (prolonged search), then one should not expect diﬀerences in
chances between the two gap year groups, all else being equal. In case of eﬀective programs,
however, those from interim solution programs should fare batter. As for the comparison
to the group with a direct entry, one would expect higher aspiration levels for the interim
solution group as well.
The third outcome under investigation, the certiﬁcation rate by age 21, helps us to explore
the long-term eﬀects of having gap years after compulsory schooling.
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4.3 Data and sample
We make use of the following information in the TREE data: ﬁrst, we restrict the sample
to individuals in low- or medium-level compulsory school tracks in ninth grade (tracks with
basic requirements, tracks with extended requirements, and tracks without selection). By
doing so, we drop those in (pre-)gymnasial tracks. In principle, this group just continues
gymnasial schooling at upper-secondary level and does not belong to the sample at risk of
having involuntary gap years. This is not to say that observed gap years in the remaining
sample always are of involuntary nature. As described in section 4.2, gap years may occur
due to failed applications at schools and ﬁrms, prolonged search, the decision to enhance
chances in ﬁrms or schools through more schooling, and, ﬁnally, a lack of motivation to
follow post-compulsory education. The data do not allow us to distinguish between the
reasons for gap years in a clear-cut manner. However, the data do provide us with a lot of
background information that helps us to predict activities after compulsory school. Hence, we
restrict the sample to cases with non-missing information in important predicting variables
(individual characteristics) and, further, to cases with non-missing information in the ﬁrst
outcome variables.
The information on the activity after compulsory school stems from the ﬁrst TREE wave
(t1), the wave in the year after the PISA 2000 survey. It refers to a point in time approxi-
mately nine months after the end of compulsory schooling. There are 3,311 cases for which we
have valid background information and information on activities after compulsory schooling.
We distinguish between three groups, also denoted as treatment groups : the group with
direct entry into certifying education, the group that follows some kind of interim solution
program as described in section 4.2, and the no education group that does not follow any
educational activity during this year. In the following, the latter groups are sometimes also
referred to as the two gap year groups. While the group with no educational activity is
easy to deﬁne, there is a wide range of heterogeneous programs pooled under the term in-
terim solutions. In our data, approximately two-thirds in this group follow an additional
(non-certifying) school year or a so-called motivational semester, and approximately 15 per-
cent follow a pre-apprenticeship (Vorlehre) or an internship. The rest follows some kind of
preparatory classes (Vorkurs), language studies (also au pairs) or other activities related to
schooling or training. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the activity in the ﬁrst TREE wave:
76.56 percent of our sample are in certifying education, 20.45 percent in an interim solution,
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and 2.99 percent without educational activity.
Table 4.1: Outcomes by treatment groups
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3
Treatment (t1) N % Entry by t2 Low aspiration level Diploma by t6
Direct entry 2535 76.56% 100.00% 19.76% 96.22%
Interim solution 677 20.45% 72.23% 25.98% 89.04%
No education 99 2.99% 48.48% 48.94% 55.77%
Total sample 3311 100.00% 776 3’067 2’254
Note: the shadowed categories are the groups used for comparisons
In order to evaluate the eﬀect of uneven transitions on educational outcomes, we start
to analyze the eﬀect of the two kinds of gap years on successful transition in the subsequent
year (TREE wave t2). The success rate of entering certifying education in the second year
after compulsory schooling (outcome 1) amounts to 72.23 percent among those coming from
interim solutions and to 48.48 percent among those without educational activity. Because
the direct entry group was successful by deﬁnition at the time of wave 2, this group is not
used for comparison.
As for the second outcome of interest (outcome 2), we analyze whether we ﬁnd disadvan-
tages of lagged entries with respect to the intellectual aspiration level of the chosen certifying
education. According to table 4.1, the most successful group, that is, the group with the
lowest share of individuals in low-level upper-secondary tracks, is found among the group
with a direct entry (19.76%), followed by the group coming from interim solutions (25.98%)
and by the group coming from a gap year without educational activity (48.94%). Note that
intellectual aspiration level refers to the year of entry into certifying education and thus either
stems from wave t1 (direct entry) or t2 (lagged entry), depending on the starting time. The
aspiration levels for 101 diﬀerent vocational tracks were rated by an expert group of voca-
tional advisers (for details and studies using this variable see Stalder, 2011).6 For individuals
following a full-time schooling variant of apprenticeship training, we assume the aspiration
level of the equivalent ﬁrm-based apprenticeship training occupation. Gymnasium and other
general education tracks are assumed to be high level.
The last outcome of interest (outcome 3) is whether or not someone has acquired a
diploma7 at the upper-secondary level six years after compulsory schooling (TREE wave t6).
6 We have imputed missing information (1.4%) about the aspiration level of less common tracks by regressing
on training duration (years), on the amount of vocational schooling lectures (hours per year) and on an
interaction term between the two. These factors strongly explain the aspiration level (R-squared of 84%).
7 There is a small minority of individuals that has not yet ﬁnished initial education, but is however enrolled
in upper-secondary education and is near graduation. We regard this minority as successful, even though
there remains some residual risk that some of these individuals might fail in the end.
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This is around age 21 for most of the individuals, depending on their age at the time of
the PISA test in 2000. If an individual had not acquired a diploma until spring 2006 and
is not enrolled in certifying education at this point in time, he or she is regarded as not
having acquired upper-secondary education. According to table 4.1, the graduation rate is
96.22 percent among those with a direct entry, 89.04 among those having followed an interim
solution program, and 55.77 percent among those without educational activity in the year
after compulsory schooling. As it also comes out of table 4.1, there is attrition in our sample
between wave t1 and t6 of around 32 percent. We assume that attrition is ignorable.
The empirical strategy in the remainder of this chapter is to estimate the outcome diﬀer-
ences between the three treatment groups that can be causally attributed to the activity at
the time of t1. In order to build valid control groups, we make use of the following information
measured in the ninth grade of compulsory schooling: for the sociodemographic and family
background characteristics, we use gender, age, immigration status, family structure, highest
achieved parental education, parental socioeconomic status (HISEI), and an index for the
number of books at home. Information on school performance and ability is represented by
the compulsory school track level, school marks in both regional language and mathematics,
and, ﬁnally, PISA test scores in both reading literacy and mathematics/sciences. Apart from
scholastic ability measures, the data also provides us with information on personal attitudes
and motivational context variables : we use indices on school absenteeism8, eﬀort and perse-
verance, family support in school matters, and expected socioeconomic status at the age of
30. To capture regional heterogeneity, we use detailed information on the place of residence
of the respondents, that is, dummies for so-called “greater regions”, a variable indicating
urbanity, dummies for municipality size, and a variable with information on the cantonal
supply of interim solution programs according to administrative data from the Swiss Federal
Oﬃce. Detailed information on the creation of all these variables is presented in table 4.A1 in
the appendix. For descriptive statistics and the distribution of characteristics by treatment
groups, we refer to table 4.2 and its discussion in section 4.5.
8 We do not know, however, the exact reasons for absenteeism at compulsory school; it might be caused, for
example, by motivational deﬁcits, family problems, or health problems.
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4.4 Empirical strategy
4.4.1 The evaluation problem and propensity score matching
To estimate the causal impact of gap years on later educational outcomes, it is necessary to
know what the outcome would have been if individuals had not chosen gap years. Because
a person cannot be a participant and a non-participant in a gap year at the same time,
we can never observe the counterfactual, namely the outcome that would have resulted if
an individual had made an alternative choice. This is the so-called fundamental evaluation
problem (see Heckman et al., 1999). The potential-outcome approach to causality suggested
by Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974) provides the standard analytical framework to address this
issue.
Assuming for now that we only face two groups (e.g., gap years versus certifying edu-
cation), the evaluation problem can be exposed and solved as follows: Let D be the binary
indicator describing treatment status with D = 1 for participants and D = 0 for non-
participants. Y1 and Y0 denote the potential outcomes for participants and non-participants
in both hypothetical states.
As we only observe the outcome for each individual in one regime (Y1 if D = 1 and Y0 if
D = 0), the observed outcomes can be written in terms of potential outcomes as
Y = DY1 + (1−D)Y0 = Y0 +D(Y1 − Y0) (4.1)
The causal eﬀect of treatment D is deﬁned by the diﬀerence of the two potential outcomes
Δ = Y1−Y0. However, Δ can never be known, because the counterfactual individual outcome
(Y1 if D = 0 and Y0 if D = 1) is unobservable.
Nevertheless, under certain assumptions that will be discussed further below, important
parameters can be estimated at the population level, that is the average treatment eﬀect
on the treated (ATT), the average treatment eﬀect on the untreated (ATU) and the average
treatment eﬀect (ATE). They can be written as follows:
ΔATT = E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) = E(Y1|D = 1)− E(Y0|D = 1) (4.2)
ΔATU = E(Y1 − Y0|D = 0) = E(Y1|D = 0)− E(Y0|D = 0) (4.3)
ΔATE = E(Y1 − Y0) = ATT × P (D = 1) + ATU × P (D = 0) (4.4)
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If treatment eﬀects are heterogeneous, the mean impact of attending the program on
those who attend the program (ATT) might diﬀer from the mean impact of attending the
program on those persons not attending the program (ATU) and from the mean impact of
attending the program on a randomly selected person in the population (ATE).
The parameter of interest in evaluation studies is most often the ATT. While E(Y1|D = 1)
in (4.2) can be estimated by the sample mean of Y1 in the subsample of participants, the
counterfactual mean E(Y0|D = 1) remains unknown. The true parameter ΔATT is thus only
identiﬁed if we can substitute the unobserved expected counterfactual outcome of participants
E(Y0|D = 1) by the observed mean outcomes of non-participants E(Y0|D = 0), that is
if E(Y1|D = 1) = E(Y0|D = 0).9 In a natural experiment, this is ensured because the
assignment of D is random. Therefore, the two groups should not systematically diﬀer in pre-
treatment characteristics and non-participants (D = 0) can be used to estimate E(Y0|D = 1).
However, there is no random assignment in our case and participants are likely to diﬀer in a
systematic manner from non-participants (selection bias). We cannot estimate ΔATT , ΔATE,
or ΔATU without imposing assumptions.
One possible identifying assumption to solve the identiﬁcation problem10 is the conditional
independence assumption (CIA) proposed by Rubin (1977). The CIA states that, given a
set of observable covariates X that are not aﬀected by treatment D, potential outcomes are
independent of treatment assignments:
Y0, Y1 ⊥ D|X (4.5)
This way of identiﬁcation is at the core of the matching estimators as well as of the
OLS-regression. While the OLS-regression is based on parametric assumptions, the idea of
matching is to pair each program participant with an observably similar non-participant and
interpret the diﬀerence in their outcomes as the eﬀect of the program.
The CIA assumption11, also referred to as unconfoundedness, ignorable treatment assign-
9 This applies analogously for identifying ΔATU , where we need E(Y1|D = 1) = E(Y1|D = 0) because
E(Y1|D = 0) is unobservable. To identify ΔATE , we need both.
10 Heckman et al. (1999) and Angrist and Krueger (1999) provide an overview on a wide set of available
identiﬁcation and estimation strategies.
11 In order to identify the ΔATT in equation (4.2), the weaker assumption that participation D is independent
of the non-treatment outcome is suﬃcient, that is Y 0 ⊥ D|X. The possibility that self-selection depends
on the treated outcome Y 1 does not have to be ruled out. Symmetrically, to identify ΔATU it is suﬃcient
to assume Y 1 ⊥ D|X. The additional challenge when estimating the ΔATE in equation (4.4) is thus that
both counterfactual outcomes E(Y 0|D = 1) and E(Y 1|D = 0) have to be constructed by assuming (4.5).
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ment, or selection on observables assumption, therefore implies that the selection bias can
be removed by conditioning on observable characteristics X. To justify the CIA assumption
that underlies this procedure, it is crucial to identify and observe all variables that could be
mutually correlated with assignment and potential outcomes. Naturally, the plausibility of
this assumption heavily relies on the quality and richness of the data. As our data described
in section 4.3 contains an unusual large and informative set of information, we assume that
CIA holds in our case.
Under CIA, the diﬀerence and hence the source of the bias between the treated and
the control group can be removed by constructing a comparison group that is as similar as
possible to the treatment group based on statistical matching on covariates or by applying
regression techniques. The latter, however, imposes functional form assumptions that might
not be adequate. In turn, matching on all covariates of a high dimensional vector X becomes
problematic, as it might be impossible to ﬁnd identical control-group individuals with respect
to all characteristics (the so-called curse of dimensionality).
A solution to the dimensionality problem is the use of the propensity score (PS) as a
balancing score. The propensity score P (X) = P (D = 1|X) is deﬁned as the probability
0 < P (X) < 1 of participating in a treatment given characteristics X. Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) show that if potential outcomes are independent of treatment conditional on
covariates X (that is if the CIA holds), they are also independent of treatment conditional
on a balancing score b(X).
The CIA based on the propensity score P (X) is the key assumption of the propensity
score matching technic and can be written as
Y0, Y1 ⊥ D|P (X) (4.6)
A further requirement to perform propensity score matching is the common support or
overlap condition, which can be expressed as
0 < P (D = 1|X) < 1 (4.7)
The common support condition12 states that persons with the same X values must have a
positive probability of being both participant and non-participant (Heckman et al., 1999). If
12 This condition reduces to P (D = 1|X) < 1 for ΔATT and to 0 < P (D = 1|X) for ΔATT .
4.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 95
there are X for which everyone gets the treatment, the matching procedure fails to construct
the counterfactual outcome for these individuals. While both linear regression and matching
methods rely on the CIA assumption, the common support assumption is speciﬁc only to
matching methods; linear regression extrapolates empty cells by functional form assumptions.
To estimate the propensity score, any discrete choice model such as the logit or probit
model can be used. When estimating the variance of the treatment eﬀect, one should address
the fact that the propensity score represents an estimated rather than a known value. A
typical solution that will be followed in our analysis is the usage of bootstrapping methods.
4.4.2 Extension to the multiple treatment case
As described in section 4.3, the individuals in our study face three diﬀerent alternatives after
compulsory schooling, namely 1) direct entry into certifying education, 2) institutionalized
interim solutions, and 3) unstructured gap years. Our aim is to estimate the causal eﬀect
of 2) versus 3) on successful entry into certifying education the year after the gap year, but
also the causal eﬀect of 2) or 3) versus 1) on avoiding low education level tracks and on later
educational outcomes. In short, our individuals face a setting of multiple treatments13.
According to Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000), the major properties shown by Rubin
(1977) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) discussed above can be generalized to the multiple
treatment case. In the notation of Lechner (1999), the two-state case can be extended as
follows:
The outcomes of (M + 1) mutually exclusive treatments are denoted by {Y0, Y1, ..., YM}.
It is assumed that each participant receives exactly one of the treatments. Therefore, for
any participant, only one component of {Y0, Y1, ..., YM} can be observed in the data, and
the remaining M outcomes are counterfactuals. Participation in a particular treatment m is
indicated by the variable S ∈ {0, 1, ...M}. The focus now lies on the pair-wise comparison of
the eﬀects of treatments m and l. The average treatment eﬀects parameters are
ΔATEm,l∗ = E(Ym − Yl) = E(Ym − E(Yl) (4.8)
ΔATEm,l = E(Ym − Yl|S = m, l) = E(Ym|S = m, l)− E(Yl|S = m, l) (4.9)
ΔATTm,l = E(Ym − Yl|S = m) = E(Ym|S = m)− E(Yl|S = m) (4.10)
13 In line with the literature, all options in the choice set of individuals are called ’treatment’ in the following.
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where ΔATEm,l∗ denotes the expected eﬀect of treatment m relative to treatment l for a
participant randomly drawn from the population and, similarly, ΔATEm,l denotes the same eﬀect
for a participant randomly selected from the group of participants in either m or l. Both
average treatment eﬀects are symmetric in the sense that ΔATEm,l = −ΔATEl,m . Further, ΔATTm,l
is the expected eﬀect for an individual randomly drawn from the population of participants
in treatment m only. If participants in treatments m and l diﬀer in a way that is related to
the distribution of X, and if the treatment eﬀects vary with X, then ΔATTm,l = −ΔATTl,m . Since
ΔATUm,l = Δ
ATT
l,m it follows that Δ
ATE
m,l is a weighted combination of Δ
ATT
m,l and Δ
ATT
l,m , where
weights are given by the participation probabilities in the respective states m and l.
Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) show that all these parameters can be identiﬁed under
the extended CIA assumption (and a generalization of the balancing score property), because
it identiﬁes E(Yl|S = m) for all combinations of l and m. The CIA for the case of multiple
treatments is
Y0, Y1, ..., YM ⊥ S|P (X) (4.11)
The common support condition further extends to the requirement that all individuals
actually have the possibility of participating in all states such that all participants in a
treatment have counterparts in the other groups.
Lechner (2001) also shows, that for the identiﬁcation of ΔATEm,l , Δ
ATT
m,l and Δ
ATT
l,m the CIA
is only necessary to hold in the subsample of participants in treatments m and l. This implies
that only this subsample is necessary for the empirical analysis. Thus, when we are interested
in comparing two programs for participants in one of those two, the existence of multiple
treatments can in fact be ignored, since individuals who do not take part in either program
are not needed for identiﬁcation.
There are several alternative ways to estimate the propensity scores within this framework
(Lechner, 2001, 2002). One of them is to use a multinomial probit or logit model including
all alternatives, where Pl|ml(X) can be derived from Pl(X)/[Pl(X)+Pm(X)]. As multinomial
probit models are computational burdensome and multinomial logit models are based on the
IIA-assumption, an alternative way is to estimate a series of M(M − 1)/2 diﬀerent binary
choice models. Lechner (2002) ﬁnds only little diﬀerence in the relative performance of
these estimation strategies. As we only consider a small amount of alternative activities
(treatments) in this study, we will perform separate binary logit models to estimate our
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balancing scores. Our aim is to estimate ΔATEm,l in equation (4.9) and Δ
ATT
m,l in equation
(4.10) for all combinations of m and l.
As the multiple treatment case can be reduced to several estimations of binary treatments,
we go back to our original notation in the following.
4.4.3 The matching procedure
a) Matching algorithms
Exact matching on the propensity score is diﬃcult in practice, as there might not be many
individuals in the comparison group who show exactly the same propensity score as individ-
uals in the treatment group. Therefore, the objective is to match units that are suﬃciently
close to each other. A typical matching estimator for the ATT takes the following general
form (see Smith and Todd, 2005)
ATTM =
1
ni
∑
i∈I1∩SP
(
Yi1 −
∑
j∈I0
wijYj0
)
(4.12)
where I1 denotes the set of program participants, I0 the set of non-participants, SP the
region of common support (see further below for ways of constructing this set), and n1 the
number of persons in the set I1∩SP . The match for each participant i ∈ I1∩SP is constructed
as a weighted average over the outcomes of non-participants, where the weights wij depend
on the distance between the propensity scores Pi(X) and Pj(X).
For each individual i in the sample of participants, there has to be deﬁned a neighborhood
C(Pi(X)). Neighbors who are matched to i are non-participants j ∈ I0|Pj(X) ∈ C(Pi(X)).
Alternative matching estimators diﬀer in how the neighborhood is deﬁned and in how the
weights wij are constructed (see Heckman et al., 1997, 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002;
Heckman et al., 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). All matching
estimators face a trade-oﬀ between bias and variance of the estimation; in small samples, the
choice of matching algorithm can be important (Heckman et al., 1997). We therefore use and
compare the results of (variants) of the following matching algorithms:
Nearest neighbor matching (NNM) is the traditional pairwise matching without replace-
ment, where non-participants with the value of Pj(X) that is closest to Pi(X) are matched to
each treated individual, that is C(Pi(X)) = min
j
‖Pi(X)−Pj(X)‖, j ∈ I0. We use a variant of
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this algorithm that matches the ﬁve nearest neighbors (5NNM) with replacement within the
region of common support. Each nearest neighbor receives equal weight in constructing the
counterfactual mean outcome. By allowing for replacement, we increase the average quality
of the matches, as we face rather small samples in some of the estimations. In turn, allowing
for ﬁve instead of only one nearest neighbor may increase the bias due to poorer matches on
average, but it also uses more information to construct the counterfactual for each participant
and thus enhances the precision of the estimation.
If the closest neighbors are far away, nearest neighbor matching faces the risk of bad
matches. This can be avoided by imposing a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score
distance, the so-called caliper. In caliper matching, matches for individual i are then selected
only if C(Pi(X)) = {Pj(X)|‖Pi(X)− Pj(X)‖ < } , j ∈ I0, where  stands for the maximum
diﬀerence that we allow between the propensity scores. A variant of caliper matching is the
radius matching suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), which not only uses the nearest
n neighbors within the deﬁned caliper, but all possible matches within the speciﬁed radius.
This algorithm allows an oversampling of good matches (if available) and disregards bad
matches. A possible drawback is the arbitrary nature of the chosen caliper (Smith and Todd,
2005). We will show results for radius matching with caliper 0.02.
In contrast to the discussed estimators, the kernel matching algorithm does not only
consider some of the observations of the comparison group; it uses a weighted average of all
individuals of the comparison group to construct the counterfactual outcome. The weights
depend on the distance between the treaded individual and each observation from the control
group. Higher weight is placed on persons close in terms of X and lower weight on more
distant individuals. The weights of the kernel matching estimator take the form
wij =
G(
Pj(X)−Pi(X)
an
)∑
k∈I0 G(
Pk(X)−Pi(X)
an
)
, (4.13)
where G(·) is a kernel function and an is a bandwidth parameter14. Nonzero values of
this weight implicitly deﬁne C(Pi(X)) for this version of matching. This algorithm achieves
a higher precision because more information is used than just the nearest neighbors; as all
comparison group observations are used to estimate the missing counterfactual outcome, a
proper implementation of the common support condition is very important for bias reduction.
14 We use an epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06, which is the default for kernel matching in the
Stata application psmatch2.
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b) Estimating treatment eﬀects
In general, the propensity score matching estimator is simply the mean diﬀerence in outcomes
of the treatment and control group over the common support, weighted by the weights given
to the matched observations among the non-treated (to estimate the ATT) or among the
treated (to estimate the ATU).
c) The common support condition
As discussed in section 4.4.1, the various treatment eﬀects are only deﬁned in the region
of common support. Suﬃcient overlap is important to ensure that we compare comparable
individuals. While for the estimation of the ATT it is suﬃcient to have potential matches in
the control group, the estimation of the ATE additionally requires that the characteristics of
the comparison group are also observed in the treatment group. If there are ranges without
overlap and with a large number of observations oﬀ support, the estimated eﬀects might only
be viewed as relating to the sub-population within support. However, holes in the support
(e.g., in the region close to 1) do not necessarily always constitute an asymptotic support
(identiﬁcation) problem, but might in practice also arise from a small sample size (Lechner,
2008). From a small sample argumentation, it is not beforehand clear whether it is better
to allow for some mismatch or whether to adjust the support: Lechner (2008) notes that
both may be misleading, ignoring the support problem or estimating treatment eﬀects only
within the support region. Lechner (2008) provides an approach to derive bounds for the true
eﬀect. There are diﬀerent possibilities to check and impose the common support criterion
(see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). After a visual analysis of the density distribution of
the propensity scores in the groups, the approach we follow is the Minima and Maxima
comparison. We ignore all observations with propensity scores smaller than the minimum
and larger than the maximum in the opposite group. This might be overrestrictive, if there
are many observations very close to the bounds that are discarded. We face this situation
in some of our estimations. For comparison to the basic version, we have also performed
estimations that use a caliper criterion instead of the minima-maxima comparison around
the bounds. Results did not change substantially by doing so (not presented).
Generally, it can be seen as an advantage of matching techniques that they explicitly high-
light the common support problem, which would also be present in parametric estimations
but overlooked due to functional form assumptions.
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d) Testing the balancing between treatment and controls
The aim of propensity core matching is to construct a comparison group, that is, to balance
the distribution of X in the treatment and control group by reweighting observations. Since
we match observations on the basis of similar (but not necessarily identical) propensity scores,
the quality of the matching procedure has to be checked by testing the balancing of the
covariates after matching. There are several indicators applied in the literature to check the
matching quality (see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).
An indicator called standardized bias (SB) has been suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985) and is deﬁned for each variable X as “the diﬀerence of the sample means in the
treated and non-treated (full or matched) sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of
the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups”. The standardized
bias before matching (SBU) and after matching (SBM) is computed as
15
SBU =
100× (X¯1U − X¯0U)√
0.5× (V1U(X) + V0U(X))
, SBM =
100× (X¯1M − X¯0M)√
0.5× (V1U(X) + V0U(X))
(4.14)
There is no formal criteria in the literature for when a standardized bias is too large.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that a value of 20 is “large”. In most empirical studies,
a mean bias reduction below 3% or 5% after matching is seen as suﬃcient.
Another procedure is to use t-test for equality of covariate means in the treated and non-
treated group, both before and after matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). This check
for signiﬁcant diﬀerences is implemented by a regression of each variable on the treatment
indicator. After matching, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences should be found.
A similar approach (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003; Sianesi, 2004) is to estimate the propensity
score for the treatment decision on all the variables before and after matching and then to
compare both Pseudo-R2 and p-values of the likelihood-ratio test for joint signiﬁcance of all
the regressors. After matching, the Pseudo-R2 should be very low and the regressors should
not be signiﬁcant for the treatment decision anymore.
Due to the dependence of some balancing tests on sample size (t-test, joint signiﬁcance)
and thus the higher probability to pass a test in small samples, we use all the described
balancing tests in combination, but mostly lean on evaluating the standardized bias.
15 Holding the variability constant, the diﬀerence between SBU and SBM represents the bias reduction, see
http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2012-03/msg01111.html.
4.5. ESTIMATION: THE MATCHING PROCEDURE 101
4.5 Estimation: The matching procedure
This section presents the matching procedure. We pairwise compare and match individuals of
three groups to each other: the group without educational activity after compulsory schooling
(denoted as N.E. for no education), the group in interim solutions (denoted as I.S. for interim
solution), and the group with direct entry into certifying education (denoted as D.E. for direct
entry). In subsection 4.5.1, we investigate the distribution of pre-treatment characteristics
across groups. Subsection 4.5.2 presents the propensity score estimation. Subsection 4.5.3
discusses the balancing of covariates and common support issues after matching.
4.5.1 Distribution of characteristics before matching
Before performing the match, it is important to evaluate how the groups of interest initially
diﬀer from each other. Table 4.2 shows variable means, pairwise t-test results for equality
of means across groups, and standardized biases for all variables before matching. Table 4.2
reveals considerable biases and thus unequal distributions for most of the variables across
groups. Even though t-test results are not very reliable (small sample), we note that, in our
case, they always point to a signiﬁcant mean diﬀerence when the bias is most severe (>20).
The comparison of the interim solution group and the direct entry group reveals that
individuals in interim solutions are (signiﬁcantly) more often female, ﬁrst generation immi-
grants, and older than the standard age (which could be due to school year repetitions in
the past) than those with a direct entry. Their family background is less favorable, all in
terms of parental education, family structure, socioeconomic status and the number of books
at home. Further, they exhibit a less successful educational history: they more often come
from low-level compulsory school tracks, they have lower school marks in the oﬃcial regional
language and mathematics, and they show inferior performance in the PISA tests in reading
and mathematics/sciences. Individuals in the interim solution group on average express lower
expectations with regard to their own socioeconomic status at age 30. There is also a higher
share of individuals with no clear idea about their occupational aim compared to the group
with a direct entry. Further, there are pronounced regional diﬀerences across the two groups
that might reﬂect both institutional and regional eﬀects. For example, the cantonal supply
of interim solutions is higher among the group in interim solutions than among the group
with direct entry (and also higher than in the group without educational activity).
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Table 4.2: Distribution of characteristics between the groups (before matching)
N.E. I.S. D.E. N.E.(1) vs. I.S.(0) I.S.(1) vs. D.E.(0) N.E.(1) vs. D.E.(0)
Variables (at PISA 2000) (No edu- (Interim (Direct comparison comparison comparison
cation) Solution) entry)
mean mean mean t-test %bias t-test %bias t-test %bias
Female 0.495 0.722 0.496 −4.64∗∗∗ -47.8 10.69∗∗∗ 47.7 −0.02 -0.2
Swiss 0.616 0.765 0.785 −3.20∗∗∗ -32.6 −1.11 -4.8 −3.98∗∗∗ -37.4
2nd generation immigrant 0.121 0.089 0.104 1.04 10.6 −1.19 -5.3 0.54 5.4
1st generation immigrant 0.263 0.146 0.111 2.96 ∗ ∗ 29.1 2.53∗ 10.6 4.63∗∗∗ 39.6
>= Age 16 0.354 0.297 0.213 1.14 12.1 4.64∗∗∗ 19.4 3.34∗∗∗ 31.6
Parental education: compulsory 0.485 0.371 0.253 2.18∗ 23.1 6.12∗∗∗ 25.6 5.18∗∗∗ 49.4
Parental education: secondary II 0.242 0.322 0.376 −1.60 -17.7 −2.59 ∗ ∗ -11.3 −2.70 ∗ ∗ -29.1
Parental education: tertiary 0.263 0.273 0.340 −0.22 -2.4 −3.32∗∗∗ -14.6 −1.61 -17.0
Parental educ: missing 0.010 0.034 0.031 −1.28 -16.3 0.42 1.8 −1.18 -14.6
Nuclear family structure 0.556 0.752 0.795 −4.13∗∗∗ -42.0 −2.45∗ -10.4 −5.74∗∗∗ -52.8
Socioeconomic status (Index) 41.143 44.691 47.833 −2.28∗ -24.8 −4.71∗∗∗ -20.8 −4.18∗∗∗ -44.9
Number of books at home (Index) 3.768 4.375 4.505 −3.91∗∗∗ -41.1 −2.00∗ -8.8 −4.76∗∗∗ -48.5
Level compulsory school: medium 0.455 0.439 0.549 0.30 3.2 −5.13∗∗∗ -22.2 −1.85+ -18.9
Level compulsory school: low 0.455 0.487 0.350 −0.61 -6.6 6.58∗∗∗ 28.1 2.13∗ 21.3
Level compulsory school: no select. 0.091 0.074 0.101 0.60 6.2 −2.11∗ -9.5 −0.31 -3.3
Mark test language: insuﬃcient 0.061 0.028 0.031 1.71+ 15.8 −0.42 -1.8 1.63 14.1
Mark test language: suﬃcient 0.384 0.285 0.339 2.01∗ 21.0 −2.65 ∗ ∗ -11.6 0.93 9.3
Mark test language: good 0.465 0.628 0.596 −3.12 ∗ ∗ -33.1 1.50 6.5 −2.61 ∗ ∗ -26.5
Mark test language: missing 0.091 0.059 0.034 1.22 12.1 3.00 ∗ ∗ 12.0 2.99 ∗ ∗ 23.6
Mark mathematics: insuﬃcient 0.121 0.087 0.064 1.10 11.1 2.16∗ 9.0 2.28∗ 20.0
Mark mathematics: suﬃcient 0.354 0.353 0.351 0.01 0.1 0.07 0.3 0.04 0.4
Mark mathematics: good 0.444 0.502 0.548 −1.07 -11.6 −2.12∗ -9.2 −2.03∗ -20.8
Mark mathematics: missing 0.081 0.058 0.037 0.90 9.1 2.38∗ 9.7 2.21∗ 18.6
Reading literacy PISA: 0 0.111 0.062 0.027 1.81+ 17.5 4.49∗∗∗ 17.1 4.84∗∗∗ 33.6
Reading literacy PISA: 1 0.242 0.145 0.104 2.50∗ 24.8 3.00 ∗ ∗ 12.4 4.36∗∗∗ 37.2
Reading literacy PISA: 2 0.283 0.287 0.243 −0.08 -0.8 2.34∗ 10.0 0.91 9.1
Reading literacy PISA: 3 0.253 0.335 0.373 −1.64 -18.2 −1.82+ -7.9 −2.44∗ -26.2
Reading literacy PISA: 4 0.081 0.149 0.212 −1.83+ -21.5 −3.66∗∗∗ -16.4 −3.17 ∗ ∗ -37.8
Reading literacy PISA: 5 0.030 0.022 0.041 0.50 5.1 −2.35∗ -11.0 −0.55 -6.0
Math/science literacy: Q1 0.434 0.355 0.238 1.54 16.3 6.16∗∗∗ 25.7 4.47∗∗∗ 42.4
Math/science literacy: Q2 0.273 0.269 0.258 0.08 0.9 0.59 2.6 0.34 3.4
Math/science literacy: Q3 0.131 0.165 0.227 −0.86 -9.6 −3.47∗∗∗ -15.5 −2.24∗ -25.1
Math/science literacy: Q4 0.040 0.083 0.162 −1.47 -17.6 −5.21∗∗∗ -24.3 −3.26∗∗∗ -41.0
Math/science literacy: missing 0.121 0.129 0.116 −0.20 -2.2 0.90 3.8 0.16 1.6
Absenteeism (Index) 1.579 1.337 1.338 4.43∗∗∗ 43.9 −0.06 -0.3 4.46∗∗∗ 42.6
Family support (Index) −0.176 0.080 0.054 −2.29∗ -25.1 0.62 2.6 −2.37∗ -23.7
Eﬀort and perseverance (Index) 2.590 2.714 2.721 −1.87+ -20.3 −0.25 -1.1 −1.98∗ -20.9
Exp. socioec. status age30: miss 0.232 0.273 0.225 −0.86 -9.4 2.64 ∗ ∗ 11.2 0.17 1.8
Exp. socioec. status age30 (Index) −0.445 −0.366 −0.172 −1.02 -10.9 −5.53∗∗∗ -25.0 −3.20∗∗∗ -34.9
Occupational aim: nursing 0.020 0.086 0.021 −2.28∗ -29.5 8.37∗∗∗ 29.4 −0.02 -0.2
Greater region: Region le´manique 0.293 0.189 0.179 2.41∗ 24.4 0.60 2.6 2.87 ∗ ∗ 27.0
Greater region: Espace Mittelland 0.182 0.290 0.195 −2.24∗ -25.5 5.32∗∗∗ 22.1 −0.33 -3.4
Greater region: Nordwestschweiz 0.111 0.099 0.057 0.37 3.9 3.94∗∗∗ 15.8 2.25∗ 19.6
Greater region: Zurich 0.091 0.106 0.078 −0.47 -5.2 2.35∗ 9.8 0.46 4.6
Greater region: Ostschweiz 0.232 0.211 0.190 0.48 5.1 1.23 5.3 1.05 10.3
Greater region: Zentralschweiz 0.020 0.056 0.046 −1.51 -18.8 1.08 4.5 −1.22 -14.5
Greater region: Ticino 0.071 0.049 0.254 0.92 9.2 −11.90∗∗∗ -59.9 −4.17∗∗∗ -51.3
Municipality type: Rural 0.303 0.375 0.359 −1.39 -15.2 0.78 3.4 −1.14 -11.9
Location: village (less 3000) 0.071 0.179 0.130 −2.71 ∗ ∗ -33.1 3.23∗∗∗ 13.5 −1.74+ -19.8
Location: small town (3000-15000) 0.576 0.521 0.589 1.01 10.9 −3.18∗∗∗ -13.7 −0.27 -2.7
Location: town (15000-100000) 0.192 0.211 0.203 −0.44 -4.8 0.48 2.1 −0.26 -2.7
Location: city (100000-1000000) 0.162 0.089 0.078 2.29∗ 22.1 0.93 4.0 3.01 ∗ ∗ 26.0
Cantonal share interim solutions 15.196 17.082 12.677 −1.92+ -22.1 11.67∗∗∗ 49.2 2.89 ∗ ∗ 31.0
N 99 677 2535 776 3212 2634
Mean of absolute bias 16.9 14.4 22.0
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Comparing the group no education to the group direct entry, we ﬁnd diﬀerences that
are similar to the ones discussed above, but even more pronounced for most variables. The
overall picture therefore implies that individuals with direct entry exhibit the most favorable
characteristics, and individuals without educational activity the least favorable ones. One
notable exception to this simpliﬁcation is the gender variable: Females are only overrepre-
sented in interim solutions. This might be (at least partly) related to the occupational aim of
“nursing”, where we ﬁnd the same picture.16 It is important to remember, however, that the
diﬀerences under discussion are raw diﬀerences and not eﬀects from multivariate regressions.
Comparing the groups interim solution and no education directly, it shows that indi-
viduals with no educational activity not only have less favorable family background and less
successful educational measures (especially language skills), but also diﬀer with respect to per-
sonal attitudes related to motivational factors. They have—according to their self-assessment
one year before—a signiﬁcantly higher tendency towards school absenteeism, lower levels of
eﬀort/perseverance and a lower level of perceived family support in school matters. There
are no such diﬀerences between those in interim solutions and those in certifying educations.
Overall, the distribution of the variables before matching is more biased between the
groups no education and interim solution than between interim solution and direct entry.
The largest overall bias is found between the groups no education and direct entry.
4.5.2 Estimation of the propensity score
In order to match observations of diﬀerent groups on the basis of their similarity, we need
to estimate the propensity score.17 We use all the pre-treatment characteristics described
in section 4.5.1 for the basic speciﬁcation of the treatment decision. The average marginal
eﬀects resulting from pairwise probit and multinomial logit estimations are presented in table
4.3. Note that we use the pairwise binary variant for our ﬁnal propensity score estimation.
The set of variables has been chosen on the basis of speciﬁcation search (reducing the
absolute bias in the balancing of covariates) and on the basis of theory and former empirical
results on what could simultaneously aﬀect the treatment decision and the outcomes. As it
16 In the interim solution group, there is a higher share of individuals who want to pursue a career in the
ﬁeld of nursing. At the time of PISA 2000 (until the year 2003), the vocational training towards nursing or
similar occupations had still required a minimum age of 18, which institutionally forced youngsters with
career aspirations in the health sector (mostly women) into interim solutions.
17 We have also tried alternative balancing scores such as the linear index or the logit of the propensity score.
The quality of the match sometimes improved, but mainly due to more observations oﬀ support.
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is not the goal of a propensity model to maximize the prediction of the treatment decision,
but rather to reduce the bias in the estimated treatment eﬀect, it is important to include
variables that are assumed to be related to the outcome, even though their relation to the
treatment decision might only be weak.18
For some of the variables in table 4.3 the estimation results lack statistical signiﬁcance
in all models. First, migration background has no eﬀect on the treatment decision after
accounting for other characteristics. This might be due to its correlation with other variables
in the model, namely family background characteristics, educational history, or language
skills. As the point estimate is not exactly zero and a potential eﬀect on outcomes cannot be
ruled out, we do not skip this information out of the model. The same holds for the indices on
family support and eﬀort/perseverance, for school marks in the test language (which might
be correlated with the PISA reading literacy test results, amongst others) and, ﬁnally, for
PISA test results in mathematics/sciences (which might be correlated with school marks in
mathematics, amongst others). The lack of signiﬁcance is, in some of the cases, likely to be
related to the rather small sample size; skipping those variables could therefore introduce
potential bias in the treatment eﬀects to be estimated. The following multivariate results in
table 4.3 are particularly notable.
The decision between no education and interim solution seems not to be driven by scholas-
tic ability. There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of school marks or PISA test scores. Having followed
a low-level compulsory school track even increases the probability of interim solutions. How-
ever, the probability to have no educational activity is signiﬁcantly related to poorer family
background, especially to non-nuclear family structure, lower socioeconomic index and less
books at home. Further, a higher tendency towards school absenteeism also increases the
probability of not following any activity related to education. The results for the decision
between no education and direct entry look quite similar. However, there is no gender eﬀect,
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the number of books at home, but a signiﬁcant eﬀect of low parental
education.
In turn, the decision between interim solution and direct entry is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
inferior compulsory schooling outcomes (school marks in mathematics, low-level compulsory
school track, lower levels of PISA reading literacy test scores) as well as poorer family back-
18 In turn, the inclusion of covariates that only aﬀect the treatment decision does not improve the subsequent
estimation of the treatment eﬀect, but rather only increases the variance of the estimation or exacerbates
the support problem (for a discussion and references see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
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ground (low parental education, non-nuclear family structure). Interestingly, the number of
books at home positively aﬀects the probability to choose interim solutions. While career as-
pirations itself do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect, there is weak evidence that higher uncertainty
levels regarding career choice increases the probability to follow interim solutions. Addition-
ally, sizeable eﬀects on the choice of interim solutions are found for local characteristics and
for the supply of respective programs.
Table 4.3: Treatment decision and propensity score estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Probit Probit Mlogit
N.E.(1) vs. I.S.(1) vs. N.E.(1) vs.
Variables (at PISA 2000) I.S.(0) D.E.(0) D.E.(0) N.E. I.S. D.E.
Female −0.091∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.005 0.133∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗
2nd generation immigrant 0.008 −0.020 0.000 0.000 −0.015 0.016
1st generation immigrant 0.004 0.024 0.008 0.006 0.023 −0.029
>= Age 16 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.009 −0.015
Parental education: compulsory 0.036 0.046∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.015∗ 0.038∗ −0.054∗∗
Parental education: tertiary 0.044 0.006 0.015 0.011 0.001 −0.012
Parental educ: missing −0.073 0.018 −0.016 −0.018 0.013 0.005
Nuclear family structure −0.087∗∗∗ −0.035∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.028+ 0.058∗∗∗
Socioeconomic status (Index) −0.002+ −0.001 −0.001+ −0.000+ 0.000 0.001
Number of books at home (Index) −0.022∗ 0.016∗∗ −0.003 −0.003 0.015∗∗ −0.012∗
Level compulsory school: low −0.055∗ 0.074∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.008 0.076∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
Level compulsory school: no selec. −0.031 −0.056∗ −0.006 −0.004 −0.052+ 0.056∗
Mark test language: insuﬃcient −0.046 −0.011 −0.007 −0.007 −0.010 0.017
Mark test language: good −0.031 −0.018 −0.009 −0.006 −0.016 0.022
Mark test language: missing 0.111 0.088 0.058 0.044 0.076 −0.120
Mark mathematics: insuﬃcient 0.025 0.043 0.004 0.005 0.034 −0.039
Mark mathematics: good 0.008 −0.051∗∗ −0.007 −0.003 −0.047∗∗ 0.051∗∗
Mark mathematics: missing −0.084 −0.108 −0.048 −0.037 −0.100 0.137
Reading literacy PISA: 0 0.018 0.081∗ 0.019 0.014 0.068+ −0.083∗
Reading literacy PISA: 1 0.026 0.018 0.015 0.012 0.014 −0.025
Reading literacy PISA: 2 0.013 0.015 0.003 0.004 0.009 −0.013
Reading literacy PISA: 4 0.000 −0.025 −0.007 −0.005 −0.021 0.026
Reading literacy PISA: 5 0.071 −0.035 0.014 0.020 −0.042 0.023
Math/science literacy: Q1 0.037 0.023 0.011 0.009 0.019 −0.028
Math/science literacy: Q2 0.030 0.020 0.013 0.011 0.016 −0.028
Math/science literacy: Q4 −0.025 −0.017 −0.020 −0.016 −0.015 0.031
Math/science literacy: missing −0.005 0.024 0.005 0.004 0.019 −0.023
Absenteeism (Index) 0.046∗ 0.007 0.016∗ 0.012∗ 0.001 −0.013
Family support (Index) −0.006 0.005 −0.001 −0.001 0.005 −0.004
Eﬀort and perseverance (Index) −0.009 −0.007 −0.004 −0.003 −0.005 0.008
Exp. socioec. status age30: miss −0.027 0.030+ 0.001 0.001 0.028+ −0.030+
Exp. socioec. status age30 (Index) −0.021 −0.005 −0.008 −0.007 −0.004 0.010
Occupational aim: nursing −0.130∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.015 0.136∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
Greater region: Espace Mittelland 0.003 0.049+ 0.014 0.007 0.046+ −0.053+
Greater region: Nordwestschweiz −0.038 0.131∗∗∗ 0.017 0.003 0.124∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
Greater region: Zurich −0.047 0.055∗ 0.001 −0.005 0.056∗ −0.051+
Greater region: Ostschweiz −0.019 0.127∗∗∗ 0.009 0.001 0.124∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
Greater region: Zentralschweiz −0.102 0.126∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.028 0.131∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗
Greater region: Ticino −0.051 −0.130∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
Municipality type: Rural −0.001 −0.045∗∗ −0.012 −0.008 −0.040∗ 0.047∗∗
Location: small town (3000-15000) 0.076+ −0.036+ 0.019 0.017 −0.039∗ 0.022
Location: town (15000-100000) 0.037 −0.033 0.005 0.005 −0.035 0.030
Location: city (100000-1000000) 0.103+ −0.127∗∗∗ 0.020 0.020 −0.126∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
Cantonal share interim solutions −0.005∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001 0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
N 776 3212 2634 3311
Pseudo-R2 17.9 15.6 17.4 15.4
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Average marginal eﬀects
Reference categories are: male, Swiss, age 15 at the time of PISA2000, parental education: upper-secondary,
other family structure, level compulsory school: medium, mark in test language: suﬃcient, mark in mathematics:
suﬃcient, reading literacy PISA: level 3, math/science literacy: Q3 (third quartile), occupational aim: other, greater
region: region le´manique, municipality type: urban, location: very small town.
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4.5.3 Assessing matching quality and common support
Table 4.4 summarizes key measures of overlap and balancing after the pairwise matching
of treatment and control group observations. The treated group has been chosen to be the
smaller one in each pairwise comparison. However, this choice does not aﬀect the estimated
treatment eﬀects in the next section, because reversing the groups only reverses the sign and
the ATT and ATU (see section 4.4).
Table 4.4: Summary of balancing and common support
’No education’ vs. ’Interim solution’ vs. ’No education’ vs.
’Interim solution’ ’Direct entry’ ’Direct entry’
Balancing Before match After match Before match After match Before match After match
Mean |bias| 16.9 4.4 14.4 1.9 22.0 4.0
Median |bias| 15.5 2.9 10.5 1.5 20.4 3.6
Pseudo-R2 17.9 1.4 15.6 0.4 17.4 2.5
N of sign. mean
diﬀ. (p<0.1) 0 0 0
Common Support Treated (1) Untreated (0) Treated (1) Untreated (0) Treated (1) Untreated (0)
Group No education Interim sol. Interim sol. Direct entry No education Direct entry
N 99 677 677 2535 99 2525
Range PS-Score [0.032; 0.712] [0.001; 0.719] [0.020; 0.885] [0.002; 0.736] [0.004; 0.486] [0.000; 0.443]
Mean PS-Score 0.262 0.108 0.337 0.177 0.116 0.035
Std. Dev PS-Score 0.179 0.110 0.179 0.140 0.109 0.048
% Oﬀ support 0.0 27.8 2.1 7.9 2.0 20.2
Note: based on Kernel matching on the initial sample and imposing the minimun-maximum criteria, 44 variables
The estimated propensity scores based on the probit models in table 4.3 succeed in balanc-
ing the covariates in the matched samples quite well. The overall mean absolute standardized
bias is reduced to 4.4% or lower in all combinations (4.4, 1.9, and 4.0).19 The distribution
of the bias among all variables is shown in ﬁgure 4.A1 in the appendix. It lies below 5% for
most of the 44 variables and exceeds 10% in only a few cases. According to t-tests, there
are no signiﬁcant mean diﬀerences across groups after matching. Overall, matching quality
seems satisfactory. The topic of common support, however, merits further investigation.
According to table 4.4, there are a considerable amount of cases without support when the
no education group is part of the comparison (as control group). Further insight is provided
by the graphical comparison of the density distributions of propensity scores in ﬁgure 4.1.
As for the comparison of no education (treated) versus interim solution (untreated),
ﬁgure 4.1 shows that observations in the no education group can be successfully matched
with controls of the interim solution group. The support is, however, very thin at the upper
19 The psmatch2 package in stata only calculates the standardized bias for the treated group (command
pstest). This is the relevant bias if we are only interested in the ATT. By reversing the treatment variables,
a calculation of the bias for the untreated shows mean standardized biases of 3.4, 3.2 and 7.0, respectively.
The latter is rather high, as it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd good matches for all direct entry individuals among the
small (and very diﬀerent) group of no education individuals. Applying an alternative matching algorithm
(radius matching instead of kernel matching) leads to a smaller mean bias of 5.7
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the propensity score
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end of the distribution. Some of these individuals would be dropped when applying a caliper
criterion as described in section 4.4.3.
In turn, there is a lack of overlap at the lower tail of the distribution: there are many in-
dividuals in interim solutions (27.8%) with extremely low probability of being in the opposite
group (lower than 0.001). According to the minimum-maximum-criteria, there are no com-
parable observations in the treatment group and the ATU cannot be estimated in this range,
strictly speaking. It is notable, however, that more than half of the observations to the left
of the treatment-group minimum are still placed within a propensity score distance (caliper)
of 0.02. In order to reduce the common support problem, one could apply a more parsimo-
nious speciﬁcation of the propensity score model. However, excluding potentially important
confounders can be very costly in terms of increased bias of estimated treatment eﬀects and
the plausibility of the CIA. We tried several speciﬁcations with a smaller variable set. It was,
however, diﬃcult to ﬁnd a variant with acceptable values of remaining standardized biases.
As for the decision between interim solution (treated) and direct entry (untreated), ﬁgure
4.1 shows an overlap over a wide range of the propensity score distribution. According to
table 4.4, the share of individuals that are oﬀ support is relatively low in both groups (2.1%
in the treated group and 7.9% in the untreated group).
The last picture in ﬁgure 4.1 shows the propensity score distribution for the decision be-
tween no education (treated) and direct entry (untreated). The situation is somehow similar
to the ﬁrst picture. There is very low density for propensity scores above 0.15. Neverthe-
less, only 2% of the treated are “oﬀ support” according to the minimum-maximum criterion.
At the lower end of the distribution, there are about 20% of untreated individuals without
overlap in the treatment group. The propensity score diﬀerence to the ﬁrst potential control
is only 0.004, however. In this case, imposing the minimum-maximum criteria disregards
potential matching of individuals that might in fact be very similar.
Overall, in all pairwise comparisons, we do not face severe common support problems
when estimating the ATT. However, in estimations with no education as the control group,
we cannot estimate the counterfactual outcome for those “non-treated individuals” (those
in interim solutions or direct entries) who are extremely unlikely to be in the no education
group. For interpretation and policy conclusions, the estimated ATU/ATE should thus not
be interpreted as indicative for this sub-population.
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4.6 Results
4.6.1 Short-term eﬀects: Successful entry after the gap year
a) Baseline average treatment eﬀects
After applying the propensity score matching techniques as described in section 4.4, we ﬁrst
compare the probability of the two “gap year” groups no education and interim solution to
successfully master the entry into certifying education in the subsequent year.
Table 4.5: Eﬀect on having had a successful entry by t2 (after the gap year)
Comparison: No education (1) versus Interim solution (0); Unmatched sample: T=99; NT=677
Method Quality %Oﬀ Support UMD ATT ATU ATE
%bias T NT Δ S.E. Δ S.E. Δ S.E. Δ S.E.
1) Kernel c.s. 4.44 0.0 27.8 -0.237*** (0.049) -0.283*** (0.062) -0.261*** (0.069) -0.264*** (0.063)
2) Radius c.s. 3.68 0.0 27.8 -0.237*** (0.049) -0.263*** (0.069) -0.274*** (0.076) -0.273*** (0.069)
3) N(5) c.s. 3.94 0.0 27.8 -0.237*** (0.049) -0.263*** (0.065) -0.270*** (0.074) -0.269*** (0.067)
4) OLS -0.237*** (0.049) -0.271*** (0.051)
5) OLS c.s. -0.237*** (0.049) -0.262*** (0.049)
6) OLS c.s.+w. -0.237*** (0.049) -0.274*** (0.061) -0.256*** (0.072) -0.259*** (0.066)
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (100 replications).
c.s.=min-max common support condition, w.=weights derived from kernel matching.
The results in table 4.5 provide evidence that students with no educational activity after
compulsory schooling (treatment group) are by far less likely to subsequently enter certifying
education. The probability diﬀerence of being successful amounts to approximately twenty-
six to twenty-eight percentage points; the diﬀerent matching techniques thus all produce
quantitative similar eﬀects. 20 The ATT and ATU are very similar to each other, too,
not pointing to notable heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀects between the treated and the
untreated group. This topic, however, will be explored in more detail further below.
The lines 4 to 6 present the results for OLS estimations. Line 4 shows the estimated
OLS coeﬃcient of the treatment dummy after controlling for all variables also used in the
matching procedure.21 The eﬀect amounts to -27.1 percentage points. Line 5 shows the same
OLS coeﬃcient after imposing the common support condition derived from the matching
20 For comparison, we have also performed matching estimations without imposing the common support
condition and by applying a caliper criterion of 0.02 percentage points in the radius and nearest neighbor
matching estimation. The ATT is not aﬀected, as the common support problem is negligible small for the
treatment group. The estimated ATU (and thus the ATE) is reduced to approximately 22.5 percentage
points in these estimations (results available on request). Because more control group individuals who are
less comparable are incorporated into the analysis, these results may be less trustworthy. They do not
change the main picture, though.
21 Instead of estimating linear probability models, it might have been more straightforward to estimate non-
linear probability models, such as logit or probit estimations. However, we prefer to show OLS estimations
for reasons of comparison.
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estimations. The estimated eﬀect is slightly reduced to -26.2 percentage points. Therefore,
results hardly change when we reduce the OLS sample to those individuals who have coun-
terparts with similar characteristics in the other group. In the last line, we additionally use
the weights estimated in kernel matching (line 1) to reweight the control group (ATT) and
the treatment group (ATU) in the OLS estimation. This follows the idea of Ho et al. (2007)
to use matching methods for preprocessing the data such that the treated group is as similar
as possible to the control group and then applying standard parametric methods on these
data. Overall, we ﬁnd that our matching estimations discussed above provide results very
similar to the results derived from OLS-regression on the raw and on preprocessed data.
In all estimations, we ﬁnd large advantages for the interim solution over the no education
group to successfully master the transition after the gap year. One could have expected that
the raw diﬀerence in the share of successful transitions overstates the advantages of interim
solutions because of pre-treatment heterogeneity across the two groups. However, a compar-
ison between the unmatched diﬀerence (UMD) and the estimated diﬀerences after matching
(ATT, ATU, ATE) shows that the selection bias even tends to go in the opposite direc-
tion: the treatment eﬀect is slightly larger in absolute terms than the unmatched diﬀerence.
Hence, the results do not support the view that better outcomes for the interim solution
group compared to the no education group are simply due to more favorable pre-treatment
characteristics.
b) Assessing treatment eﬀect heterogeneity over the propensity score
Our results also help us to explore if there is treatment-eﬀect heterogeneity. Under the
CIA, treatment-eﬀect heterogeneity is present whenever the ATT and the ATU substantially
diﬀer from each other. A comparison of the treatment eﬀects for the two populations under
investigation generally helps to answer how good target programs are. If those who join
the treatment are those who proﬁt most from treatment (positive selection with respect to
program eﬀects), a program can be regarded as well target and eﬃcient. In our case, table
4.5 does not show notable diﬀerences in the ATT and ATU. Depending on the matching
algorithm, one or the other is slightly larger and they do never statistically diﬀer from each
other. Therefore, it might be most safe to conclude that those who have chosen not to follow
an institutionalized interim solution might have equally proﬁted from these programs than
those who have actually joined interim solutions (and vice versa). Note that these are average
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eﬀects over all individuals.
A more detailed insight into selection procedures and treatment eﬀect heterogeneity can
be provided by analyzing treatment eﬀects over the range of participation probabilities, as
discussed in Lechner (2002); Brand and Xie (2010); Xie et al. (2012).
Figure 4.2: Treatment eﬀect heterogeneity by ps-score
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Figure 4.2 graphically shows the application of kernel weighted local-mean smoothing on
observed outcomes, counterfactual outcomes, and resulting treatment eﬀects for both the
treatment and comparison group over the whole range of propensity scores.22
22 To compute the counterfactual outcome for the treated and the ATT, the untreated group is weighted by
the resulting weights of propensity score matching using the kernel matching algorithm. Accordingly, the
group of the treated is reweighted to compute the counterfactual outcome for the untreated and the ATU.
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First, ﬁgure 4.2 shows lower expected transition rates for the no education state (D=1)
compared to interim solutions (D=0) over the whole range of propensity scores. The treat-
ment eﬀects (ATT, ATU) are rather constant at approximately 20 percentage points in
absolute terms until a propensity score of 0.25, the range wherein a large mass of individuals
can be found. The treatment eﬀect then increases in absolute terms up to 40 percentage
points until a propensity score of approximately 0.45 is achieved; that is, the negative eﬀect
of having a no-education gap year becomes larger with increasing propensity of having a no-
education gap year. According to the density distribution of propensity scores, there are still
many no education individuals observed within this range. These individuals would proﬁt
most from participating in interim solutions, as their expected counterfactual success rate
increases (black dashed line) and their observed success rate decreases (solid black line).
This can be seen as a sign that the sorting into interim solutions might not be very
eﬃcient. However, the estimated treatment eﬀects at even higher propensity scores of no
education are again similar to those at the lower end of the propensity score distribution.
However, as there are only a few individuals with high propensity scores and as there is only
thin overlap between treated and controls in this region, the results from the propensity score
range over 0.45 are potentially less reliable.
c) Assessing treatment eﬀect heterogeneity by sub-groups
Next, we look at potential treatment eﬀect heterogeneity between sub-groups of interest.
We perform a disaggregated analysis by splitting the sample along the dimensions gender,
migration background (yes versus no), compulsory school track (low versus medium), and
results of PISA-2000 reading literacy tests (low versus high), one after another. That is, we
perform exact matching on one dimension at a time. Results are presented in table 4.6.
Naturally, the sample size for certain sub-groups becomes very small. It gets more diﬃ-
cult to ﬁnd good matches for each treatment and control observation within the same group.
Overlap and matching quality are considerably reduced in some of the estimations. Further,
due to high variances in the small samples, otherwise substantial treatment eﬀects lack sig-
niﬁcance. Overall, eﬀects should be interpreted with caution. However, as shown in the last
column of table 4.6, OLS regressions using all available cases within a sub-group (no com-
mon support condition) come to very similar results for most of the sample-splits. The OLS
results, however, show higher signiﬁcances due to lower standard errors of the estimates.
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Table 4.6: Treatment eﬀects by sub-groups
Group PSD=1 % % Oﬀ supp. N used UMD Matching results OLS
Bias T NT T NT ATT ATU ATE
Female 0.199 2.9 6.1 36.0 46 313 -0.283*** -0.287** -0.258* -0.261** -0.282***
(0.070) (0.094) (0.100) (0.091) (0.071)
Male 0.389 6.5 10.0 20.7 45 149 -0.243*** -0.236* -0.285* -0.273* -0.246***
(0.067) (0.118) (0.140) (0.115) (0.073)
Swiss 0.239 5.1 1.6 23.7 60 395 -0.176** -0.206* -0.189* -0.191* -0.217***
(0.061) (0.088) (0.092) (0.087) (0.063)
Migrated 0.480 7.9 21.1 55.1 30 71 -0.315*** -0.475*** -0.443* -0.452** -0.466***
(0.085) (0.138) (0.184) (0.149) (0.097)
CS: low 0.346 8.1 11.1 30.0 48 266 -0.227*** -0.161 -0.255* -0.241* -0.221**
(0.068) (0.111) (0.107) (0.096) (0.073)
CS: med 0.369 5.5 17.8 34.7 37 194 -0.253*** -0.285* -0.190 -0.206 -0.247***
(0.070) (0.144) (0.135) (0.127) (0.076)
PISA: low 0.324 4.4 7.9 21.0 58 264 -0.222*** -0.281** -0.206+ -0.220* -0.236***
(0.065) (0.091) (0.111) (0.098) (0.068)
PISA: high 0.283 8.6 8.3 30.0 33 240 -0.233** -0.318* -0.208 -0.221 -0.276***
(0.076) (0.125) (0.177) (0.152) (0.081)
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Bootstrapped standard errors of matching results in parenthesis (100 replications).
Matching algorithm: kernel matching imposing common support. OLS: no common support condition.
PSD=1: the mean propensity score of the treated (’no education’). %Bias: standardized absolute bias after matching.
Note: The sample ’Migrated’ consists of both ﬁrst and second generation immigrants.
The sample ’CS: low’ consists of individuals from compulsory schools (CS) with both low-level and no selection.
The sample ’PISA: low’ consists of individuals with PISA-literacy-levels up to 480 score points (medium low).
Shortly summarizing the results in table 4.6, there is not much substantial treatment
eﬀect heterogeneity between most of the sample-splits. The most striking diﬀerence in esti-
mated treatment eﬀects is found for the sample split by migration background. The average
treatment eﬀect amounts to approximately 20 percentage points for Swiss pupils (born in
Switzerland with at least one parent born in Switzerland) and to approximately 40 percent-
age points for pupils having a migration background. Therefore, the latter would proﬁt twice
as much from following interim solution programs than Swiss pupils. However, migrated
pupils have much higher propensity to choose no education gap years than Swiss pupils do
(0.480 versus 0.239 among the no education group, column 2)23. They are located in the
same propensity score range in ﬁgure 4.2 for which we have already detected large treatment
eﬀects of interim solution programs but rather high probabilities to choose no education.
23 Even though the group of individuals with migration background is overrepresented in high propensity
score ranges of no education, migration background does not directly aﬀect the decision for no education
gap years, but rather operates through characteristics that are related to migration background (see section
4.5.2).
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4.6.2 Short-term eﬀects: Aspiration level of educational track
a) Baseline average treatment eﬀects
This section analyzes whether the diﬀerent treatment groups enter upper-secondary education
at diﬀerent intellectual aspiration levels, conditional on having had a successful transition into
certifying education by the second year after compulsory schooling.
As it is our hypothesis that interim solutions might be chosen, amongst others, to lower
the probability of entering a track at low aspiration level, the dependent variable of table 4.7
is coded accordingly: 1 denotes low aspiration levels, and 0 middle to high aspiration levels
of certifying education tracks.
Table 4.7: Eﬀect on having entered at low (versus middle/high) aspiration level by t2
A) Comparison: No education (1) versus Interim solution (0); Unmatched sample: T=47; NT=485
Method Quality %Oﬀ Support UMD ATT ATU ATE
%bias T NT Δ S.E. Δ S.E. Δ S.E. Δ S.E.
1) Kernel c.s. 3.85 10.6 25.8 0.230*** (0.068) 0.207* (0.093) 0.250** (0.089) 0.245** (0.081)
2) Radius c.s. 4.94 12.8 26.8 0.230*** (0.068) 0.197+ (0.107) 0.318** (0.111) 0.305** (0.100)
3) N(5) c.s. 5.86 10.6 25.8 0.230*** (0.068) 0.214* (0.102) 0.318*** (0.098) 0.307*** (0.089)
4) OLS 0.230*** (0.068) 0.219** (0.068)
5) OLS c.s. 0.230*** (0.068) 0.229** (0.072)
6) OLS c.s.+w. 0.230*** (0.068) 0.226* (0.091) 0.225* (0.092) 0.225* (0.089)
B) Comparison: Interim solution (1) versus Direct entry (0); Unmatched sample: T=485; NT=2535
1) Kernel c.s. 1.72 0.6 10.5 0.062** (0.020) -0.029 (0.023) -0.018 (0.023) -0.020 (0.021)
2) Radius c.s. 1.77 0.6 10.5 0.062** (0.020) -0.031 (0.023) -0.022 (0.022) -0.023 (0.021)
3) N(5) c.s. 2.40 0.6 10.5 0.062** (0.020) -0.021 (0.029) -0.026 (0.026) -0.025 (0.024)
4) OLS 0.062** (0.020) -0.023 (0.019)
5) OLS c.s. 0.062** (0.020) -0.028 (0.019)
6) OLS c.s.+w. 0.062** (0.020) -0.033 (0.023) -0.022 (0.024) -0.024 (0.023)
C) Comparison: No education (1) versus Direct entry (0); Unmatched sample: T=47; NT=2535
1) Kernel c.s. 6.42 2.1 22.6 0.292*** (0.059) 0.191* (0.087) 0.241** (0.082) 0.240** (0.081)
2) Radius c.s. 4.00 4.3 22.8 0.292*** (0.059) 0.154+ (0.085) 0.275** (0.096) 0.272** (0.094)
3) N(5) c.s. 5.00 2.1 22.6 0.292*** (0.059) 0.152 (0.107) 0.297* (0.121) 0.293* (0.118)
4) OLS 0.292*** (0.059) 0.180*** (0.053)
5) OLS c.s. 0.292*** (0.059) 0.165** (0.057)
6) OLS c.s.+w. 0.292*** (0.059) 0.160** (0.059) 0.198** (0.070) 0.197** (0.069)
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (100 replications).
c.s.=min-max common support condition, w.=weights derived from kernel matching.
Our ﬁrst comparison (panel A) shows that those with a no education gap year have a
higher probability of approximately 21 percentage points of entering at low aspiration level
than those coming from an interim solution (ATT). The eﬀect is slightly smaller than the
unmatched diﬀerence of 23 percentage points. The reversed analysis shows that the causal
gain of interim solutions is estimated to be somewhat larger for the group that eﬀectively
followed an interim solution (ATU). It amounts from 25 to 32 percentage points, depending
on the matching algorithm. The pattern of ATU>ATT is evidence for positive sorting:
individuals who proﬁt the most from interim solutions with respect to low aspiration track
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avoidance are also more likely to choose them. There are similar patterns and eﬀects revealed
in panel C, where those with a no education gap year are compared to those with a direct
entry.
Panel B compares interim solution to direct entries. The estimation results show that
the unmatched diﬀerence of 6.2 percentage points in disfavor of the interim solution group
disappears once treatment and control groups are matched on the basis of their observables.
There is a switch in the sign from positive to negative and the point estimate is close to
zero and not signiﬁcant. Therefore, there is no evidence that those coming from interim
solutions are harmed by not having a direct entry (which would have resulted in a positive
sign). However, there is no evidence that they proﬁt either.
These results are only partly in line with our expectation that interim solutions should
lower the probability of following educational tracks at low-aspiration level. While this is the
case in comparison to gap years without educational activity, it is not the case in comparison
to direct entries into certifying education.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the latter comparison and inspect whether
there are speciﬁc propensity score ranges or sub-groups of compulsory school graduates for
which—as an alternative to direct entries—interim solution programs causally help to avoid
entering at low- instead of high-aspiration-level tracks.
b) Assessing treatment eﬀect heterogeneity over the propensity score
First, ﬁgure 4.3 graphically shows that the same characteristics that increase the probability
to choose an interim solution instead of a direct entry also enhance the probability to enter
a low aspiration educational track instead of a more challenging one (increasing lines in the
upper part of the ﬁgure). Over large parts of the propensity score range, the counterfactual
outcome of the interim solution group (dashed black line) lies slightly above and runs parallel
to the observed outcome (solid black line). The treatment eﬀects are rather constant over
the propensity score range, except for the lower and upper end of the propensity score dis-
tribution. At the lower end, the eﬀect is even closer to zero. There is a switch in the sign at
the upper end, where there are very little observations and estimations that are potentially
less reliable and less relevant.
Overall, this analysis does not reveal substantial treatment eﬀect heterogeneity in those
propensity score ranges where the largest mass of individuals is found.
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Figure 4.3: Treatment eﬀect heterogeneity by ps-score
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c) Assessing treatment eﬀect heterogeneity by sub-groups
Finally, we again split the sample in order to investigate potential treatment eﬀect hetero-
geneity by sub-groups. Results are presented in table 4.8. Most of the estimated treatment
eﬀects are still not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Table 4.8: Treatment eﬀects by sub-groups: interim solution (1) vs direct entry (0)
Group PSD=1 % % Oﬀ supp. N used UMD Matching results OLS
Bias T NT T NT ATT ATU ATE
Female 0.325 2.6 0.3 10.7 336 1257 0.104∗∗∗ −0.048 0.012 −0.002 −0.025
(0.024) (0.030) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023)
Male 0.169 2.1 0.7 10.6 148 1143 −0.001 −0.053 −0.067∗ −0.065∗ −0.051
(0.036) (0.041) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033)
Swiss 0.257 2.0 0.3 4.4 375 1903 0.075∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.008 −0.011 −0.018
(0.023) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021)
Mig (2nd) 0.303 5.5 7.7 42.8 36 151 0.002 −0.131 −0.133 −0.133 −0.137∗
(0.062) (0.120) (0.088) (0.081) (0.058)
Mig (1st) 0.399 5.3 5.7 33.8 66 186 0.008 0.060 0.035 0.041 0.025
(0.058) (0.079) (0.091) (0.070) (0.059)
CS: low 0.354 2.8 1.3 7.4 221 822 −0.009 −0.104∗∗ −0.089∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.088∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034)
CS: med 0.231 1.8 1.3 10.2 224 1250 0.055∗ 0.007 −0.006 −0.004 0.006
(0.023) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.023)
CS: no sel 0.428 9.0 29.4 50.6 24 124 0.191∗∗ 0.072 0.031 0.038 0.060
(0.060) (0.146) (0.118) (0.114) (0.065)
PISA: low 0.304 2.6 0.4 6.6 225 884 0.027 −0.051 −0.081∗ −0.075∗ −0.045
(0.035) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033)
PISA: high 0.247 2.1 0.0 13.4 259 1376 0.055∗ 0.004 0.014 0.012 0.009
(0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.022)
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Bootstrapped standard errors of matching results in parenthesis (100 replications).
Matching algorithm: kernel matching imposing common support. OLS: no common support condition.
PSD=1: the mean propensity score of the treated (’interim solution’). %Bias: standardized absolute bias after matching.
’Mig (2nd)’: second generation migrants; ’Mig (1st)’: ﬁrst generation migrants.
’CS: low’: compulsory schooling (CS) at low-level; ’CS: med’: compulsory schooling (CS) at medium-level,
’CS: no sel’: compulsory schooling (CS) without selection (no tracking);
’PISA low’ consists of individuals with ’PISA-literacy-levels up to 480 score points (medium low).
In terms of signiﬁcance, the most reliable substantial treatment eﬀect is found for the
group of pupils coming from low-level compulsory school tracks. For this group, following
interim solution programs instead of directly entering certifying education signiﬁcantly lowers
the probability of entering at a low aspiration level by about 10 percentage points. In
contrast, pupils from compulsory school tracks with extended requirements (medium-level)
do not proﬁt.
For some other groups, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ATU and ATE, but not a signiﬁcant
ATT: among those who directly entered certifying education, the group of males (ATU: -6.5
percentage points) and the group with low PISA-test-scores (ATU: -8.1 percentage points)
would have signiﬁcantly proﬁted from interim solutions with respect to entering a higher
aspiration level track.
The sample split by migration status reveals that the quantitatively most pronounced
eﬀect among all sub-samples is found for second generation migrants (-13 percentage points).
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This eﬀect is, however, not statistically signiﬁcant due to large standard errors of the esti-
mation. Notably, the OLS coeﬃcient points to a quantitatively similar and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of 13.7 percentage points. Therefore, one would probably ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for second
generation migrants in a larger sample by applying matching techniques.
Overall, compared to direct entries, interim solutions do not seem to lower the probability
of pursuing an educational track at low aspiration level, at least not on average. There is
evidence, however, that certain sub-groups with less favorable characteristics proﬁt all the
same, particularly graduates from low-level compulsory school tracks, but presumably also
pupils with low PISA-scores and migration background, for which the eﬀects are pronounced
as well, but lack statistical signiﬁcance in some of the estimations.
4.6.3 Long-term eﬀects
We now turn to the longer-term inﬂuence of the activity directly after compulsory schooling
and analyze the eﬀect of having gap years or following interim solutions on educational
outcomes at age 21. Table 4.9 shows the results for the outcome of not having a diploma or
no educational enrolment at age 21.
Table 4.9: Eﬀect on having no diploma or no enrolment at age 21
A) Comparison: No education (1) versus Interim solution (0); Unmatched sample: T=52; NT=456
Method Quality %Oﬀ Support UMD ATT ATU ATE
%bias T NT Δ S.E. Δ S.E. Δ S.E. Δ S.E.
1) Kernel c.s. 5.08 5.8 22.1 0.333*** (0.049) 0.331*** (0.084) 0.299** (0.112) 0.303** (0.099)
2) Radius c.s. 6.55 5.8 22.6 0.333*** (0.049) 0.343*** (0.091) 0.281* (0.121) 0.288** (0.107)
3) N(5) c.s. 5.55 5.8 21.7 0.333*** (0.049) 0.306*** (0.087) 0.338*** (0.105) 0.334*** (0.093)
7) OLS 0.333*** (0.049) 0.329*** (0.052)
8) OLS c.s. 0.333*** (0.049) 0.314*** (0.056)
9) OLS c.s.+w. 0.333*** (0.049) 0.308*** (0.078) 0.279*** (0.082) 0.283*** (0.078)
B) Comparison: Interim solution (1) versus Direct entry (0); Unmatched sample: T=456; NT=1746
1) Kernel c.s. 2.27 2.0 7.7 0.072*** (0.012) 0.050* (0.020) 0.043* (0.020) 0.044** (0.017)
2) Radius c.s. 2.30 2.0 7.7 0.072*** (0.012) 0.050* (0.020) 0.042+ (0.023) 0.044* (0.020)
3) N(5) c.s. 2.53 2.0 7.7 0.072*** (0.012) 0.054* (0.021) 0.041 (0.027) 0.044+ (0.023)
7) OLS 0.072*** (0.012) 0.051*** (0.012)
8) OLS c.s. 0.072*** (0.012) 0.047*** (0.013)
9) OLS c.s.+w. 0.072*** (0.012) 0.052*** (0.016) 0.041* (0.019) 0.044** (0.017)
C) Comparison: No education (1) versus Direct entry (0); Unmatched sample: T=52; NT=1746
1) Kernel c.s. 4.63 3.8 43.5 0.405*** (0.029) 0.367*** (0.077) 0.317*** (0.077) 0.320*** (0.075)
2) Radius c.s. 3.62 7.7 44.0 0.405*** (0.029) 0.333*** (0.082) 0.316*** (0.095) 0.316*** (0.092)
3) N(5) c.s. 5.46 3.8 43.5 0.405*** (0.029) 0.356*** (0.078) 0.285** (0.106) 0.288** (0.102)
7) OLS 0.405*** (0.029) 0.362*** (0.029)
8) OLS c.s. 0.405*** (0.029) 0.354*** (0.036)
9) OLS c.s.+w. 0.405*** (0.029) 0.349*** (0.067) 0.301*** (0.068) 0.304*** (0.067)
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (100 replications).
c.s.=min-max common support condition, w.=weights derived from kernel matching.
The unmatched diﬀerence between the treatment group no education and the two other
groups (panel A and C) points to a much higher probability of not having a diploma or
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enrolment at age 21 for the group without educational activity directly after compulsory
schooling. The UMD amounts to 33.3 (or 40.5) percentage points compared to those with an
interim solution (or direct entry, respectively.) After matching, the diﬀerence to the group
interim solution remains more or less at the same level (ATT: 33.1 percentage points), the
diﬀerence to the group direct entry decreases only slightly (ATT 36.7 percentage points).
Therefore, pre-treatment heterogeneity plays only a small role in explaining the diﬀerences.
Comparing the group interim solution to the group direct entry, we ﬁnd that the un-
matched diﬀerence of 7.2 percentage points decreases to a ATT of 5 percentage points and
an ATU of 4.3 percentage points after matching. Therefore, there remains a comparatively
small (but signiﬁcant) higher risk for those with interim solutions to end up having no edu-
cational credential or enrolment six years after compulsory schooling.
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the causal eﬀect of non-certifying interim solution programs on subse-
quent educational outcomes by applying propensity score matching techniques. Outcomes of
program participants are compared to those of matched non-participants without educational
activity in the year after compulsory schooling and to those of matched non-participants who
directly enter upper-secondary education.
We ﬁnd substantial program eﬀects when comparing participants with those having no
educational activity during the gap year. Taking part in interim solution programs en-
hances subsequent chances to enter upper-secondary education by approximately 26 percent-
age points, decreases the probability to only enter at low intellectual aspiration level (as
compared to middle/high-level tracks) by approximately 25 percentage points, and increases
the graduation probability at age 21 by approximately 30 percentage points. Program ef-
fects for both participants and non-participants are similar, indicating that those without
educational activity in the gap year would proﬁt equally from following interim solution
programs as participants do on average. Further, program participation rather uniformly
enhances chances to enter upper-secondary education afterwards, with exceptionally large
eﬀects, however, for the sub-group of non-native youngsters (about 40 percentage points).
In turn, there is no evidence for positive program eﬀects when we compare the outcomes of
program participants to those of the other control group, namely of matched non-participants
who directly enter upper-secondary education. The intellectual aspiration level of the subse-
quent certifying track is not aﬀected, on average, and the probability of having no diploma
or enrolment by age 21 even slightly decreases (by 5 percentage points) upon program partic-
ipation. However, there is evidence for some positive program eﬀects for speciﬁc sub-groups:
those participants from low-level compulsory school tracks and those with low PISA literacy
test scores are more likely to subsequently enter more demanding certifying tracks than their
otherwise identical peers with direct entries.
Overall, estimated program eﬀects are only small in either direction when comparing
interim solutions to direct entries; the outcomes of the two groups do not diﬀer by much.
In contrast, eﬀects are always positive and substantial when comparing interim solutions (or
direct entries) to gap years without educational activity. Therefore, not being in education
the year after compulsory schooling, in neither a certifying nor a non-certifying track, is a
very strong and causal predictor for a failed upper-secondary education career. Only a small
4.7. CONCLUSION 121
majority of the early dropouts are reintegrated at a later point in time in the educational
system. Therefore, in order to enhance the upper-secondary graduation rate, one of the
most important challenges might be to prevent pupils from completely dropping out of the
educational system by the end of compulsory school. The issue of whether someone directly
enters certifying education or via a non-certifying interim solution program does not appear
to be of major relevance.
From a policy point of view, not only are the treatment eﬀects insightful, but so are the
ﬁndings on the selection behavior of pupils in diﬀerent kinds of states after compulsory school.
The diﬀerent groups can broadly be characterized as follows: Compared to the group with
direct entry into certifying education, interim solution participants have—on average—lower
compulsory school performance (low-level tracks; low PISA-reading literacy; inferior marks in
mathematics) and a less favorable family background (lower parental education; non-nuclear
family structure). However, they have more books at home. Further, they are slightly
more uncertain about their occupational aim, live in cantons with a higher supply of interim
solutions (which does not prove causality, however), and are more often female. In turn,
the group not following any educational activity in the year after compulsory school shows
comparable initial school performance to the direct entry group and even better performance
than the interim solution group. However, their parental background is the least favorable
on average, all with respect to family structure, socioeconomic index, and number of books
at home. Additionally, they exhibit higher tendencies towards school absenteeism during
compulsory school. In bivariate (but not multivariate) comparisons, parental support in
scholastic matters and (self-assessed) school eﬀort and perseverance are less favorable, too.
Overall, the results regarding the selection behavior at the transition into upper-secondary
education indicate that scholastic barriers do not seem to be the main sources for delayed
entries. For virtually all individuals in interim solutions, we ﬁnd similar individuals in the
direct entry group (the reverse does not hold, however), implying that the mix of their
characteristics should not impede per se the direct integration into certifying education. The
same holds for the group in gap years without educational activity; they virtually all have
counterparts in the two other groups. Therefore, there is no evidence that youngsters not
being in certifying educational pathways should generally be incapable or unready to undergo
some kind of certifying education.
In the light of our results, many policy eﬀorts of recent years might be eﬀective measures
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to work against delayed entries. The measures are, ﬁrst, to earlier detect pupils at risk and
accompany them through their earlier post-compulsory schooling years (“case management”),
and second, to create new vocational tracks with lower scholastic entry-barriers (so-called
“Attestlehren”) but with institutionalized permeability towards more demanding tracks at a
later stage. While the former should particularly decrease the number of pupils without any
educational activity, the latter should also reduce the necessity to follow interim solutions
as the only way to enhance the chances of getting into more demanding tracks afterwards.
Naturally, the willingness of ﬁrms to provide such tracks is of crucial importance.
A shortcoming of the present analysis is that it is restricted to the compulsory school
graduation cohort of the year 2000. Transitions to upper-secondary education might take
place under diﬀerent economic and institutional settings nowadays. Therefore, our results
remain silent on the eﬀects of recent reforms mentioned above. Although oﬃcial population
data do not suggest increasing (or otherwise changing) shares of direct entries into certifying
education (see section 4.2), some mechanisms behind aggregate numbers might have changed
all the same, potentially leading to diﬀerent selection behavior or diﬀerent treatment eﬀect
patterns.
Some important questions from a policy point of view remain open. First, whereas hetero-
geneity of eﬀects between sub-groups was addressed to some extend (with very small group
sizes, however), the potential heterogeneity of diﬀerent programs was not investigated due
to the lack of information in the data. Second, the results do not allow for quantifying the
human capital eﬀects (compensating for deﬁcits) versus signalling eﬀects of interim solution
programs. Third, nothing can be said about how many postponed entries are due to post-
poned occupational decisions versus failures in the application process on the apprenticeship
market. There remains the open issue on how the existence of such a transitory feeder system
itself aﬀects ﬁrms’ willingness to train those coming directly from compulsory schooling or,
generally, how the supply of such programs aﬀects the demand for them (the latter is one of
the open questions also formulated in a recent policy report by the SBFI-SERI (2015a)).
Future research should therefore investigate the same topic with newer data sources—
ideally data sources that are larger but not less informative and contain several cohorts of
compulsory school leavers, permitting the exploitation of information that is varying over
regions as well as years.
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4.A Appendix
Table 4.A1: Variable deﬁnition
Variablea) Deﬁnition
Treatment status 3 categories representing the activity after compulsory schooling
(TREE wave t1). Direct entry : the respondent follows a certi-
fying education at upper-secondary level. Interim solution: the
respondent follows a program that has some preparatory school-
ing or practical character. No education: the respondent is not
involved in any educational activity.
Outcome 1: “Successful entry at t2” Indicator variable that equals 1 if there is a successful transition
into certifying education after a lagged entry (TREE wave t2);
0 otherwise.
Outcome 2: “Aspiration level of entry” Indicator variable that equals 1 if the intellectual aspiration level
of the certifying education is low (1 or 2) and equals 0 if the
aspiration level is medium or high (3 to 6). The aspiration levels
for 101 diﬀerent vocational tracks were rated on a scale ranging
from 1 to 6 by an expert group of vocational advisers (for details
and studies using this variable see Stalder (2011)). See also
section 4.3 and footnote 6 on how this scale has been extended
to other educational tracks. The intellectual aspiration level
refers to the entry year into certifying education and thus stems
from wave t1 (direct entry) or t2 (lagged entry).
Outcome 3: “Graduation by t6” Indicator variable that equals 1 if the respondent has acquired
a diploma at upper-secondary level by the time six years after
compulsory schooling (t6) or, alternatively, is enrolled in certi-
fying education at the time of the survey t6; 0 otherwise.
Female Equals 1 if female; 0 if male.
Nationality Dummies representing 3 categories: Swiss: respondent born
in Switzerland with at least one parent born in Switzerland;
second-generation immigrant: respondent born in Switzerland
but parents born outside Switzerland; ﬁrst-generation immi-
grant: respondent and parents are foreign born.
Age 16 at PISA survey Equals 1 if pupil aged 16 at the time of PISA 2000; 0 if aged 15.
Parental education Dummies representing 4 categories of highest parental educa-
tion: compulsory school, upper-secondary education, tertiary
education, missing information.
Family structure Equals 1 if the family structure is nuclear; 0 otherwise (single,
mixed, other, missing information).
Socioeconomic status The international socioeconomic index (ISEI) ranges from 16 to
90 and is constructed on the basis of ISCO-88-coded professions
of the parents. We use the highest value among the parents.
Number of books Index for the number of books at home as stated in the PISA-
2000 survey.
Level of compulsory school Dummies for the school track that was attended at the time
of the PISA 2000 survey: low-level compulsory school (e.g.
Realschule), medium-level compulsory school (e.g. Sekun-
darschule), and “no selection” (integrated track, mixed). Re-
spondents of high-level compulsory school tracks (e.g. Pro-
Gymnasium) are dropped from the analysis.
School mark in test language 4 categories for the school mark in test language (German,
French, Italian, depending on the linguistic region) in the last
compulsory school report: insuﬃcient (<4), suﬃcient (from 4 to
<5), good (from 5 to 6), missing.
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School mark in mathematics 4 categories for the school mark in mathematics in last compul-
sory school report: insuﬃcient (<4), suﬃcient (from 4 to <5),
good (from 5 to 6), missing.
Reading literacy PISA 6 categories of reading literacy from the PISA 2000 survey. Test
scores are summarized in the following levels: 0 “very low”
[0;334.75], 1 “low” [334.75; 407.67], 2 “medium low” [407.67;
480.18], 3 “medium high” [480.18; 552.89], 4 “high” [552.89;
625.61], 5 “very high” [>625.61].
Math/sciences literacy PISA 5 categories of literacy in mathematics/sciences from the PISA
2000 survey. Mathematical and scientiﬁc literacy were each in-
vestigated only for approximately half of the students in PISA
2000. We pooled the resulting test scores in one variable and
built 4 categories representing quartiles and one category repre-
senting missing values (11.9%).
Absenteeism PISA index derived from students’ reports on how often they
missed school, skipped classes and were late for school in the
two last weeks (3 items).
Family support PISA index of family educational support derived from students’
reports on how frequently their mother, father, or brothers and
sisters worked with the student on what is regarded nationally
as schoolwork. Students responded to each statement on a ﬁve-
point scale with the following categories: never or hardly ever,
a few times a year, about once a month, several times a month
and several times a week.
Eﬀort & perseverance PISA index derived from the frequency with which students used
the following strategies when studying: I work as hard as pos-
sible; I keep working even if the material is diﬃcult; I try to do
my best to acquire the knowledge and skills taught; and, I put
forth my best eﬀort.
Expected status age 30 Index (standardized) representing the expected socioeconomic
status at age 30, constructed on the basis of the ISCO-88-coded
expected job at age 30. We additionally include a dummy vari-
able for missing information (23.5%). This variable is likely to
capture, up to a certain degree, uncertainty about career choice.
Occupational aim “nursing” Dummy variable that equals 1 if the expected job at age 30 is in
the ﬁeld of nursing. At the time of PISA 2000, the vocational
training towards nursing or similar occupations had still required
a minimum age of 18, which institutionally forced youngsters
with career aspirations in the health sector (mostly women) into
interim solutions.
Greater regions 7 categories of greater regions (oﬃcial grouping of cantons)
based on the location of compulsory school.
Municipality type “rural” Dummy variable that equals 1 if school location is urban, 0 if
rural.
School location 5 categories of municipality sizes (number of inhabitants) where
the compulsory school is located: village (less 3000), small town
(3000-15000), town (15000-100000), town (15000-100000), city
(100000-1000000).
Cantonal share interim solutions Cantonal share of pupils in interim solution programs in the year
2000 according to the administrative data base of the Federal
Statistical Oﬃce (Bildungsstatistik).
a) All variables except for the outcome variables are measured at the time of PISA 2000.
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Figure 4.A1: Distribution of the standardized bias before and after matching
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Chapter 5
Human capital speciﬁcity of
VET—Evidence from mobility after
graduation
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter,1 we study the speciﬁcity and transferability of human capital by analysing
inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility of Swiss apprentices shortly after the conclusion of train-
ing. Countries with comprehensive work-based apprenticeship programs lend themselves to
the study of occupation-speciﬁc human capital because they are structured along a multitude
of well-deﬁned occupations and corresponding educational tracks. Work-based apprentice-
ships are of central importance to the educational system in many countries, such as Austria,
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Wolter and Ryan, 2011). In the
United Kingdom, policy initiatives have been proposed to reinvigorate the apprenticeship
system UK Parliament, 2009: the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act of
2009), while calls for more vocational education tracks are a subject of public debate in the
US (see Hoﬀman, 2011; Symonds et al., 2011; or President Obama’s 2014 State of the Union
Address2).
1 This chapter is based on Mueller and Schweri (2015), How speciﬁc is apprenticeship training? Evidence
from inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility after graduation, Oxford Economic Papers 67(4), 1057-1077;
and its earlier version: Mueller and Schweri (2012b), The returns to occupation-speciﬁc human capital—
Evidence from mobility after training, Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0081, University of
Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
2 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oﬃce/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address
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The main economic rationale for a comprehensive work-based apprenticeship system is to
provide trainees with a set of clearly deﬁned and nationally tested occupational skills that are
transferable to other ﬁrms after graduation. Occupational skills promise specialization gains
due to more specialization than would be achieved in a purely general education system.
Apprentices acquire occupation-speciﬁc human capital that enables them to immediately
begin work as skilled workers after training; in a general education system, they would need
to go through a period of on-the-job training when taking up employment at a ﬁrm.
However, this specialization may also be detrimental if the allocative eﬃciency of appren-
ticeship systems is inferior to that of general education systems. Speciﬁc human capital may
impede workers from making eﬃciency-enhancing ﬁrm or occupation changes and lead to
wage losses for those who want to or have to leave the training ﬁrm or the learned occupa-
tion.3 This barrier becomes particularly important when job prospects on the labor market
deteriorate because of the business cycle or changes in the skills needed in the economy,
due to technological change or macroeconomic reallocation (Bassanini et al., 2007; Wasmer,
2006). Transferability might become even more important in the future, as some studies
have indicated that occupational mobility has generally been increasing in recent decades
(Kambourov and Manovskii, 2008; Lale´, 2012; Parrado et al., 2007).
The potential for gains from specialization as well as for allocative ineﬃciencies associated
with apprenticeship systems depend on the transferability of the human capital acquired in
apprenticeships. Firm-based apprenticeships have been suspected of conveying an overly
speciﬁc, narrow set of skills.4 To empirically assess the transferability of this human capital,
we study the incidence of inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility5 of Swiss apprentices shortly
after their training and the eﬀect of these types of mobility on wages.
The literature on mobility after apprenticeships refers mainly to Germany and comes to
heterogeneous results on the importance of inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility for wages
(see section 5.2). However, the evidence reported in the literature may not be generalizable
outside of Germany where there are labor market institutions that limit the ability to observe
the eﬀects of mobility on wages (Muehlemann et al., 2010). Labor market institutions that
hinder post-training mobility (such as work councils, industry-wide collective agreements,
3 Furthermore, Lamo et al. (2011) compare the economic transitions in Poland and Estonia and conclude
that overly speciﬁc training may increase unemployment.
4 Heckman (1994) described the German apprenticeship program as ’very narrow technical training’ with a
’rigid curriculum’ that contributes ’to diminished options in later life’ (p. 108).
5 The terms ’occupational change’ and ’occupational mobility’ are used interchangeably in our analysis.
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strong employment protection) are weaker or non-existent in Switzerland. By looking at
outcomes in Switzerland, we can shed light on the outcomes of mobility from comprehensive
apprenticeships schemes (like those in Germany) under more lightly regulated labor market
conditions, similar to those that prevail, e.g., in English-speaking countries.6
We investigate the inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility of a sample of apprentices who
have just completed several years of training in ﬁrms (combined with vocational school) in a
particular occupation. After training, apprentices must decide whether to (i) continue work-
ing for their training ﬁrm as a skilled worker, (ii) change ﬁrms within the learned occupation,
or (iii) change ﬁrms and move out of the learned occupation.7 Analysing the causal wage
eﬀect of trainees’ mobility decisions by addressing the endogeneity of mobility allows us to
assess the transferability of the trainees’ newly acquired human capital to other ﬁrms and
occupations.
We use a longitudinal data set that is based on the Swiss cohort of the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA) 2000 and matches employer and employee data.
We exploit the employment information of workers one year after apprenticeship graduation,
along with information on their training period. One advantage of this data is that all trainees
are at the same stage of their labor market career; mobility immediately after training is not
inﬂuenced by years of (additional) labor market experience.8 Some confounding factors as-
sociated with years on the labor market include job-shopping, multiple changes and internal
promotions. By avoiding these factors, the wage eﬀects of mobility after training provide
a ’purer’ measure of the transferability of human capital acquired in training than analy-
ses that compare learned and current occupations for employees with many years of labor
market experience. Furthermore, the dataset contains open text information on the learned
and current occupations (in addition to occupation codes) that we use to ensure accurate
coding of occupation change. The wealth of background variables available in PISA allows
us to control for important dimensions of individual heterogeneity such as socio-economic
background, ability and the quality of worker-ﬁrm and worker-occupation matches. Finally,
6 The Swiss labor market is one of the least regulated in Europe. Unlike in Germany, employment protection
is low (OECD, 2004; Venn, 2009) and inter-ﬁrm mobility after apprenticeship is relatively high (Wolter
and Ryan, 2011). Also see OECD (2009a) for diﬀerences in the institutional setup of the VET system in
Switzerland and Germany.
7 We restrict attention to these three alternatives. Occupation change always implies a ﬁrm change since
we observe virtually no cases of occupation changes within the training ﬁrm after training.
8 Firm or occupation movers may require more time than stayers before their wages reﬂect their individual
performance potential. Firms would then pay wages equal to the expected value of movers’ productivity,
which will still allow us to identify the productivity diﬀerential between movers and stayers.
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we address further sources of endogeneity of inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility by means
of the multinomial treatment regression model of Deb and Trivedi (2006).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The institutional background and
related literature are discussed in section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the data. The empirical
strategy and identiﬁcation issues are discussed in section 5.4. Section 5.5 is dedicated to the
results of the empirical analyses. Section 5.6 presents conclusions.
5.2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 131
5.2 Institutional Background and Related Literature
Cantonal authorities have to approve apprenticeship contracts to ensure that training ﬁrms
fulﬁl the legal requirements (such as employing trained supervisors). While participation in
the apprenticeship market is voluntary for ﬁrms and youngsters, federal laws regulate the
occupations in which apprenticeships can be undertaken and provide various instruments
for quality control. National training ordinances deﬁne every occupation’s title, duration,
educational objectives, curricula (including the number of lessons in vocational school) and
procedures for the ﬁnal exams. These regulations and the external certiﬁcation reduce asym-
metric information between the actors about training content and workers’ ability (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 2000; Malcomson et al., 2003) and ensure that ﬁrms provide a certain amount
and quality of training that is transferable to other ﬁrms after graduation.
Successful graduates of an apprenticeship are awarded federally recognized diplomas and
the respective titles that identify them as skilled workers in their occupation. The appren-
ticeship curricula provide for a mix of general and specialized occupational skills: for three
or four years (in few cases, two years), apprentices work for three to four days a week in
their training ﬁrm and attend vocational school for one to two days a week. In ﬁrms, they
acquire all types of skills, learning about the ﬁrm’s products and production technology, oc-
cupational tasks and general skills such as work values (accuracy, etc.). In vocational schools,
apprentices attend general education classes and occupation-speciﬁc lessons. Industry train-
ing courses organized by employer associations complement the education in schools and
ﬁrms by training all apprentices in a set of occupation-related skills deﬁned in the training
ordinance. Final exams consist of oral, written, and practical parts that test general and
occupational knowledge and skills as deﬁned in the training ordinance.
From a human capital perspective, apprentices acquire a mix of general and occupational
skills that are transferable to other ﬁrms. Firms are free to provide additional ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills. Stevens (1994b) demonstrates that monopsony power due to imperfect competition
can lead training ﬁrms to overinvest in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc element of training to reduce turnover
and to capture the beneﬁts of training at the expense of the worker. If the costs and beneﬁts
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital are shared between training ﬁrm and apprentice (Becker, 1962;
Hashimoto, 1981; Oosterbeek and Leuven, 2001), the workers’ returns on ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital should be observable in wages. Changing the employer after training should then lead,
ceteris paribus, to a wage loss.
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The concept of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital introduced by Becker (1962) extends to the
idea of occupation-speciﬁcity of human capital (Shaw, 1987; Zangelidis, 2008; Kambourov
and Manovskii, 2009; Sullivan, 2010): Occupation-speciﬁc human capital is transferable to
other jobs within the same occupation but cannot be used in jobs outside that occupation.
It can thus be classiﬁed as ’transferable’ according to the deﬁnition by Stevens (1994b), in
which ’it is of some value to at least one ﬁrm in addition to the training ﬁrm’ (p. 540),
but not perfectly general.9 An exogenous change away from the learned occupation should
entail a wage loss, ceteris paribus, because acquired occupation-speciﬁc skills cannot be put
to use anymore. The causal wage diﬀerence between those changing occupation and those
staying in an occupation can be interpreted as a measure of the transferability of training
and, accordingly, as a measure of the occupation-speciﬁcity of the human capital that the
training confers.
The empirical literature on mobility after apprenticeships refers mainly to Germany and
comes to heterogeneous results on wage eﬀects of inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility. With
respect to inter-ﬁrm mobility, von Wachter and Bender (2006) found causal evidence of
initial wage losses for graduates leaving middle- and large-sized training ﬁrms at the time of
graduation. In addition, they showed that initial sorting, adverse selection and endogenous
job mobility bias ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results such that short-run wage
losses are underestimated on average. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and Bougheas and
Georgellis (2004) also found negative eﬀects of leaving the training ﬁrm. Harhoﬀ and Kane
(1997) and Werwatz (1996) found some evidence for positive wage eﬀects of leaving the
training ﬁrm. Dustmann et al. (1997) found no signiﬁcant mover-stayer wage diﬀerential,
nor did Euwals and Winkelmann (2004), once they considered movers staying in the same
ﬁrm size class. Winkelmann (1996) analyzed mobility patterns and found that apprentices’
human capital was not less portable than that from other educations.
The eﬀects reported for switching out of the learned occupation are similarly heteroge-
neous. Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010) found that task-speciﬁc human capital accounts
for a part of the wage growth observed for medium-skilled workers. Fitzenberger and Spitz
(2004) found positive eﬀects of occupational changes. Werwatz (2002) found wage losses only
for those occupational movers who ended up in unskilled jobs, showing that apprentices’ hu-
9 At ﬁrst sight, such transferable human capital does not oﬀer a lever for ﬁrms to retain workers as ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital does. Yet, if ﬁrms have monopsony power within the boundaries of the occupation,
occupation-speciﬁc skills could also be used to retain workers (Smits, 2007).
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man capital is largely general. Clark and Fahr (2002) came to a similar conclusion; they
estimated a ’worst-case scenario’ where only one third of the human capital of exogenously
displaced workers can be transferred beyond 1-digit occupations. Goeggel and Zwick (2012)
looked at ﬁrm and occupation changes in the period immediately after graduation and re-
ported heterogeneous wage eﬀects; on average, they found positive eﬀects for ﬁrm changes
and negative eﬀects for occupation changes.
We contribute to this literature by analysing ﬁrm and occupation changes in one estima-
tion model. Many of the mentioned studies addressed the endogenous nature of mobility, but
none of them analysed employer and occupation changes simultaneously.10 This is necessary
to disentangle the eﬀects of ﬁrm- and occupation-speciﬁc human capital on wages in the
early careers of apprenticeship graduates, because occupational change typically goes hand
in hand with employer change. A new study by Fitzenberger et al. (2015), however, uses an
estimation approach similar to ours for Germany. They use variation in regional labor mar-
ket characteristics to analyse wage eﬀects caused by both mobility across ﬁrms and mobility
across occupations after graduation from apprenticeship. They ﬁnd that pure ﬁrm changes
and occupation-and-job changes result in average wage losses.
10 For example, von Wachter and Bender (2006) and Werwatz (1996) dropped occupational changers when
analysing the causal wage eﬀect of employer changes. Clark (2000) and Clark and Fahr (2002) focused
on displaced workers when analysing occupational changes. Goeggel and Zwick (2012) estimated separate
models for employer change and occupational change; it remains unclear whether the correlation between
both is taken into account. Other studies ignored the possibility that the wage eﬀect of ﬁrm (occupation)
changes might be partly driven by a loss of occupation-speciﬁc (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) human capital. An exception
is Longhi and Brynin (2010), who studied inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility in Britain and Germany,
but did not address the endogeneity of mobility with respect to wages.
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5.3 Data and Descriptives
The data base for our analysis is the Swiss TREE data. We use individuals who completed
their apprenticeship by 2005 and use data including wave 2006 to identify their subsequent
labor market outcome one year after graduation. Focusing on this period allows us to include
the vast majority of the individuals with apprenticeships because these programs typically
start immediately after compulsory school and end after two to four years.11 We observe
1,618 individuals with a transition from apprenticeship to work or to another activity within
a year after graduation. Of the graduates, 72 percent took up work, 15 percent were enrolled
in further education, 4 percent were serving in the military, 3 percent were temporarily out
of the labor force because they were travelling or engaged in language studies abroad, and 6
percent were unemployed.
We include working individuals12 with non-missing values in the wage and mobility vari-
ables. Our ﬁnal sample of employed individuals include 878 observations for the wage regres-
sions. Due to the limited sample size, we do not split the sample between men and women.
Female labor participation is similar to male participation at this age for apprenticeship
graduates.13 We control for occupation dummies to account for occupational segregation by
gender in the labor market.14
The mobility behavior after apprenticeship is our primary interest; ﬁrm change is deﬁned
as working in a diﬀerent enterprise than the training enterprise.15 Occupation change is
deﬁned as a change away from the apprenticeship 2-digit occupation after the apprenticeship
period, based on occupation codes used to classify occupation by the Swiss Federal Statistical
11 Comparing our TREE sample with oﬃcial numbers on apprenticeship graduates, graduates of four-year
apprenticeships are slightly underrepresented.
12 Using all VET graduates, the paper of Mueller and Schweri (2009) puts its focus on the determinants of
various activities after apprenticeship graduation and includes a comparison of the mobility behavior of
dual VET graduates compared to graduates of full-time vocational schools.
13 In our data, female labor market participation of apprenticeship graduates is even higher (77% versus 66%).
While both genders show very similar rates of unemployment (6%) and periods of being temporarily out
of the labor force because they were travelling or engaged in language studies abroad (3%), only male
participants are in military service (9%). The proportion of graduates who attend further certifying
education (e.g., a university of applied sciences) is slightly higher for male graduates as well (16% versus
14%).
14 Note that industry changes occur almost exclusively together with occupation changes in our data. Because
all apprenticeship regulations refer to clearly deﬁned occupations and not to industries, occupations are
the relevant dimension in our context.
15 Enterprises can consist of several establishments in the deﬁnition of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce. We use
information from the ﬁrm census of the FSO to identify changes on enterprise level. This is our preferred
deﬁnition because information on workers’ abilities is likely to be available to the enterprise, not only to
the establishment; see Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) for a short discussion.
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Oﬃce (FSO).16 There are thirty-nine 2-digit occupation categories.17 Thus, we adopt a rather
broad deﬁnition of an occupation to exclude changes between occupations entailing a very
similar set of skills.18 As a sensitivity check, we also provide results for 5-, 3- and 1-digit
changes. As only three individuals showed an occupation change without a ﬁrm change (these
were dropped from the analysis), we deﬁned three mutually exclusive mobility categories.
These are represented by the two dummy variables, ﬁrm movers who remain within the
learned occupation and occupation changers who switched both ﬁrm and occupation, and by
the reference category, stayers.
Table 5.1 describes the mobility behavior of employed apprenticeship graduates. Roughly
one half of the graduates continue to work in their training ﬁrms, 42% change ﬁrms but
not occupation, and 7% change ﬁrm and move out of the 2-digit occupation in which they
were trained. The proportion of occupation changes is rather low one year after completing
apprenticeship training. If we use the 5-digit deﬁnition, we ﬁnd 4.5 percentage points more
occupation changes than with the 2-digit deﬁnition.
Table 5.1: Mobility patterns after training (status one year after graduation)
Digit-level of occupational change
Category 5-digit 3-digit 2-digit 1-digit
Job in training ﬁrm (’Stayer’) 51.03% 51.03% 51.03% 51.03%
Firm change within occupation (’Firm mover’) 37.24% 41.23% 41.80% 42.60%
Firm change across occupation (’Occupational change’) 11.73% 7.74% 7.18% 6.38%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100. 00% 100.00%
16 Apprenticeship occupations were pre-coded according to the oﬃcial classiﬁcation BIS (Bildungsstatistis-
ches Informationssystem) of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce, which is designed to categorize apprenticeship
occupations. However, the occupations of the jobs that were accepted after the apprenticeships are coded
according to the Swiss Occupation Classiﬁcation SBN (Schweizerische Berufsnomenklatur 2000); this clas-
siﬁcation system is typically used for labor market analysis in Switzerland. To compare the learned and
current occupations, we convert the vocational training occupations (i.e., BIS codes) into the Swiss Occu-
pation Classiﬁcation codes using the oﬃcial ’thesaurus’ developed by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce, which
assigns about 19’000 job titles (open text) to the numeric classiﬁcation scheme. While we could convert
these codes into international classiﬁcation codes, such as ISCO, we prefer to use the Swiss classiﬁcation
system, which is better suited to discriminating among the diﬀerent Swiss apprenticeship occupations.
17 Examples of these thirty-nine occupation categories include: ’24: occupations in metalworking and engine
construction (Berufe der Metallverarbeitung und des Maschinenbaus),’ ’26: occupations in wood process-
ing and paper manufacture/paper conversion (Berufe der Holzverarbeitung sowie der Papierherstellung
und -verarbeitung),’ ’28: occupations in the chemical and plastics industry (Berufe der Chemie und Kun-
ststoﬀverfahren),’ ’61: occupations in the hotel and restaurant industry and domestic economy (Berufe
des Gastgewerbes und Hauswirtschaftsberufe)’ and ’62: occupations in cleaning and hygiene (Berufe der
Reinigung, Hygiene und Koerperpﬂege).’
18 Task-based (Gathmann and Schoenberg, 2010) or skill-weights approaches (Lazear, 2009; Geel and Backes-
Gellner, 2011) allow one to analyse the distance between occupations directly. The more classical approach
that distinguishes among oﬃcial occupations remains relevant because all state regulations (on training
ordinances, curricula and diplomas) are based on these.
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In studies using the German Qualiﬁcation and Career Survey (GQCS), insight on the
transferability of the human capital can be gained by using apprentices’ own assessments
about the proportion of skills acquired during apprenticeship that are applicable at their
current job. Dustmann and Schoenberg (2007) use this information and report results for the
degree of speciﬁcity of apprenticeship training in Germany (ﬁrm-speciﬁc: 4.5%, occupation-
speciﬁc: 34.3%). Replicating their calculations using TREE respondents’ assessements of the
usefulness of what they learned in training (in ﬁrms as well as in school) to their current work,
table 5.2 shows virtually identical results for Switzerland: Firm movers report values that are,
on average, 2.4 percent below the values reported by ﬁrm stayers (’ﬁrm-speciﬁc component’),
whereas occupation changers report values that are 34.4 percent below the average value of
ﬁrm movers within the learned occupation (’occupation-speciﬁc component’).
Table 5.2: Usefulness of the skills acquired in training for current job
Skills training ﬁrm Skills voc. school Mean of both sources
mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
Firm stayer 3.60 (0.62) 3.02 (0.78) 3.31 (0.58)
Firm mover (same occupation) 3.35 (0.76) 3.11 (0.81) 3.23 (0.64)
Occupational change 2.12 (0.95) 2.12 (0.94) 2.12 (0.84)
Note: The usefulness of the skills for the current job were rated by the respondents on a scale ranging
from 1, ’not useful,’ to 4, ’very useful.’
However, an analysis of (self-assessed) skill applicability might be distorted by similar
endogeneity issues as discussed in the next session in the case of wages. In the remainder of
the analysis, we restrict our attention to wages as our outcome of interest.
As the dependent variable, we use the logarithm of hourly wages in the current job.
Descriptively, the wage distributions in ﬁgure 5.1 show that average wages are highest for
stayers, followed by ﬁrm movers and occupation changers. Occupation changers earn the least
on average: they earn 21.74 CHF per hour, compared with 22.86 CHF for ﬁrm movers and
23.31 CHF for stayers (see table 5.A2 in the appendix). Furthermore, the wage distributions
are broader for movers than for stayers and even broader for occupation changers. This is also
the pattern that we would expect for the (unobservable) distribution of wage oﬀers because
the oﬀers come from very diﬀerent ﬁrms in the case of occupation changers.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the logarithm of hourly wages by mobility status one year after
graduation
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In our estimations, we always include variables on personal characteristics (gender, immi-
grant), parental education, language region, the apprenticeship training program (occupation
and duration of apprenticeship, size of training ﬁrm, professional baccalaureate obtained),
information on the period between end of apprenticeship and time of interview, size of the
current ﬁrm and the unemployment rate in the occupation19. Further variables such as ability
and match quality proxies as well as variables used for identiﬁcation purposes are discussed
in the next section. Table 5.A1 in the appendix contains variable deﬁnitions, and table 5.A2
presents descriptive statistics for all variables.
19 Brunner and Kuhn (2014), and others cited there, have shown that unemployment at the time of labor
market entry has a substantial eﬀect on individuals’ wages.
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5.4 Estimation Strategy
5.4.1 Operationalization of the hypotheses
To estimate the eﬀects of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and occupation-speciﬁc components of human capital,
we analyse the wage eﬀects of changing ﬁrm within occupation (ﬁrm movers) and changing
ﬁrm across occupation (occupation changers), as opposed to staying in the training ﬁrm and
the occupation (stayers). These wage diﬀerentials can, in principle, be estimated by an OLS
log wage (lnwi) regression for person i:
lnwi = β0 + β
fmfmi + β
ococi + xiβ
x + ui (5.1)
Our main hypotheses pertain to the wage eﬀect of mobility.20 Due to human capital losses,
we expect the coeﬃcients βˆfm and βˆoc for the ﬁrm mover (fm) and occupation changer (oc)
dummy variables to be negative, with a larger wage loss for occupation changers than for
ﬁrm movers. x is a vector of covariates, and u is the error term.
5.4.2 Potential sources of bias in OLS estimation
The OLS dummy coeﬃcients may be biased due to four reasons: (i) heterogeneous occupation
changes, (ii) optimizing behavior in job search, (iii) heterogeneity in worker-ﬁrm and worker-
occupation matches and (iv) heterogeneity in worker ability. We discuss the likely direction of
the biases introduced in OLS estimation, as well as our strategy to address these endogeneity
issues.
First, the transferability of human capital from one occupation to another may not be
constant. For instance, an electrician might still make some use of his technical skills as
a car mechanic, but not as an oﬃce clerk. Thus, we would like the OLS coeﬃcient of the
occupational change dummy in equation (5.1) to identify the mean loss of human capital
between two diﬀerent occupations due to occupation-speciﬁc human capital. It does not
identify a mean eﬀect if occupation changers are more likely to choose a new occupation that
20 Goeggel and Zwick (2012) used the ’wage mark-up’ between the last apprenticeship wage and the ﬁrst
skilled wage as dependent variable, arguing that higher quality training ﬁrms pay higher apprenticeship
wages. However, human capital theory predicts that trainees accept lower training wages in return for
receiving general human capital. Lower wages might thus indicate a higher training intensity. Muehlemann
et al. (2013) indeed ﬁnd that Swiss ﬁrms whose staﬀ provides more training hours to trainees pay lower
apprenticeship wages. The wage mark-up is then not suited to measure human capital transferability.
Instead, we include apprenticeship wage as control in our robustness checks.
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allows a high transfer of human capital from their learned occupation. In this case, occupation
changers transfer more of their skills than would be the case if changes were purely random.
The OLS coeﬃcient for occupation change will be biased upwards and underestimate the
wage penalty for changing occupation.
Second, apprentices have to search for jobs as their apprenticeship contracts end. In search
theory (Mortensen, 1986; Rogerson et al., 2005), the focus lies on the endogenous nature of
inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility with respect to wages. Search theory assumes that
workers trade oﬀ the gains from accepting a job that oﬀers a given wage with the expected
gains from continuing to search and waiting for a higher wage oﬀer. Apprentices will search
for a post-training job and compare wage oﬀers from the training ﬁrm, from other ﬁrms within
the same training occupation and from ﬁrms in other occupations altogether. Occupational
or inter-ﬁrm changes are realized when the wage oﬀer in another ﬁrm or occupation exceeds
the asking wage of the graduating apprentices. Because voluntary changers tend to beneﬁt
from mobility, their wage loss due to speciﬁc human capital will be underestimated.
Third, during the period of training, apprentices experience the quality of their match
with the training ﬁrm and with the occupation. Matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979) highlights
the idea that job mobility enhances eﬃciency when it improves the quality of worker-ﬁrm or
worker-occupation matches. Apprentices might thus voluntarily change ﬁrm or occupation
after training to dissolve a bad match. It is unclear whether these apprentices will have a
higher or lower average match quality after their change than stayers, and whether match
quality introduces any bias. Stevens (2003) convincingly argues that stayers will have below-
average matches that they do not resolve because they would lose ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns. In the
presence of returns to speciﬁc human capital, match quality diﬀerences might thus introduce
an upward bias in the OLS coeﬃcients for the ﬁrm mover and occupation changer dummies.
We would underestimate the wage loss due to speciﬁc human capital.
Fourth, the literature suggests that mobility in the labor market depends on the unob-
served ability of individuals. If abler apprentices receive better oﬀers from outside ﬁrms,
selection into mobility could be positive. However, the predominant case discussed in the
literature is adverse selection. Gibbons and Katz (1991) analysed adverse selection in job
changes when the ability of individuals is not observable by outside employers. In the model
developed and tested by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), apprenticeships serve as screening
devices for ﬁrms to learn about the most able apprentices and retain them after graduation,
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while not retaining those that fail to attain a certain ability threshold. This leads to invol-
untary mobility of adversely selected graduates. In such a case, OLS overestimates the wage
penalty for changers, as ﬁrm and occupation changers are less able on average.
The ﬁrst three of the four sources of endogeneity discussed are presumed to induce an
upward bias in the OLS regression estimates of our mobility dummy variables, which results
in underestimation of the wage loss that would occur when an apprentice moves randomly
(in a thought experiment) from one occupation or ﬁrm to another. If the size of a (fourth)
possible bias due to ability sorting is small compared to the size of the other biases discussed,
then OLS regression provides a lower bound for the causal wage penalty resulting from ﬁrm
and occupation changes and hence for the returns to speciﬁc human capital.
5.4.3 Estimation Setup
Our ﬁrst estimation model for equation (5.1) is OLS regression, augmented with observable
proxy variables to account for some of the possible sources of bias. The second type of models
are endogenous treatment regressions that account for the endogeneity problems.
According to the third and fourth sources of endogeneity discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, the fm and oc dummy variables depend on individuals’ unobserved abilities and match
qualities in a sample with endogenously determined ﬁrm and occupation changes. With
respect to ability, we control for individuals’ grades in the ﬁnal examination at the end of
apprenticeship training, reading literacy test scores at age 15 (before training) from the in-
ternational PISA 2000 survey21, PISA mathematical self-concept, self-eﬃcacy in work tasks
during apprenticeship, extrinsic motivation, vocational baccalaureate, and previous school
type on lower-secondary level. This proxy solution assumes that the unobserved, true ability
and the ﬁrm mover and occupation change dummy variables are uncorrelated, conditional on
the mentioned proxy variables. With respect to the quality of the trainee-ﬁrm and trainee-
occupation matches, we control for the apprentices’ statement whether they want to stay with
the training ﬁrm after training, whether they like to perform the typical tasks of their appren-
ticeship occupations, for their assessments of the perspectives in the occupation and of the
quality of their supervisor, all measured during training at least one year before graduation.
If the proxies for ability and match qualities are good proxies that eliminate or greatly
21 Contrary to reading performance, PISA 2000 tested mathematics performance only for a subgroup of
pupils.
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reduce ability bias, the remaining two sources of endogeneity will bias the OLS coeﬃcients
of mobility upwards and underestimate the wage loss due to speciﬁc human capital. Hence,
OLS provides a lower bound on the wage diﬀerentials. We treat the OLS coeﬃcients as
baseline results and address endogenous mobility by means of an endogenous treatment
model (Heckman, 1978; Vella, 1998; Vella and Verbeek, 1999).
In our case, the endogenous regressor is multinomial instead of binary (on multiple treat-
ments, see Lee, 1983; Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Dahl, 2002). It is a variable with three
categories (i.e., two dummy variables) for ﬁrm stayers, ﬁrm movers and occupation changers.
The ﬁrst equation of the model consists of a discrete choice model for mobility decisions, and
the second equation is a wage regression.
y∗ij = γ
0
j + xiγ
x
j + ziγ
z
j + vij j = st,fm,oc (5.2)
lnwi = β0 + β
fmfmi + β
ococi + xiβ
x + liλ+ ui (5.3)
Equation (5.2) describes the choice of apprentices among three mobility alternatives based
on the individual latent ’utilities’ y∗ij. The observed, optimal choice enters equation (5.3) as
dummy variables fm and oc. xi represents controls included in both equations, zi represents
variables that inﬂuence the mobility decision but do not inﬂuence wages. li represents the
selection eﬀect and will be derived from the choice equation, as explained below.
We use two diﬀerent approaches to estimate equations (5.2) and (5.3). Both model the
choice equation (5.2) as a multinomial logit, and the log wage equation (5.3) as a linear
regression. Deb and Trivedi (2006) propose a simulated maximum likelihood method to
estimate the joint distribution of endogenous treatment and outcome using a latent factor
structure. Their model includes two lambda coeﬃcients (for three choice categories) in the
outcome equation that account for the selection eﬀect.
We compare the results of the Deb and Trivedi (DT) method with those of a standard
two-step control function (CF) approach. We derive Mills ratios from a ﬁrst-stage multi-
nomial logit, applying a generalized version of the Dubin and McFadden (1984) approach.
Bourguignon et al. (2007) showed that this version (’DMF1’ in their paper) performs well in
Monte Carlo simulations of selection bias correction models and is their preferred option for
small samples. The DMF1 approach involves one control function per choice alternative in
the ﬁrst stage, i.e., li includes three Mills ratios in wage regression (5.3). We assume that
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the treatment eﬀect operates only through the intercept such that the coeﬃcient vector βx
is the same for all groups (as in DT).22 The two-step method has the advantage that it does
not rely on simulation. Two-step methods are, however, ineﬃcient and may result in inﬂated
standard errors.
In both methods discussed, nonlinear functional forms identify the parameters even if
the set of variables in both equations is identical. For more robust identiﬁcation, we include
variables (zi) in the mobility equation (5.2) that are excluded from wage regression (5.3). If
these variables are correlated with mobility but uncorrelated with wages (after controlling
for xi), the model identiﬁes the causal eﬀect of mobility on wages.
Ideally, these variables reﬂect exogenous variation in the demand for apprenticeship grad-
uates at ﬁrm and occupation level. In the absence of direct measures in the data, we use
matched information from other data sources to create measures at the level of the local labor
market23 (and industry) for average inter-ﬁrm and occupational mobility in the workforce and
for employment growth within local industry. These measures for local labor market thick-
ness or tightness will inﬂuence mobility behavior at the individual level. We use three such
variables, for which we assume no correlation with realized wages. The ﬁrst variable is the
average regional quit rate of apprentices in the relevant industry. We calculated regional,
industry-speciﬁc quit rates from two Swiss surveys on costs and beneﬁts of ﬁrms from ap-
prenticeship training that contain information on the percentage of apprentices staying with
their training ﬁrm after training.24 The second variable is the regional, occupation-speciﬁc
share of workers up to age 25 that do not work in their learned occupation according to the
Swiss population census 2000. The third variable is due to Neal (1995) who used level of
employment and employment growth in industries as variables aﬀecting switching behavior.
As employment levels are not signiﬁcantly related to mobility in our sample, we include only
the employment growth variable. We expect that in industries with higher growth, appren-
22 Due to the limited sample size, we are not able to allow for diﬀerences in the βx coeﬃcients across mobility
groups as would be possible in a full switching regression.
23 Local labor markets were deﬁned as follows: individual regions encompass all municipalities that can be
reached within 30 minutes by car from the apprentice’s residential municipality. The computation is based
on a distance matrix provided by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (FSO). According to the Federal population
census, the average commuting time in Switzerland was 20.1 minutes in 2000 and increased by less than
2 minutes since 1970 (Scherer et al., 2010). At the time of graduation, apprentices typically live at their
parents’ homes and are not very mobile. A distance of 30 minutes by car seems therefore a realistic radius.
24 We thank Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan Wolter for the permission to use the cost-beneﬁt data 2000 and
2004 (see Schweri et al., 2003, and Muehlemann et al., 2007). We use the pooled data set containing 4729
training ﬁrms. To account for possible outliers in quit rates, we use a dummy indicating a quit rate above
the sample average.
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tices are more likely to receive a job oﬀer by their training ﬁrm and are more likely to stay.
Vice versa, they are forced to leave the ﬁrm in the case of a non-growing industry, because
the ﬁrm might not want to grow by hiring the former apprentice as a skilled worker.25 We
calculated employment growth from the ﬁrm census data. We matched all regional variables
to the apprentices based upon their place of residence and occupation / industry during ap-
prenticeship training. The relevant individual regions encompass all municipalities reachable
within thirty minutes by car from the apprentice’s residential municipality. We have thus
created a speciﬁc region for every community in the data (see table 5.A1 in the appendix for
more details).26
25 Some authors use information on ﬁrm closures or sharp declines in ﬁrm size to analyse the eﬀects of
mobility (Fitzenberger and Spitz, 2004; Dustmann and Meghir, 2005). We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of ﬁrm size reductions on mobility and there is no suitable data available on the former.
26 Switzerland is composed of about 2700 communities. Apprentices in the sample lived in 390 diﬀerent
communities.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Main ﬁndings
The ﬁrst OLS wage regression in table 5.3 (second column) does not yet include ability or
match quality proxies. The results show no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in wages between stayers
and ﬁrm movers, but wages for occupation changers are lower by 5.2% compared to stayers,
and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
We add ability and match quality proxy variables in the OLS wage regression in the
third column. The coeﬃcients of the mobility dummies remain very similar, with occupation
changers earning 4.5% less than ﬁrm stayers. Looking at the new covariates, we see that
the PISA literacy test score at age 15 is signiﬁcant: an increase by one standard deviation
on the international PISA scale, i.e. 100 score points, increases wages by 1.4%. We do
not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between mobility and test score (results not shown).
Individuals with higher mathematical self-concept, higher self-eﬃcacy in work tasks and
higher extrinsic motivation also earn signiﬁcantly more, which shows that these ability and
personality variables measured during training or before are relevant for later labor market
outcomes. Other signiﬁcant eﬀects are in line with results well known from the literature:
women earn less, employees in larger ﬁrms earn more (see Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2011), and
there are wage diﬀerences across language regions and occupations.27
The multinomial logit results in the last three columns of table 5.3 allow us to assess the
selection process into ﬁrm and occupational mobility. We present average marginal eﬀects.
Many ability variables have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on mobility; yet, as the PISA reading
test score increases by one standard deviation, the probability of occupation change reduces
by 2.8 percentage points. Trainees that earn a vocational baccalaureate during their appren-
ticeship period are more likely to stay with their training ﬁrm. Most matching variables show
highly signiﬁcant and substantial eﬀects: A positive assessment of the career prospects in the
learned occupation and a high perceived quality of training both reduce the probability of
changing occupation. Wanting to stay in the training ﬁrm strongly increases the probability
of working in the training ﬁrm one year after training.
27 Controlling for 13 industries using dummy variables does not change the results.
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Table 5.3: Wage estimations: OLS, Deb-Trivedi (DT) and control function (CF) estimates;
ﬁrst stage mlogit
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage) MLOGIT
OLS 1 OLS 2 DT model CF estim. Average marginal eﬀects
Firm Mover Occ.change Stayer
Firm mover −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.022
(0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.036)
Occupational change −0.052∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.059)
PISA test score reading literacy 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.012 0.017 −0.028∗∗ 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) −0.021 −0.012 −0.02
Mathematics self-concept 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.002 0.011 −0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.011) (0.017)
High GPA in apprent. training 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.049 −0.014 −0.036
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.024) (0.035)
Self-eﬃcacy in work tasks 0.025∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ −0.022 0.026 −0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.034) (0.020) (0.032)
Extrinsic motivation 0.019∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.018 −0.026 −0.034∗ 0.060∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.032) (0.018) (0.031)
Vocational baccalaureate −0.018 −0.018 −0.017 −0.064∗ −0.023 0.087∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.038) (0.025) (0.036)
High track in lower-sec. school 0.015 0.017 0.018 −0.082∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.032
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.022) (0.036)
Likes tasks of training occupation −0.006 −0.007 −0.010 0.027 −0.017 −0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.026) (0.014) (0.025)
Wants to work in training ﬁrm 0.005 0.005 0.011 −0.204∗∗∗ 0.006 0.198∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.030) (0.018) (0.029)
Perspectives in occupation 0.001 −0.001 −0.002 0.024 −0.032∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019)
Perceived quality of supervisor 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.000 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.048∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.030) (0.017) (0.028)
Female −0.041∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.006 −0.001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.040) (0.023) (0.038)
Immigrant: second-generation 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.049 −0.019 −0.029
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.060) (0.033) (0.058)
Immigrant: ﬁrst-generation −0.006 −0.008 −0.01 −0.009 −0.075 −0.019 0.093∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.057) (0.033) (0.054)
French-speaking part of CH 0.018 0.029∗ 0.029∗ 0.026 −0.042 0.028 0.014
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.059) (0.035) (0.056)
Italian-speaking part of CH −0.099∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.081 0.089∗∗ −0.008
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.070) (0.038) (0.068)
Parental educ.: upper-secondary −0.003 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.015 0.015 0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.035) (0.020) (0.033)
Parental educ.: tertiary −0.003 −0.005 −0.008 −0.011 0.035 −0.055∗∗ 0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.040) (0.026) (0.038)
Size of training ﬁrm: 11-100 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.012 −0.079∗∗ 0.007 0.072∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.033) (0.019) (0.032)
Size of training ﬁrm: 100+ 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.016 −0.086∗ 0.008 0.078∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.049) (0.028) (0.047)
Size of current ﬁrm: 11-100 0.018∗ 0.020∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ −0.050 0.013 0.037
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.034) (0.021) (0.033)
Size of current ﬁrm: 100+ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ 0.023 0.114∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.047) (0.026) (0.045)
Unemployment rate −0.006 −0.008∗ −0.007 −0.007 −0.004 0.008 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
Training occupation (duration):
Agriculture and Forestry (3) −0.125∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.051 0.066∗ −0.015
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.081) (0.040) (0.080)
Production, Manufacturing (3) −0.036∗∗ −0.018 −0.016 −0.018 −0.043 0.026 0.017
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.065) (0.035) (0.061)
Production, Manufacturing (4) −0.018 −0.011 −0.011 −0.013 0.002 −0.051 0.049
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.076) (0.044) (0.071)
Technicians, IT (4) 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.003 −0.019 −0.153∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.074) (0.064) (0.065)
Construction (3) 0.005 0.029 0.029 0.030 −0.133 0.003 0.130
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.088) (0.046) (0.083)
Construction (4) −0.002 0.012 0.009 0.009 −0.123 −0.056 0.178∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.099) (0.056) (0.090)
Retail and wholesale, transport (2) −0.157∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗ −0.010 0.172∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.072) (0.042) (0.068)
— continued on next page ... —
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— ... continued from previous page —
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage) MLOGIT
OLS 1 OLS 2 DT model CF estim. Average marginal eﬀects
Firm Mover Occ.change Stayer
Retail and wholesale, transport (3) −0.043∗∗ −0.034∗ −0.033∗ −0.029∗ −0.199∗∗∗ 0.007 0.193∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.066) (0.039) (0.060)
Catering and restaurant (2) −0.097∗∗ −0.077∗ −0.077∗∗ −0.074∗∗ −0.118 0.001 0.117
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.035) (0.129) (0.071) (0.128)
Catering and restaurant (3) −0.091∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ 0.024 0.028 −0.051
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.069) (0.038) (0.068)
Oﬃce worker (2) −0.066∗ −0.068∗ −0.058 −0.045 −0.337∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.189
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.048) (0.165) (0.060) (0.148)
Health and welfare (3,4) −0.021 −0.014 −0.013 −0.015 −0.023 0.014 0.009
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.066) (0.047) (0.061)
Tenure in month at current job 0.002 0.002∗ 0.002 0.003 −0.008 0.000 0.009∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Time between graduation & job 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.006 −0.013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010)
Spells between graduation & job:
Any unemployment spell −0.020 −0.020 −0.017 −0.020 0.263∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.054) (0.023) (0.057)
Any military service spell −0.008 −0.017 −0.013 −0.012 0.028 0.064 −0.091
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.083) (0.039) (0.082)
Any travelling / at home spell 0.010 0.004 0.004 −0.000 0.169∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.192∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.053) (0.027) (0.053)
Any educational activity spell −0.005 −0.001 −0.000 0.002 −0.022 0.030 −0.008
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.067) (0.030) (0.069)
Any other job spell 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.142∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.147∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.053) (0.025) (0.054)
Any other spell (missing info) −0.012 −0.009 −0.009 −0.008 −0.022 0.005 0.017
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.057) (0.036) (0.051)
High regional quit rate 0.124∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.107∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.019) (0.030)
Regional rate of occupation change 0.225 0.298∗ −0.523
(0.349) (0.180) (0.342)
Regional employment growth −0.272 −0.188 0.461∗∗
(0.210) (0.137) (0.198)
Lambda / Mills ’Firm mover’ −0.002 −0.004
(0.023) (0.017)
Lambda / Mills ’Occ. change’ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(0.016) (0.020)
Mills ’Firm stayer’ 0.011
(0.013)
Constant 3.163∗∗∗ 2.986∗∗∗ 3.001∗∗∗ 3.006∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.056) (0.055) (0.073)
N 878 878 878 878 878
R-sq / Pseudo R-sq 0.282 0.311 0.318 0.334
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
CF (control function) estimates: bootstrapped standard errors (2000 replications) to account for generated regressors.
Reference group: ﬁrm stayer; no professional baccalaureate; lower track in lower-secondary school; male; Swiss;
German speaking part of Switzerland; highest parental education: compulsory school; ﬁrm size: 1-10 fulltime-equivalents;
training occupation: commercial employee (3); no intervening spell between graduation and current job.
Overall, we ﬁnd only limited evidence for adverse selection on ability in post-training
mobility. A possible explanation is that positive and adverse selection exist at the same
time, such that the mean eﬀect of ability on mobility is rather small. Occupation changers
have a somewhat lower PISA score and are less likely to earn a vocational baccalaureate,
but the experience during training as represented by the match quality variables is more
inﬂuential for mobility decisions than ability. The match quality variables, however, do not
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence wages in the OLS regression. Accordingly, ability and match quality
variables are important to understand mobility decisions and wage setting, but exert little
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inﬂuence on the wage diﬀerentials between stayers, ﬁrm movers and occupation changers.
If our ability and match quality variables are good proxies, the remaining bias in OLS
(from heterogeneous eﬀects and endogenously chosen mobility) should be an upward bias.
Thus, the OLS coeﬃcient of 4.5% wage loss for occupation changers provides a lower bound
(in absolute terms) for the short-term wage loss due to occupation-speciﬁc human capital
acquired during apprenticeship training.
The last columns of table 5.3 show mlogit results for the mobility equation that acts
as ﬁrst stage for the endogenous treatment models. The three variables excluded from the
(second stage) wage equation are jointly signiﬁcant (p < 0.0001) in a Wald test. The regional
quit rate and regional employment growth aﬀect individuals’ probability to stay in the ﬁrm
signiﬁcantly; the regional rate of occupation change increases individuals’ probability to
change occupation.28
The Deb and Trivedi (2006) endogenous treatment model accounts for the endogeneity
of job and occupation changes. For most covariates, the ’DT’ results in column 4 of table
5.3 are very similar to the OLS results. Yet, the wage loss of an occupation changer relative
to a stayer increases from 4.5% to 9.4%. This result is in line with our prediction that—
controlled for ability and match quality—OLS underestimates the wage loss due to switches
out of the learned occupation. The lambda coeﬃcient for occupation change is signiﬁcantly
positive, indicating that selection into mobility is not random, conditional on the observed
xi-variables.
The point estimate for ﬁrm movers is almost equal to zero and insigniﬁcant. Two in-
terpretations are possible: Either there is no substantial ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills component on
average, or the training ﬁrm acquires all the returns on ﬁrm-speciﬁc training investments.
Irrespective of the interpretation, there is no evidence that ﬁrms distort training contents
towards ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills in an eﬀort to retain workers. Of course, training ﬁrms might
oﬀer contracts with modest post-training wages and back-loaded compensation that reward
tenure as a strategy to retain apprentices (Stevens, 2004). Firm-speciﬁc human capital would
thus matter for lifetime earnings. We would need data on apprentices with many years of
post-training labor market experience to analyse such behavior by training ﬁrms.
28 Concerning the variable ’regional rate of occupation change’, its marginal eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 10%
level for occupation change against the two other alternatives (see table 5.3); however, its coeﬃcient in the
ﬁrst stage DT mixed mlogit is signiﬁcant at the 5% level between the alternatives staying and changing
occupation (see table 5.A3 in the appendix).
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5.5.2 Robustness Checks
First, we compare the results of the Deb and Trivedi approach with the two-step control
function approach described in section 5.4.3. The ﬁfth column in table 5.3 (’CF’) shows
that occupation change is again associated with a higher wage loss than in the OLS models,
whereas ﬁrm stayers and movers show no signiﬁcant wage diﬀerence. The point estimate
of occupation change is larger than estimated by the DT-Method, however, the qualitative
results remain the same. The two-step procedure comes at the cost of markedly higher
(bootstrapped) standard errors leading to an imprecise estimation of the mobility eﬀects.
Second, we redeﬁne the occupation change dummy variable using 5-digit, 3-digit and
1-digit deﬁnitions in place of the 2-digit deﬁnition of an ’occupation’ that we deem most
adequate (see section 5.3). These diﬀerent deﬁnitions of occupation change imply diﬀerent
delimitations between ﬁrm- and occupation-speciﬁc human capital in our setting (see table
5.1). Wage losses are smallest (6.3% in DT estimation, see table 5.4) when occupational
changes mean small (5-digit) changes, which is what we would expect from human capital
theory.
Table 5.4: Overview of key results obtained by varying the deﬁnition of occupational change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5-digit 3-digit 2-digit 1-digit
Results of wage regression OLS
Firm mover −0.001 −0.000 0.001 −0.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Occupational change −0.018 −0.038∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.044∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Results of Deb-Trivedi treatment regression
Firm mover −0.006 −0.001 0.001 −0.000
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Occupational change −0.063∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Lambda ’ﬁrm mover’ 0.004 0.000 −0.002 −0.001
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Lambda ’occ. change’ 0.056∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Controlled for the full set of covariates as in table 5.3
The deﬁnition in (3) is the one used throughout our analysis.
Note: The 4-digit-level coincides with the 3-digit-level nearly everywhere in the nomenclature.
Third, we change the calculation of the regional variables excluded from the wage equation
(z-variables). If we deﬁne a 45-minute travel-time radius from the apprentices’ places of
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residence instead of 30 minutes, the results (not shown) are very similar to those in table 5.3.
The occupation change dummy coeﬃcient is virtually identical with -.093.
Fourth, we estimate the DT model using only two, one or none of the z-variables in the
mobility equation, thus relying on non-linear functional form for identiﬁcation. The results
are very similar; in particular the occupation change dummy remains signiﬁcant and between
-9.0% and -9.5%.
Finally, if we include the last training wage as an additional control for unobserved het-
erogeneity in training (Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004), it is weakly signiﬁcant in the DT
wage regression with positive sign. The wage eﬀects of mobility remain virtually the same.
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5.6 Conclusions
Firm-based apprenticeships have been suspected of transferring an overly speciﬁc, narrow
set of skills. The literature available on human capital transferability for Germany comes to
heterogeneous results and is probably not generalizable to other countries; however, several
studies have reported high transferability of skills learned in apprenticeship.
We show that in Switzerland with its lightly regulated labor market, ﬁrm mobility within
one year after completing an apprenticeship is high (49 percent of all apprenticeship gradu-
ates, including occupation changers), whereas occupational mobility is limited (7 percent of
all graduates). In OLS wage regressions, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in wages of ﬁrm
stayers and ﬁrm movers within their learned occupation deﬁned at the two-digit occupation
level, even when we control for ability and match quality proxies. Firm movers with occupa-
tion change, however, earn almost 5 percent less. Applying a treatment regression approach
to account for endogenous mobility decisions, we still ﬁnd no wage eﬀect for ﬁrm movers who
stay within the occupation, but a negative wage diﬀerential of approximately 9 percent for
occupation changers.
We conclude that within the occupational ﬁeld of an apprenticeship, the human capital
acquired is widely transferable to other ﬁrms after graduation. Transferability is more limited
for changes beyond the occupational ﬁeld: apprenticeship graduates that undertake such
changes earn lower wages, with the magnitude of the wage cut depending on the distance
between occupations. Adverse selection and the match quality with the training ﬁrm and the
training occupation hardly aﬀect these ﬁndings: while the match quality matters for mobility
decisions in our estimations, it does not aﬀect post-mobility wages. Conversely, we ﬁnd that
several ability variables have an eﬀect on wages (in the usual direction); however, for the
mobility decision, only PISA-test scores show some adverse selection into occupation change.
While ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital does not seem to play a signiﬁcant role for Swiss ap-
prentices’ early labor market wages, on average, occupation-speciﬁc human capital is an
important component of apprenticeship training and accounts for a portion of the return to
training.
Overall, Swiss apprenticeship curricula and quality assurances as deﬁned by legal regu-
lations seem to be successful in producing transferable skills and knowledge such that ap-
prenticeships are not restricted to a very narrow set of skills. There is no evidence that
training ﬁrms distort the regulated training content towards ﬁrm-speciﬁc components in an
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eﬀort to reduce across-ﬁrm mobility of workers. High across-ﬁrm transferability of acquired
skills is also in line with the ﬁndings of cost-beneﬁt studies for Switzerland, which show that
Swiss apprentices bear the full costs of training on average. Still, the provision of widely
transferable human capital should be stressed in ongoing curricula reforms. Our ﬁndings on
the importance of occupation-speciﬁc human capital highlight the need for continuing voca-
tional training to continuously update or retrain skilled workers according to changing labor
market needs. Otherwise, apprenticeships might reduce long-term ﬂexibility compared to a
general education system that does not require a choice of an occupation at the age of 16. At
the same time, we may also interpret the importance of occupation-speciﬁc human capital
as necessary condition for gains that accrue from specialization, both at the individual level
and for the economy as a whole. Relatively high rates of (lifetime) returns to apprenticeships
(Weber et al., 2001), compared to individuals that do not follow any post-compulsory educa-
tion, support the view that the apprenticeship system is successful in supplying young adults
with the skills demanded by Swiss ﬁrms. More empirical studies are required to analyse the
relative long-term costs and beneﬁts of education systems that rely on vocational education
with early specialization.
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5.A Appendix
Table 5.A1: Variable deﬁnition
Variable Deﬁnition
Ln(hourly wage) in current job Natural logarithm of hourly gross wage in the current job (one year after graduation).
Mobility Two dummy variables. ’Firm mover’ equals 1 if individual does not work in the
training ﬁrm (but in the learned occupation) one year after graduation. ’Occupation
change’ equals 1 if individual works in occupation (and ﬁrm) diﬀerent from the
apprenticeship occupation (ﬁrm) one year after graduation. Reference category:
Firm stayer.
PISA test score for reading literacy Reading literacy test score from the PISA 2000 survey (OECD, 2002); standardized
with the international mean (500) and standard deviation (100) for the estimations.
Mathematics self-concept (PISA) Mathematics self-concept measures whether one thinks positively about one’s math-
ematics abilities. Measured in PISA 2000 survey, continuous scale (min: -1.62, max:
1.74). See OECD (2002) for details. Plus dummy for missing information. Ques-
tions: I get good marks in mathematics / Mathematics is one of my best subjects /
I have always done well in mathematics.
High GPA in apprenticeship training Dummy equals 1 when average grade in the ﬁnal apprenticeship examination is
above 5 (on a scale of 4=suﬃcient to 6=excellent); 0 otherwise. Plus dummy for
missing information.
Self-eﬃcacy in work tasks Self-eﬃcacy in work tasks reported by individuals in second last year of appren-
ticeship training. Scale 1 (min) to 4 (max). Plus dummy for missing information.
Questions: I can always manage to solve diﬃcult problems if I try hard enough / I
am conﬁdent that I could deal eﬃciently with unexpected events / Thanks to my
resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations / I can usually handle
whatever comes my way (1=not at all true; 4=exactly true).
Extrinsic motivation Extrinsic motivation reported by individuals in second last year of apprenticeship
training, scale 1 (min) to 4 (max). Plus dummy for missing information. Questions:
To earn a lot of money, a good wage / To have a secure job position / To have a
position with career opportunities / To have a job which is recognized and respected
by others (1=totally subordinate; 4=very important).
Vocational baccalaureate Dummy equals 1 if apprentice obtained a vocational baccalaureate (additional
schooling) while serving his apprenticeship; 0 otherwise.
High track lower-secondary school Dummy equals 1 if apprentice attended a lower-secondary school track with extended
requirements (i.e., before starting apprenticeship); 0 otherwise.
Likes tasks of training occupation Variable indicating how much the apprentice likes to perform the pertinent tasks
of the apprenticeship occupation. Reported during training, ranging from 1 (don’t
like them at all) to 4 (like them very much).
Wants to work in training ﬁrm Dummy indicating whether the apprentice wants to work in his/her training ﬁrm
after graduation. Reported in second last year of apprenticeship training, 1 equals
yes (exactly true [4] or moderately true [3])
Perceived perspectives in learned occ. Apprentices’ agreement to the statement that he/she will be able to make a living
working in the occupation which he/she is trained in. Reported during training,
ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 4 (exactly true).
Perceived quality of supervisor Apprentices’ rating of the pedagogical and professional competences of his/her su-
pervisor in the training ﬁrm; index based on eight questions, reported during train-
ing, from 1 (not true at all) to 4 (totally true). Questions: I am very pleased with my
vocational instructor / My vocational instructor explains my tasks well / Usually
my vocational instructor tells me if I did a good job or not / If I ask a question, my
vocational instructor takes time to explain / My vocational instructor praises me
for the things I do well / I have a good relationship with my vocational instructor
/ My vocational instructor knows his/her area of expertise very well.
Female Equals 1 if female; 0 if male.
Nationality Dummies representing 3 categories: ’Swiss’ (trainee born in Switzerland with at
least one parent born in Switzerland), ’second-generation immigrant’ (trainee born
in Switzerland but parents born outside Switzerland), ’ﬁrst-generation immigrant’
(trainee and parents foreign-born).
Language region Dummies representing Swiss language regions (German, French, Italian).
Parental education Dummies representing 3 categories of highest parental education: compulsory
school, upper-secondary education, tertiary education. Plus dummy for missing
information.
Size of training ﬁrm Dummies for 3 ﬁrm size categories (ﬁrm = establishment).
Size of current ﬁrm Dummies for 3 ﬁrm size categories (ﬁrm = establishment) and a dummy for missing
information.
Unemployment rate The mean unemployment rate in the corresponding language region in the industry
the apprentice was trained in. Source: Swiss Labour Force Survey, pooled annual
data for 1996 to 2006.
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Tenure in month at the current job Tenure in month at the current job, measured from job start (after graduation) until
the (individual) interview date
Time between graduation and job Number of month between apprenticeship graduation and job start, ranging from 0
to 12. Intervening spells are observed for 48% of the sample (25% of stayers, 60%
of ﬁrm movers, 78% of occupational changers).
Any unemployment spell Dummy equals 1 if the apprentice had any unemployment spell between graduation
and current job
Any military service spell Dummy equals 1 if the apprentice had any spell of serving military service between
graduation and current job
Any travelling / at home spell Dummy equals 1 if the apprentice had any spell of travelling or staying (longer) at
home between graduation and current job
Any educational activity spell Dummy equals 1 if the apprentice had any spell with educational activity (mostly
language studies abroad) between graduation and current job
Any other job spell Dummy equals 1 if the apprentice had any (short) job between graduation and
current job
Any other spell (with missing info) Dummy equals 1 if the apprentice had any spell with missing information on the
activity between graduation and current job
Training occupation and duration Dummies representing apprenticeship tracks and their duration. Training occupa-
tions are coded according to the nomenclature of occupations (Schweizerische Beruf-
snomenklatur SBN) at the 1-digit level and split according to the oﬃcial duration
of the corresponding apprenticeship track (2, 3 or 4 years).
High regional quit rate Dummy indicating that the share of apprentices who leave their training ﬁrm af-
ter graduation is above average in this region and industry. Source: Cost-Beneﬁt
surveys, pooled data from 2000 and 2004.
Regional rate of occupation change Regionala), occupation-speciﬁc share of workers up to age 25 that do not work in
their learned occupation according to the Swiss population census 2000
Regional employment growth The change in regionala) employment level in the corresponding industry (13 sec-
tions) between 2001 and 2005, i.e., between the time the apprentices started their
training and the time they completed their training. Source: Swiss Firm Census.
a) Deﬁnition of regions: individual regions encompass all municipalities that can
be reached within 20 minutes by car from the apprentice’s residential municipality.
The computation is based on a distance matrix provided by the Federal Statistical
Oﬃce (FSO).
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Table 5.A2: Descriptive statistics (mean or %; std. dev.)
Overall Stayer Mover Occ.change
Total 878 484 331 63
Total percent 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Hourly wage in current job (CHF) 23.01 23.31 22.86 21.74
(3.17) (3.04) (3.10) (4.07)
PISA test score for reading literacy 505.58 505.69 509.62 481.30
(here: unstandardized) (75.39) (77.88) (70.08) (83.58)
Mathematics self-concept (PISA) 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.12
(0.85) (0.86) (0.84) (0.87)
High GPA in apprenticeship training 21.87 20.76 23.98 17.47
Self-eﬃcacy in work tasks 3.04 3.06 3.02 3.03
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.40)
Extrinsic motivation 3.31 3.35 3.29 3.22
(0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46)
Vocational baccalaureate 23.01 28.35 17.71 15.87
High track lower-secondary school 63.90 66.74 61.04 60.32
Likes tasks of training occupation 3.43 3.49 3.41 3.11
(0.64) (0.59) (0.65) (0.82)
Wants to work in training ﬁrm 0.64 0.80 0.47 0.48
Does not want to work in training ﬁrm 0.36 0.20 0.53 0.52
Perceived perspectives in learned 3.16 3.18 3.19 2.83
occupation (0.89) (0.79) (0.78) (0.87)
Perceived quality of supervisor 3.28 3.34 3.24 3.10
(0.50) (0.47) (0.51) (0.57)
Female 58.54 55.36 63.49 52.38
Swiss 85.65 84.82 87.19 82.54
Immigrant: second-generation 6.26 5.58 6.54 9.52
Immigrant: ﬁrst-generation 8.09 9.60 6.27 7.94
German-speaking part of Switzerland 69.13 72.77 65.94 61.90
French-speaking part of Switzerland 23.58 20.31 27.52 23.81
Italian-speaking part of Switzerland 7.29 6.92 6.54 14.29
Parental education: compulsory schooling 30.98 30.58 30.79 34.92
Parental education: upper-sec. education 39.29 39.06 38.15 47.62
Parental education: tertiary education 26.42 27.23 27.25 15.87
Parental education: no information 3.30 3.13 3.81 1.59
Regional unemployment rate per industry 3.49 3.04 3.54 3.82
(1.46) (1.38) (1.44) (1.97)
Tenure in month at the current job 6.95 8.02 5.83 5.82
(3.61) (3.31) (3.47) (4.18)
Time between graduation and job 2.17 0.92 3.36 4.19
(3.04) (2.12) (3.24) (3.52)
Training occupation (duration in years):
Agriculture and forestry (3) 4.90 2.68 6.27 12.70
Production, manufacturing (3) 7.06 5.58 7.90 12.70
Production, manufacturing (4) 5.81 5.58 6.27 4.76
Technicians, IT (4) 9.34 12.28 7.08 1.59
Construction (3) 4.44 5.80 2.72 4.76
Construction (4) 3.19 4.24 1.91 3.17
Retail and wholesale, transport (2) 6.15 7.59 4.63 4.76
Retail and wholesale, transport (3) 6.95 8.93 4.63 6.35
Catering and restaurant (2) 1.25 0.67 1.91 1.59
Catering and restaurant (3) 8.31 4.24 12.81 11.11
Oﬃce worker (2) 1.14 1.34 0.54 3.17
Commercial employee (3) 33.37 34.60 32.43 30.16
Health and welfare (3, 4) 8.09 6.47 10.90 3.17
Size of training ﬁrm: 1-10 40.66 33.93 49.05 39.68
Size of training ﬁrm: 11-100 43.39 46.65 38.96 46.03
Size of training ﬁrm: 100+ 15.95 19.42 11.99 14.29
Size of current ﬁrm: 1-10 38.72 33.04 46.32 34.92
Size of current ﬁrm: 11-100 40.32 43.30 37.33 36.51
Size of current ﬁrm: 100+ 18.11 23.21 11.44 20.63
Size of current ﬁrm: Missing 2.85 0.45 4.90 7.94
Any unemployment spell 14.46 2.68 25.34 34.92
Any military service spell 3.99 2.46 4.90 9.52
Any travelling / at home spell 9.45 5.36 13.90 12.70
Any educational activity spell 7.97 3.35 11.99 17.46
Any other job spell 20.39 7.81 33.51 33.33
Any other spell (with missing information) 7.40 8.48 6.27 6.35
High regional quit rate 53.19 43.30 65.94 49.21
Regional rate of occupation change 21.96 22.17 21.56 22.79
(5.83) (5.57) (5.99) (6.58)
Regional employment growth in industry −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
5.A. APPENDIX 155
Table 5.A3: Wage estimations: OLS, Deb-Trivedi (DT); ﬁrst stage: DT mixed mlogit
ln(wage) ln(wage) MMLOGIT coeﬃcients
OLS 2 DT model (base category=stayer)
Firm Mover Occ.change
Firm mover 0.001 0.001
(0.011) (0.021)
Occupational change −0.045∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.022)
PISA test score reading literacy 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.015 −0.624∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.166) (0.276)
High GPA in apprent. Training 0.006 0.005 0.343 −0.076
(0.011) (0.011) (0.285) (0.542)
Mathematics self-concept 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.059 0.186
(0.005) (0.005) (0.140) (0.256)
Self-eﬃcacy in work tasks 0.025∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.061 0.566
(0.010) (0.010) (0.265) (0.470)
Extrinsic motivation 0.019∗∗ 0.018∗∗ −0.364 −1.068∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.256) (0.426)
Professional baccalaureate −0.018 −0.018 −0.668∗∗ −0.975∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.294) (0.568)
High track in lower-sec. school 0.015 0.017 −0.425 0.769
(0.011) (0.011) (0.292) (0.511)
Likes tasks of training occupation −0.006 −0.007 0.176 −0.284
(0.008) (0.008) (0.207) (0.339)
Wants to work in training ﬁrm 0.005 0.005 −1.687∗∗∗ −0.967∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.258) (0.439)
percieved perspectives in training occupation 0.001 −0.001 0.032 −0.675∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.153) (0.269)
perceived quality of supervisor 0.010 0.008 −0.226 −1.200∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.239) (0.386)
Female −0.033∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.054
(0.012) (0.011) (0.312) (0.544)
Immigrant: second-generation 0.027 0.026 0.286 −0.263
(0.018) (0.017) (0.474) (0.764)
Immigrant: ﬁrst-generation −0.008 −0.010 −0.708 −0.909
(0.016) (0.016) (0.443) (0.784)
French-speaking part of CH 0.029∗ 0.029∗ −0.218 0.213
(0.017) (0.016) (0.461) (0.817)
Italian-speaking part of CH −0.084∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.245 1.718∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.556) (0.923)
Parental educ.: upper-secondary −0.005 −0.004 −0.046 0.328
(0.010) (0.010) (0.272) (0.459)
Parental educ.: tertiary −0.005 −0.008 0.031 −1.133∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.304) (0.588)
Size of training ﬁrm: 11-100 0.010 0.011 −0.637∗∗ −0.211
(0.010) (0.010) (0.261) (0.454)
Size of training ﬁrm: 100+ 0.013 0.014 −0.679∗ −0.215
(0.014) (0.014) (0.385) (0.641)
Size of current ﬁrm: 11-100 0.020∗ 0.021∗∗ −0.362 0.133
(0.010) (0.010) (0.266) (0.494)
Size of current: 100+ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ −1.021∗∗∗ −0.023
(0.014) (0.014) (0.374) (0.599)
Unemployment rate −0.008∗ −0.007 0.009 0.209
(0.005) (0.004) (0.122) (0.183)
Training occupation (duration):
Agriculture and Forestry (3) −0.119∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.119 1.378
(0.024) (0.023) (0.655) (0.941)
Production, Manufacturing (3) −0.018 −0.016 −0.190 0.303
(0.019) (0.019) (0.507) (0.817)
Production, Manufacturing (4) −0.011 −0.011 −0.208 −1.350
(0.021) (0.021) (0.589) (1.041)
Technicians, IT (4) 0.010 0.004 −0.903∗ −3.973∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.519) (1.374)
Construction (3) 0.029 0.029 −1.100 −0.561
(0.024) (0.023) (0.688) (1.025)
Construction (4) 0.012 0.009 −1.379∗ −2.087∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.753) (1.169)
Retail and wholesale, transport (2) −0.139∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −1.355∗∗ −1.476
(0.020) (0.020) (0.558) (0.990)
Retail and wholesale, transport (3) −0.034∗ −0.033∗ −1.627∗∗∗ −1.036
— continued on next page ... —
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ln(wage) ln(wage) MMLOGIT coeﬃcients
OLS 2 DT model (base category=stayer)
Firm Mover Occ.change
(0.019) (0.018) (0.510) (0.901)
Catering and restaurant (2) −0.077∗ −0.077∗∗ −0.930 −0.985
(0.040) (0.039) (1.064) (1.802)
Catering and restaurant (3) −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ 0.364 0.585
(0.020) (0.019) (0.552) (0.917)
Oﬃce worker (2) −0.068∗ −0.058 −2.337∗ 1.819
(0.041) (0.040) (1.267) (1.324)
Health and welfare (3,4) −0.014 −0.013 −0.100 0.287
(0.019) (0.018) (0.491) (1.025)
Tenure in month at current job 0.002∗ 0.002 −0.072∗ −0.040
(0.001) (0.001) (0.041) (0.061)
Time between training & job (month) 0.003 0.003 0.088 0.206∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.082) (0.116)
Spells between graduation & job:
Any unemployment spell −0.020 −0.017 2.400∗∗∗ 2.453∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.468) (0.623)
Any military service spell −0.017 −0.013 0.515 1.717∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.671) (0.975)
Any travelling / at home spell 0.004 0.004 1.603∗∗∗ 1.514∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.442) (0.661)
Any educational activity spell −0.001 −0.000 −0.033 0.580
(0.019) (0.019) (0.551) (0.768)
Any job spell 0.010 0.008 1.211∗∗∗ 0.713
(0.016) (0.016) (0.440) (0.634)
Any other spell (with missing info) −0.009 −0.009 −0.150 −0.246
(0.017) (0.017) (0.424) (0.847)
High regional quit rate 0.943∗∗∗ 0.118
(0.251) (0.430)
Regional rate of occupation change 3.276 8.603∗∗
(2.794) (4.289)
Regional employment growth −3.117∗ −6.241∗∗
(1.618) (3.074)
Lambda / Mills ’Firm mover’ −0.002
(0.023)
Lambda / Mills ’Occupation change’ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.016)
Constant 2.986∗∗∗ 3.001∗∗∗ 2.060 2.632
(0.056) (0.055) (1.632) (2.547)
N 878 878 878
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Reference group: ﬁrm stayer; no professional baccalaureate; lower track in lower-secondary school;
male; Swiss; German speaking part of Switzerland; highest parental education: compulsory school;
ﬁrm size: 1-10 fulltime-equivalents; training occupation: commercial employee (3);
no intervening spell between graduation and current job.
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